In re Stephanie B.

• Decision Date: 30 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2002-491-M.P., No. 2002-492-M.P., No. 2002-490-MY.
• Citation: 826 A.2d 985
• Parties: In re STEPHANIE B. In re AMANDA A. In re THOMAS J.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

826 A.2d 985

In re STEPHANIE B.

In re AMANDA A.

In re THOMAS J.

Nos. 2002-490-MY., 2002-491-M.P., 2002-492-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 30, 2003.

Charles Blackman, Esq., Thomas Corrigan, Esq., and Joseph Victor Smith, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.

Joyce Ioanes, Esq., Richard J. Welch, Esq., Martha Diamond, Esq., and Jonathan Fitta, Esq., Jamestown, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., and FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice.

These companion cases came before the Supreme Court on May 7, 2003, pursuant to three petitions for writ of certiorari by the petitioner, Butler Hospital (Butler or petitioner), a private mental health care facility, seeking review of several orders issued by the Family Court that enjoined Butler from discharging two minor children in the temporary custody of the respondent, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) and, with respect to the third child in DCYF custody, an order that directed petitioner to appear and show cause why it refused to admit that child into the hospital. The petitioner argues that the Family Court exceeded its statutorily prescribed jurisdiction by issuing injunctions against Butler, a non-party to these cases, and did so without proper notice or an opportunity to be heard, in violation of Butler's due process rights. This Court issued the writ and consolidated the cases for briefing and argument based on the parallel issues presented.

Over a two-week span during the summer of 2002, in separate proceedings, the Family Court issued three injunctions against Butler in the absence of personal jurisdiction and without affording petitioner notice and an opportunity to appear and defend. The subjects of these injunctions were three juveniles in temporary custody of DCYF, Stephanie B., Amanda A., and Thomas J. (hereinafter Stephanie, Amanda and Thomas, respectively). Although the procedural history of each case varies to a degree, all three youths needed continued mental health care, and in each case, Butler became the designated treatment facility by order of the Family Court. Butler was not a party to any contractual relationship with DCYF or any other state agency, nor was Butler a party to these proceedings. Before addressing the merits of the appeal, the circumstances surrounding the care and treatment of each juvenile warrant a brief overview.

Facts and Travel

Stephanie was civilly certified,¹ pursuant to the state's Mental Health Law, G.L.1956 § 40.1-5-8(a), to Bradley Hospital (Bradley), a private juvenile psychiatric facility, and had been in residential treatment at Bradley for four months when, after she attained the age of eighteen, Bradley sought to transfer her to adult placement at Butler, a facility that admits both adult patients and a limited number of minors. On July 24, 2002, a status hearing was held to review Stephanie's treatment plan, and a justice of the Family Court ordered Bradley to "contact Butler Hospital to apprise it of Bradley Hospital's plan to transfer * * * [Stephanie] to adult placement under the [M]ental [H]ealth [L]aw, and of its desire to transfer * * * [Stephanie] to Butler Hospital[.]" Furthermore, the order required that, if no agreement was reached concerning Stephanie's transfer, "Butler Hospital and/or its agents will be subpoenaed for the July 31, 2002 hearing and Butler Hospital will be expected to show cause why they are unable to assist Bradley Hospital with its plan." The petitioner was notified of the hearing justice's order after it was issued. On July 30, 2002, Butler sought to vacate the order on the ground that it placed an affirmative obligation on a disinterested, non-party without service of process or an opportunity to be heard and contravened the Family Court's jurisdictional authority. At a chambers conference on August 7, 2002, at which Butler was present, Stephanie's treating physician informed the court that Butler would not be suitable as a longterm placement for Stephanie. The Family Court justice thereupon excused Butler from further participation in the proceeding. Although effectively moot, the show cause order was not vacated, however, Stephanie was not admitted to Butler.

Amanda was placed in DCYF's temporary custody pursuant to a wayward petition and was hospitalized at Butler when, on August 7, 2002, a justice of the Family Court entered an order declaring that "[r]esp[ondent] at Butler—not to be disch[arged] w/o court order until DAS [Diagnostic Assessment Service evaluation on August 16th]." This "order," although lacking in formality and merely handwritten on the back of a wayward/delinquent event hearing sheet and signed by the hearing justice, was considered by Butler to be a binding order when it was received the next day. Butler complied with the order until Amanda was discharged into DCYF custody later that month.

The circumstances under which Thomas was the subject of a mandatory injunction are more troublesome. Under DCYF's custody by way of a wayward petition, Thomas was admitted to Butler as an inpatient after a criminal incident. On August 9, 2002, a status conference, off the record, was held with DCYF and other representatives on Thomas's behalf and an order was issued mandating that Thomas "remain on an inpatient basis at Butler Hospital pending further [o]rder of this [c]ourt." As was the case for the orders relative to Stephanie and Amanda, Butler was not a party to the proceeding, which culminated in this non-discharge order. Butler contends, and the sparse record establishes, that no medical doctor was consulted before the court mandated continued hospitalization of Thomas "pending further [o]rder of this [c]ourt." Clearly concerned for the well-being of an emotionally unstable child were he discharged without an alternative residential facility, the Family Court, pursuant to seven additional orders over the course of the next several months, continued its original injunction until October 28, 2002, when Thomas was discharged. Although DCYF was ordered to coordinate with the proper treating representatives at Butler "in an effort to locate and provide an appropriate placement" for Thomas, who no longer needed inpatient care, he remained hospitalized in a mental health facility until a bed at a residential center became available.

Although compliant with the non-discharge order, Butler was not idle. On September 6, 2002, Butler filed an emergency motion to vacate, or alternatively to stay the order(s), accompanied by a memorandum and two medical affidavits stating that Thomas was medically stable, ready to be discharged, and likely to be harmed if hospitalized for a prolonged period. In response, on September 10, 2002, again at a chambers conference, the court informed DCYF that it would permit Butler to discharge Thomas on September 12, 2002. However, this order was subsequently revoked when Thomas's condition rapidly deteriorated after he was notified that he would be discharged to a homeless shelter. Once it became apparent that Thomas had relapsed when informed about his impending move to a homeless shelter and needed continued care and treatment, Butler agreed that Thomas's hospitalization should continue. However, when Thomas again reached the point of discharge and no longer needed inpatient care, Butler was enjoined from discharging him because DCYF had no alternative residential placement.

Mootness

Before this Court, the petitioner acknowledges that the three companion cases are moot, but urges this Court to decide this case on the ground that circumstances giving rise to these petitions are capable of repetition and are likely to evade review. In re George G., 676 A.2d 764, 765 (R.I.1996) (per curiam). We agree. This Court previously has concluded that "`our whole idea of judicial power' is entailed within the concept of courts applying laws to cases and controversies within their jurisdiction." Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 752 (R.I.1997) (quoting G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 337 (1856)). Although judicial consideration of moot, abstract, academic, or hypothetical questions generally is beyond a court's judicial power, this rule is not absolute. Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 139 (R.I.1980). An exception lies when the issue or question presented, while technically moot or deficient in some other respect, involves issues "of extreme public importance, which are capable of repetition but which evade review." Id. In this case, it is clear that juveniles in DCYF custody will continue to need mental health care and hospitalization in the future, and that resources and beds at treatment facilities and residential placements will continue to be sparse. Clearly, as in the case of Stephanie, Amanda and Thomas, if petitioner is again enjoined from discharging a juvenile patient from its facility, it is virtually certain that the child will be released before this Court has an opportunity to review the case. Butler has informed this Court that, although no ex parte restraining orders have been issued since Thomas's hospitalization, similar situations have presented themselves in the past and are likely to occur again. We accept this representation. A justiciable controversy is well illustrated by the circumstances presented herein and an exception to the mootness doctrine on the ground that this controversy is capable of repetition while evading review is warranted. Additionally, because the issues before us pertain to important questions of jurisdictional constraint and constitutional due process, they deserve our attention and will be addressed in this opinion.

Issues

Butler argues that the orders issued by the Family Court exceeded the court's statutorily based jurisdiction and, even if the court was vested with jurisdiction, it had no authority to issue injunctions to a non-party over whom it had no personal jurisdiction. Butler contends that its due process rights, as protected by...