In re Stepp's Estate, 14144.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1937
• Docket Number: 14144.
• Citation: 101 Colo. 506,75 P.2d 146
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Parties: In re STEPP'S ESTATE. v. STEPP. STEPP

75 P.2d 146

101 Colo. 506

In re STEPP'S ESTATE.

STEPP v. STEPP.

No. 14144.

Supreme Court of Colorado

December 20, 1937

In Department.

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Charles C Sackmann, Judge.

Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Missouri A. E. Stepp deceased, wherein William G. Stepp filed a claim for services rendered deceased as housekeeper and attendant. To review a judgment for the claimant, Andrew J. Stepp, executor, brings error.

Affirmed.

Bartels, Blood & Bancroft and Arthur H. Laws, all of Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Joseph H. Ross and Frank L. Hays, both of Denver, for defendant in error.

BAKKE Justice.

Suit on a claim by William G. Stepp against the estate of his mother Missouri A. E. Stepp, for services as 'nurse, attendant, and housekeeper,' from February 6, 1919, to April 3, 1935, at $15 a month, or a total amount of $2,880. Judgment in the county court was for the claimant in the full amount. Upon appeal to the district court, the judgment was reduced to $1,664, the district court finding that the claimant was not entitled to any compensation for services as nurse or housekeeper. To this latter judgment against the estate, plaintiff in error, the executor, another son, assigns error and asks that the judgment be reversed and the claim dismissed.

By her will, the said Missouri A. E. Stepp provided that her estate should go to her twelve living children, share and share alike, the estate being worth approximately $6,500.

Prior to 1918, the deceased was living on a farm in Jefferson county with her son, William G. Stepp, under an arrangement, whereby William furnished most of the machinery and equipment and did the farm work in return for his support and a share of the crop. About that time, Mrs. Stepp, realizing that she was advancing in years and wishing to take life easier, sold the farm to Mr. and Mrs. George Harkness, and moved to Denver, where she resided until her death in 1934, her son William, the claimant, being with her during all of said time, helping her with the housework and doing odd chores about the house, such as bringing in wood, taking care of the lawn, and serving generally as helper and companion.

Claimant was the only one of the children not married. There was no written agreement between him and his mother, but in support of his claim he relies on several conversations heard by certain of the witnesses, particularly the Harknesses, his brother, Charles Stepp, and several of the neighbors.

Charles Stepp testified that in 1924, in the presence of his wife and William, his mother stated, 'That some of her children had objected to Bill staying there, but she wanted to retain him because it gave her a chance to maintain a home; and that all he got was his board and room * * * and he should have something for his time, and that after she was gone if they made any trouble over a settlement, that he could put in a claim for wages and get it out of the estate.' Witness further stated that, between 1924 and the time of his mother's death, she had made the same statement half a dozen times or more.

Both Mr. and Mrs. Harkness testified that while negotiations were pending for the purchase by them of the Jefferson county farm, that Mrs. Stepp told them she wanted Will to come to Denver and make his home with her and help her, and that if he would do so that she would 'make it right with Will if he came to town and not go to his own farm.' Several of her neighbors testified to the same effect.

This entire matter hinges on whether the claimant's witnesses are incompetent under certain provisions of section 2, chapter 177, volume 4, '35 C.S.A., section 6556, C.L.1921, reading in part as follows:

'No party to any civil action, suit or proceeding, or person directly interested in the event thereof, shall be allowed to testify therein, of his own motion, or in his own behalf, by virtue of the foregoing section, when any adverse party sues or defends as the trustee or conservator of an idiot, lunatic or distracted person, or as the executor or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian or trustee of any such heir, legatee or devisee; unless when called as a witness by such adverse party so suing or defending, and also, except in the following cases, namely: * * * Sixth--In any such action, suit or proceeding, any adverse party or parties in interest may testify as to any conversation or admission, or as to all matters and things connected with the subject matter of said action, suit or proceeding, and which conversation and

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