In re Steven M.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16732)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: IN RE STEVEN M.

264 Conn. 747

826 A.2d 156

IN RE STEVEN M.¹

(SC 16732)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 14, 2003.

Officially released July 22, 2003.

Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js. Michael Besso, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman and Susan Quinn Cobb, assistant attorneys general, for the appellant (petitioner).

Sandra A. Trionfini, guardian ad litem, for the appellee (respondent).

Robert J. Meredith, deputy assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, was D. Keith Foren, for the appellee (respondent).

Martha Stone filed a brief for the Center for Children's Advocacy, Inc., et al. as amici curiae.

Opinion

SULLIVAN, C.J.

This certified appeal involves the proper scope of inquiry at a hearing to transfer a juvenile in the custody of the department of children and families (department) to the custody of the department of correction pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-12 (a).² The petitioner, the commissioner of children and families, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court vacating the order of the trial court granting the petitioner's motion to transfer the respondent juvenile, Steven M. (juvenile), pursuant to § 17a-12 (a). In re Steven M., 68 Conn. App. 427, 434-35, 789 A.2d 1169 (2002). The following questions were certified for appeal: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that: (1) the appeal was not moot because it met the test of `capable of repetition, yet evading review'; (2) under ... § 17a-12 (a), the [trial] court must determine that the requested transfer is in the juvenile's best interest; and (3) the [trial] court was required to determine the juvenile's competency before transferring him from Long Lane School [school] to John R. Manson Youth Institution [institution]?" In re Steven M., 260 Conn. 916, 917, 797 A.2d 515 (2002).

We conclude that the Appellate Court properly determined that the appeal was not moot. We further conclude that, although the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court must consider the best interest of the juvenile, that court improperly concluded that in order to transfer the juvenile, the transfer must be in the juvenile's best interest. Finally, we conclude that the Appellate Court properly determined that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was required to hold a hearing to evaluate the juvenile's competence. We further conclude, however, that the trial court's failure to hold such a hearing in the present case was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. The juvenile, who was born in 1983, was committed to the custody of the department in 1991 on the basis of a finding of parental neglect. In re Steven M., supra, 68 Conn. App. 429. The juvenile has been diagnosed with dysthymia, conduct disorder, mild mental retardation and borderline personality disorder.³ Id., 433. In 1998, the juvenile was placed at Riverview Hospital, a mental health facility for children that is under the jurisdiction of the department. Id., 429 and n. 3. While at Riverview Hospital, the juvenile engaged in aggressive behavior, which included assaults on both other juveniles at the hospital and hospital staff members.⁴ On April 7, 1999, the juvenile was charged with, among other things, two counts of disorderly conduct on the basis of this aggressive behavior. Id., 429.

On April 14, 1999, a competency evaluation was ordered; id.; and on May 5, 1999, an evaluator from the juvenile public defender's office concluded that the juvenile was incompetent, but restorable. The juvenile remained at Riverview Hospital and, in November, 1999, Riverview Hospital reported to the Juvenile Court that the juvenile was competent.⁵ On December 23, 1999, an independent evaluation from the juvenile public defender's office stated that the juvenile was competent. It is unclear from the record whether the Juvenile Court ever found the juvenile competent. The parties, however, agreed on December 23, 1999, that the juvenile was competent.

On January 12, 2000, the juvenile pleaded guilty to two counts of disorderly conduct. At the plea hearing, the juvenile's attorney represented to the court that the juvenile was competent. The court adjudicated the juvenile as a delinquent and committed him to the custody of the department for eighteen months, placing him at the school, a facility under the jurisdiction of the department. While at the school, the juvenile continued to engage in aggressive behavior. In March, 2000, the juvenile was arrested and charged as an adult⁶ as a result of this aggressive behavior. He subsequently was transferred to an adult correctional facility to await trial.

On March 17, 2000, representatives of the department, the department of correction, the department of mental retardation, and the department of mental health and addiction services met to review the juvenile's case and to develop a long-term plan to manage him. At that meeting, the department was made aware that the juvenile was scheduled to appear in adult criminal court on March 20, 2000, where he was likely to be found incompetent, but restorable. The department anticipated that if the juvenile was found to be incompetent, he would be released from the adult system and that the department would then resume responsibility for his custody in order to render him competent to stand trial. In anticipation of this series of events, on March 22, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion, pursuant to § 17a-12 (a), to transfer the juvenile to the institution, alleging that the juvenile was a danger to himself and to others and could not be safely maintained by the department. On April 3, 2000, a transfer hearing was held. Id. At the outset of the hearing, the juvenile assistant public defender requested that the court appoint a guardian ad litem because he had been unable to ascertain the juvenile's position regarding the transfer; id.; stating that he had "met with [the juvenile] ... and during the course of that conversation ... [the juvenile] represented that he wanted to do two different things. One was [to] go to [the school]. One was to go to [the institution]." The court noted that it had been made aware of a report stating that the juvenile would be found incompetent but restorable in the adult criminal system, and it appointed a guardian ad litem.⁷

At the transfer hearing, the petitioner claimed that the juvenile was a danger to himself and to others and that the department was incapable of safely maintaining him. The juvenile did not dispute these allegations. Rather, he claimed that it was not in his best interest to be transferred to the institution and that, if the department would put "appropriate behavior modification plans and the appropriate staff" into place, the department would be able to maintain him safely. The juvenile sought to present evidence, in the form of expert testimony, that, although he did present a danger to others, if he were provided with appropriate services he could be maintained safely by the department. The court declined to take evidence on the issue of what "appropriate services" the department might put into place. The court concluded that it was obligated under the statute to balance the danger posed by the juvenile against the juvenile's best interest.⁸ The court concluded that it had been clearly demonstrated that the juvenile was a danger to himself and to others. Accordingly, the court granted the petitioner's motion to transfer the juvenile to the institution effective upon the juvenile's discharge from the adult criminal system.

The juvenile appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that he was denied due process of law. Id., 428. The Appellate Court vacated the order of the trial court; id., 429, 435; concluding that the juvenile was denied due process of law because the trial court improperly had failed (1) to determine the juvenile's competency prior to ordering his transfer; id., 434; and (2) to determine whether the transfer was in the juvenile's best interest, after considering alternatives to transfer to the institution. Id., 435. This appeal followed.

I

The petitioner first claims that, because the juvenile has reached the age of eighteen and is no longer in the custody of the department, his appeal is moot and that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that it is subject to the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. We disagree.

The Appellate Court concluded, and the parties do not dispute, that the present case has become moot. Id., 430. "When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot.... It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow....

"We note that an otherwise moot question may qualify for review under the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception. To do so, however, it must meet three requirements. First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom...