In re Strang's Will
| Decision Date | 01 February 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 96.,96. |
| Citation | 158 A. 489 |
| Parties | In re STRANG'S WILL. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Appeal from Prerogative Court.
Proceedings by Lydia Kaysel and husband for the probate of the last will and testament of John Strang, deceased, opposed by Caroline Strang Reid. From a decree of the Prerogative Court dismissing the appeal from the decree of the Orphans' Court affirming the order of the surrogate of the county, admitting to probate a paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament of John Strang, deceased, Caroline Strang Reid appeals.
Affirmed.
G. M. Belfatto, of Newark, for appellant.
Forlenza & Harrington, of Newark, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a decree of the New Jersey Prerogative Court dismissing the appeal from the decree of the orphans' court of the county of Essex, affirming the order of the surrogate of the county, admitting to probate a paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament of John Strang, deceased.
Strang, a farmer 87 years of age, died on February 12, 1930. He left him surviving two elderly sisters, the appellant, Caroline Strang Reid, and Sarah Strang Skinner, the latter of whom died about five months after the death of the testator, leaving four children.
Under the will, which was executed November 24, 1919, the sister Caroline was bequeathed $100, the sister Sarah $300, and the residue of the estate was given and devised to Lydia Kaysel and Edward J. Kaysel, her husband, neither of whom were related to John Strang, and the Kaysels were appointed the executors of the will.
The surrogate, on February 14, 1930, admitted this will to probate and the sister, Caroline Strang Reid, appealed to the orphans' court of the county of Essex, from the order of the surrogate, admitting the will to probate, on three grounds: First, that John Strang was of unsound mind and incapable of disposing of his estate by will. Second, that Mr. and Mrs. Kaysel unduly influenced Strang to make the will. Third, that the will was illegally executed.
The orphans' court dismissed this appeal and affirmed the order of the surrogate. An appeal was taken from the decree of the orphans' court to the Prerogative Court on substantially the same grounds set forth in the appeal to the orphans' court, with the addition of another ground of appeal that the counsel fee allowed by the orphans' court to the proctors for the proponents of the will was excessive.
The appeal came up for hearing before the Honorable Alonzo Church, vice ordinary, who declined to hear any evidence and directed the proctors for the respective parties to file briefs, and in due course the vice ordinary filed an opinion, dismissing the appeal. It is from that part of the final decree admitting to probate the will of the said John Strang that Caroline Strang Reid now appeals to this court.
Our examination of the record fails to disclose any objection made by the appellant to the due and legal execution of the will of John Strang, nor is there any testimony whatever which would tend to show the state of mind of said John Strang at the time of the making of his will.
This court has held that "The point of time at which the testamentary capacity is tested is that of the execution of the will; the antecedent and subsequent condition of a testator being chiefly important as bearing upon that epoch, and of no importance where the evidence of capacity at such time is convincing." In re Buckman's Will, 80 N. J. Eq. 556, 85 A. 246.
The appellant bases her appeal mainly upon the ground that the mind of the said testator was unduly influenced by the proponents of the will.
There is set forth in the appeal, although it is not argued in appellant's brief, another ground for reversal, namely, that the vice ordinary refused to hear additional testimony and affirmed the orphans' court upon the record made there.
The only two questions properly before this court are the propriety of the vice ordinary in refusing to hear testimony and the question of whether or not the decree affirming the orphans' court...
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