In re Strength

• Decision Date: 05 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–P–1188.,11–P–1188.
• Citation: 978 N.E.2d 592,82 Mass.App.Ct. 1124
• Parties: Phillip B. STRENGTH'S CASE.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

82 Mass.App.Ct. 1124

978 N.E.2d 592

Phillip B. STRENGTH'S CASE.

No. 11–P–1188.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts.

December 5, 2012.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREBy the Court (CYPHER, GREEN & CARHART, JJ.).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

On appeal, the employee challenges the administrative judge's determination that his testimony lacked credibility and that he therefore failed to prove that he suffered a workplace injury. Inasmuch as his challenge is directed to the administrative judge's assessment of his credibility, the claim is without merit. “Findings of fact, assessments of credibility, and determinations of the weight to be given the evidence are the exclusive function of the administrative judge.” Pilon's Case, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 167, 169 (2007).¹

The employee cites no authority, and we are aware of none, to support his additional claim that the administrative judge erred by admitting medical records for impeachment purposes.² The employee's argument that the judge was obliged to accept the impartial physician's testimony regarding causation also fails as it rests on a factual premise explicitly rejected by the administrative judge. Because the administrative judge disbelieved the employee's claim that he suffered a workplace injury on May 19, 2008, she did not need to reach the issue of causation.

Finding no other reason to disturb the decision of the reviewing board, we affirm.

Decision of reviewing board affirmed.

1. We may reverse or modify the reviewing board's decision only when it is “[i]n violation of constitutional provisions,” “[i]n excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency,” “[b]ased on an error of law,” “[m]ade upon unlawful procedure,” “[u]nwarranted by facts found by the court on the record ... where the court is constitutionally required to make independent findings of fact,” or “[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7)( a )-( d ), ( f ), and ( g ). See Scheffler's Case, 419 Mass. 251, 257–258 (1994).

2. In any event, the claim appears to have been raised for the first time on appeal. See Collins's Case, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 557, 557 n. 1 (1986).