In re Sullivan, Case No. 15–30544–HJB
| Decision Date | 02 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15–30544–HJB |
| Citation | 550 B.R. 163 |
| Parties | In re: Jacqueline M. Sullivan, Debtor |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Massachusetts |
L. Jed Berliner, Berliner Law, Springfield, MA, for Debtor.
Before the Court is an “Objection to Exemptions”, filed by the Chapter 7 trustee, Gary M. Weiner (the “Trustee”). The Trustee challenges the homestead exemption claimed by the debtor, Jacqueline M. Sullivan (“the Debtor”), in a condominium unit located at 80 Regency Park Drive, Agawam, Massachusetts (the “Agawam Condo”). The Trustee asserts that the Debtor holds an interest in the property as a beneficiary of a constructive or resulting trust and, as such, is not entitled to the protections of the Massachusetts Homestead Statute. The Debtor denies that she holds an interest in the Agawam Condo, but takes the alternative position that, even if she held such an interest, it would be exempt.
The material facts necessary to decide this matter are not in dispute. Prior to the commencement of this bankruptcy case, and following her divorce in 2010, the Debtor wished to purchase the Agawam Condo, but was unable to obtain the necessary financing. The Debtor sought the financial assistance of her sister, Michelle Markowski (“Ms.Markowski”). Using her own home equity line of credit (the “Mortgage”), Ms. Markowski purchased the Agawam Condo in her own name for the sum of $68,000. The sisters orally agreed that: (i) the Debtor would pay $650.00 per month to Ms. Markowski (the “Monthly Payments”), plus electricity and insurance, which sum would be used to cover the real estate taxes, condominium fees and monthly mortgage payments; and (ii) once the Mortgage was fully repaid, Ms. Markowski would convey title to the Agawam Condo to the Debtor.
After the purchase, the Debtor moved into the Agawam Condo, and continues to live there. To implement their arrangement, Ms. Markowski established a bank account for the Agawam Condo expenses (the “Dedicated Account”). Originally, Ms. Markowski would deposit the Monthly Payments from the Debtor into the Dedicated Account and then pay taxes, fees and mortgage payments from the Dedicated Account. In 2013, the Debtor was added to the Dedicated Account as a joint signatory to accommodate Ms. Markowski's frequent travel and permit the Debtor to write checks from the Dedicated Account. No party has asserted that Ms. Markowski ever deposited her own funds into the Dedicated Account or paid any expense associated with the Agawam Condo other than from the Dedicated Account.
On June 12, 2015 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtor filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, together with her schedules of assets and liabilities. On Schedule B, the Debtor described her interest in the Agawam Condo as an “[u]nenforceable oral rent to own contract for condo at 80 Regency Park Drive, Agawam, MA; unenforceable per statute of frauds MGL c. 259 sec. 1 (zero value).” The original Schedule C likewise described the interest as an “[u]nenforceable oral rent to own contract for condo at 80 Regency Park Drive, Agawam, MA; unenforceable per statute of frauds MGL c. 259 sec. 1 (zero value)”, but nonetheless asserted a federal exemption of $11,475 in the Agawam Condo pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). On August 21, 2015, the Debtor filed an Amended Schedule C, now claiming the “automatic” homestead exemption of $125,000 under Massachusetts General Laws, ch. 188, § 4 (the “Massachusetts Homestead Statute”). The Trustee's Objection to Exemptions ensued. Following a non-evidentiary hearing, the parties filed supplemental briefs and a joint statement of stipulated facts. The Court then took the matter under advisement.
The Trustee maintains that, although the Debtor does not hold a legal interest in the Agawam Condo, she has an equitable interest in the property. He asks this Court to find and rule that (i) the agreement between the Debtor and Ms. Markowski gave rise to either a constructive or resulting trust, and (ii) the Debtor cannot claim an exemption in the Agawam Condo under the Massachusetts Homestead Statute because beneficiaries of constructive or resulting trusts are not included in the definition of an “owner” entitled to claim such an exemption under the statute. Accordingly, the Trustee contends, the Debtor's ownership interest in the Agawam Condo is property of the bankruptcy estate which the Trustee may administer.
The Debtor denies that she holds any interest in the Agawam Condo. And, were this Court to find otherwise, she argues that any interest she holds in the property has been properly exempted under the Massachusetts Homestead Statute.1
A bankruptcy estate is created upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Estate property includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
It is undisputed that record title to the Agawam Condo was, and is, held in the name of Ms. Markowski. Nor is there any contention that the Agawam Condo is held in an express trust of which the Debtor is a beneficiary. Instead, the Trustee urges the Court to conclude that the Debtor holds an equitable interest by way of a constructive or resulting trust . The Court must first review the requisite features of constructive and resulting trusts under Massachusetts law before applying the facts here presented. Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) ().
A constructive trust is not a conventional formal trust with a named trustee and named beneficiary. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 (2003). It is a court-fashioned device intended to prevent unjust enrichment. Zimmerman v. Epstein Becker and Green, P.C., 657 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir.2011). Under Massachusetts law, a constructive trust may be imposed for the benefit of another where the holder acquired the property through fraud, mistake, breach of duty, or other circumstances indicating that the holder would be unjustly enriched. Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester, 416 Mass. 781, 789, 625 N.E.2d 1352 (1994) (citing to Nessralla v. Peck, 403 Mass. 757, 762, 532 N.E.2d 685 (1989) ); see also, North Beacon Street 155 Assocs., LLC v. Mesirow Fin. Interim Mgmt. LLC, 135 F.Supp.3d 1, 8–9 (D.Mass.2015). Such circumstances are not present here. Ms. Markowski holds title to the Agawam Condo as a result of her voluntary agreement with the Debtor. The Debtor continues to make payments towards the Mortgage, and, under her agreement with Ms. Markowski (even if enforceable), the time has not yet come for a transfer of title to the Debtor. Absent Ms. Markowski's participation, the Agawam Condo could not have been purchased. No party has argued that Ms. Markowski has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the Debtor, nor could they. Accordingly, the Court cannot impose a constructive trust in favor of the Debtor or the Trustee.
A resulting trust is also a court-fashioned device, employed to give effect to the parties' intentions. See Lassman v. McQuillan (In re Charles River Press Lithography, Inc.), 338 B.R. 148, 160–61 (Bankr.D.Mass.2006) (citing to Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Valente, 360 F.3d 256 (1st Cir.2004) ); see also, Fortin, 416 Mass. at 789, 625 N.E.2d 1352. Under Massachusetts law, “when a person pays the purchase price of property and takes title in the name of another, the beneficial interest in the property inures to the person who paid the purchase price by way of resulting trust.” Collins v. Duda (In re Duda), 422 B.R. 339, 346 (Bankr.D.Mass.2010) (quoting Collins v. Curtin, 325 Mass. 123, 89 N.E.2d 211 (1949) ); see also, In re Wojtkun, 534 B.R. 435, 449–50 (Bankr.D.Mass.2015) ; In re Frankel, 508 B.R. 527, 531 (Bankr.D.Mass.2014). The title holder holds the property in trust for the person who pays the consideration “based upon the natural presumption that, in the absence of anything to show the contrary, he who supplies the purchase price intends that the property bought shall inure to his own benefit and not that of another, and that the conveyance is taken in the name of another for some incidental reason.” Citizens Bank of Massachusetts v. Coleman, 83 Mass.App.Ct. 609, 613, 987 N.E.2d 1282 (2013) (citing to Quinn v. Quinn, 260 Mass. 494, 501, 157 N.E. 641 (1927) ). A necessary element is that the parties intended to create a trust relationship. Id. ; see also, e.g., Charles River Press Lithography, Inc., 338 B.R. at 160–61. In determining whether the requisite intent exists, it is necessary to review the circumstances as a whole. Clement e v. Nickless, 434 B.R. 202 (D.Mass.2010). Subsequent conduct, including the exercise of “indicia of ownership,” is relevant to the inquiry. In re Woj t kun, 534 B.R. at 449–50.
The parties have stipulated that the intent of the agreement between the Debtor and Ms. Markowski was to enable the Debtor to purchase the Agawam Condo as her residence. And since the purchase date, the Debtor has continuously occupied the Agawam Condo. The parties have further stipulated that the Debtor undertook responsibility for all of the mortgage and maintenance expenses for the Agawam Condo and, thereby, has continually furnished the consideration for the Agawam Condo. It appears that the agreement between the sisters has been a success, and their continuous course of conduct is a further indicator of their intent at the time of the purchase. The Debtor continues to reside in the Agawam Condo, maintain the Agawam Condo, and pay all bills associated with the Agawam Condo. In contrast, the Debtor has not demonstrated that Ms. Markowski has exercised any control over, or evidenced any indicia of ownership in, the Agawam...
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