Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester

Citation416 Mass. 781,625 N.E.2d 1352
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Decision Date14 January 1994
PartiesRonald FORTIN 1 & another 2 v. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF WORCESTER.

Stephen Gordon (Roberta Fitzsimmons, with him), for plaintiffs.

Samuel R. DeSimone (Dale R. Harger, with him), for defendant.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

LIACOS, Chief Justice.

This case presents a dispute between two parishioners of the former parish of St. Joseph's Church in Worcester and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester (Bishop). On June 1, 1992, the parish of St. Joseph's was merged with the parish of Notre Dame, in accordance with a decision by the Bishop. In a complaint of the same date, the plaintiffs alleged that the Bishop's decision to merge the parishes wrongfully deprived them of property to which they were equitably entitled, and constituted a breach of an oral contract between the Bishop and the plaintiffs. They sought an injunction prohibiting the Bishop from taking any action in regard to the real and personal property of St. Joseph's Church. They also sought an order of specific performance of the alleged oral contract and damages, and declaratory relief.

The Bishop responded to the plaintiffs' complaint with a motion for summary judgment. The Bishop advanced three main arguments why he was entitled to judgment: (1) the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited a civil court from taking jurisdiction over the matter; (2) the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the action; and (3) the plaintiffs could not prevail on the merits on any of their legal claims. A judge in the Superior Court found that the First Amendment imposed no restraints on the court's jurisdiction, but he allowed the Bishop's motion, based on his conclusion that the plaintiffs could not prevail on any of their legal claims. The plaintiffs filed a timely appeal, and we transferred the case here on our own motion. We agree with the judge below that the Bishop was entitled to summary judgment, although we hold that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over some of the parishioner's claims.

We begin with the undisputed facts established by the plaintiffs. On September 26, 1886, the Church of St. Joseph was established in the Wall Street area of Worcester. The founding members were the pastor, Father Brouillet, and five communicants. Shortly thereafter, a church school was established. By June of 1887, an effort was undertaken to build a church that would replace the original chapel. In December, 1890, St. Joseph's parish was established. In May, 1891, St. Joseph's parish purchased a parcel of land on Wall Street, on which the members of the St. Joseph's parish voted to construct a new church and other facilities. Members of the parish financed the project completely.

Early in this century, two tracts of land bounded by Hamilton, Dupont, Chrome, and Plantation Streets in Worcester (Hamilton Street property) were conveyed to the Bishop of Springfield, in whose diocese St. Joseph's Church belonged. The Bishop then conveyed this land to the St. Joseph's School of Worcester Corporation. Parishioners formed the School Corporation in 1914 to hold title to parish real estate and to manage the internal affairs of the parish.

In 1927, the School Corporation reconveyed the parcel to the Bishop of Springfield, retaining only a parcel at the corner of Chrome and Plantation Streets. The School Corporation and the Bishop of Springfield then jointly mortgaged both parcels as security for a $325,000 note to build a new church on the property. The parishioners funded the construction of the building, which cost over $1,000,000. This structure served as the parishioner's house of worship until the Bishop's decision to merge St. Joseph's with another parish took effect.

The General Court created the Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester as a corporation sole in 1950. St.1950, c. 197. Thereafter, the Bishop of Springfield conveyed, by an omnibus deed, all of the property situated in the diocese of Worcester to the Bishop of Worcester. In 1958, the treasurer of the School Corporation signed a deed which conveyed the corner parcel of the Hamilton Street property to the Bishop of Worcester. At this time (and until the present day) the Bishop held legal title to all the property at issue in this dispute.

In May of 1991, the Bishop met with the pastor of St. Joseph's and certain parish members to discuss some structural problems that had developed with the church building. The following month, a representative of the Bishop, Monsignor Tinsley, met with the parishioners and allegedly told them that if they raised one-half of the funds needed to repair the church, the diocese would lend the parishioners the remaining funds, and the church would remain open.

The plaintiffs claim to have raised pledges of over $600,000. The Bishop nonetheless decided to merge St. Joseph's with another Roman Catholic parish in Worcester, Notre Dame. The new parish, Notre Dame-St. Joseph, controls the property of both former parishes and uses the facilities of the former Notre Dame as the sole place of worship for the merged parishes.

1. The plaintiffs' claims. On the date that the merger took effect, June 1, 1992, the plaintiffs commenced this action. The numerous causes of action (which were not divided into counts in the complaint) derive from two basic assertions by the plaintiffs. The first is that the plaintiffs are the equitable owners of the real estate and personalty of St. Joseph's parish. Conceding that the Bishop holds legal title to all of the property in question, the plaintiffs claim to be equitable owners under a theory of resulting trust or constructive trust. 3 Based on their claim that they equitably own the property, the plaintiffs further claim that the Bishop is liable to them for conversion. We shall refer to these claims as "the ownership claims."

The second basic assertion is that the Bishop breached his promise to the plaintiffs that he would not close the parish if the parishioners raised sufficient funds to repair the church. Emanating from this are claims of breach of contract and promissory estoppel and requests for specific performance and damages. We shall refer to these as the "promise-based claims."

2. Jurisdiction. The first question facing the judge below and facing this court today is whether this dispute properly belongs in the civil courts of the Commonwealth. The judge below held that he had "jurisdiction to hear the present action." We believe this conclusion sweeps too broadly.

We begin our discussion with the long-recognized principle that "the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from intervening in disputes concerning religious doctrine, discipline, faith, or internal organization." Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 72, 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985), and cases cited. As to the plaintiffs' promise-based claims, the judge below ought not to have looked beyond this principle to dismiss those counts. To inquire into an alleged promise by the Bishop to keep a parish open or refrain from merging it with another parish was an impermissible intrusion into the Bishop's ecclesiastical authority. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2380, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). See also Parent v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 436 A.2d 888, 890-891 (Me.1981) (no jurisdiction over dispute regarding Bishop's alleged promise to provide church services).

As to the plaintiffs' ownership claims, such a cursory review is not warranted. Although "the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes," Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, 378 Mass. 58, 63, 389 N.E.2d 966, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899, 100 S.Ct. 208, 62 L.Ed.2d 135 (1979), quoting Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969), this circumscription is not absolute, and courts have recognized instances where civil resolution of church property disputes may occur without offense to the First Amendment. Probably the most notable departure from the traditional notion that civil courts ought not resolve church property disputes came with Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3025, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that States are constitutionally entitled to adopt "neutral principles of law" to resolve church property disputes. Id. at 602-603, 99 S.Ct. at 3025. Thus, if a dispute can be resolved without inquiry into matters of religious doctrine or polity, a court may examine such sources as "(a) statutory provisions governing the holding of property by religious corporations; (b) the constitutions and by-laws of the religious organizations involved, especially in so far as they pertain to the ownership and control of church property; and (c) the deeds to the property in question," to resolve the dispute. Antioch Temple, Inc. v. Parekh, 383 Mass. 854, 867, 422 N.E.2d 1337 (1981), citing Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at 599-601, 99 S.Ct. at 3024. This court has never expressly taken the "neutral principles of law" approach to a church property dispute.

As an alternative, this court has, in the past, focused primarily on the distinction between hierarchical and congregational church structures in determining when jurisdiction is appropriate. 4 See Antioch Temple, Inc., supra, 383 Mass. at 860-864, 422 N.E.2d 1337; Wheeler, supra, 378 Mass. at 61-62, 389 N.E.2d 966. The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this distinction. See Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. at 3025; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can., supra, 426 U.S. at 724-725, 96 S.Ct. at 2387-2388; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,...

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