In re Sunnyland Farms, Inc., Case No. 14-10231-t11
Decision Date | 28 March 2016 |
Docket Number | Case No. 14-10231-t11 |
Parties | In re: SUNNYLAND FARMS, INC., Debtor. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of New Mexico |
Before the Court is Jerry Capussi's motion to compel the Debtor to issue shares of stock in accordance with Debtor's confirmed Chapter 11 plan. Capussi argues that the Plan is ambiguous and should be interpreted to allow him to receive stock rather than cash. Debtor counters that the Plan requires Capussi to settle for cash. The Court agrees with Capussi's position.
The Court finds2 the following facts:3
Debtor is a New Mexico corporation that owns a large greenhouse near Grants. Capussi assisted Debtor in developing its New Mexico greenhouse business.
Because of a large fire at a former greenhouse location, Debtor fell on hard times. Creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy case against Debtor, which it converted to a voluntary Chapter 11 case.
Debtor filed a fourth amended plan of reorganization on January 14, 2015. The plan contains the following:
(Italics added). The disclosure statement stated:
All holders of allowed unsecured claims... will be given the opportunity to receive either shares of the Reorganized Debtor ... Alternatively, if a creditor opts for a payout rather than shares in the Reorganized Debtor, it will be paid 1% of its allowed claim. The voting ballot to accept or reject the Plan will allow unsecured creditors to elect their preferred treatment. In the event the creditor fails to vote on the plan, it will be assumed that the creditor elects to receive a payment rather than stock.
And elsewhere:
When voting to confirm or reject the Plan, holders of allowed general unsecured claims (including those who hold deficiencies on secured claims) shall have the option to elect to receive either payment or a stock distribution as set forth in paragraphs 6.3.5 of this disclosure statement and 6.5 of the Plan.
The Plan treatment is for allowed Class 5 claims. During the crucial voting process, Capussi's Class 5 claim was disputed, so he could not vote.4 The plan does not say whether, how, or when the holder of a Class 5 claim may elect to receive cash or stock when his claim is disputed during the voting period but later allowed.
Despite being unable to vote, Capussi cast a ballot against the Plan. He did not elect a distribution preference on his ballot. The Court disregarded Capussi' ballot. Capussi did not object to the plan or actively oppose confirmation.
The Court confirmed the Plan by an order entered April 8, 2015. The confirmation order included a finding that the plan complied with all applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
After confirmation, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on Debtor's objection to Capussi's claim. On August 18, 2015, the Court entered an order allowing the claim in the amount of $108,000. By then, the voting was long over. The same day, Capussi notified Debtor that he elected to take stock rather than cash. The Debtor refused to issue the shares.
The Plan provides that the Court shall retain jurisdiction after the effective date for "interpretation or construction of the Plan."
There is little question that interpretation of the language of a confirmed plan involving distribution to creditors is within the core jurisdiction of the Court. See In re Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 356 B.R. 93, 98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Resorts Int'l, Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 166-67 (3d Cir. 2004) ( ); In re Thickstun Bros. Equip. Co., Inc., 344 B.R. 515, 522 (6th Cir. BAP 2006); Donaldson v.Bernstein (In re Donaldson), 104 F.3d 547 (3d Cir.1997) ( ); In re Lacy, 304 B.R. 439, 444 (D. Colo. 2004) (); Matter of Case, 937 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1991) ( ). See also Miller v. United States, 363 F.3d 999, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2004) ().
1. Plan and Disclosure Statement Construed together. When determining the meaning of a chapter 11 plan, the plan and disclosure statement may be construed together. See, e.g., In re Penberthy, 211 B.R. 391 (Bankr. W.D. Wa. 1997) ( ). However, the Plan is controlling. See In re Sonoma V, 34 B.R. 758, 761, (9th Cir. BAP 1983) (); In re Futter Lumber Corp., 2011 WL 5417094, at *5-6 (Bankr. E.D. NY 2011) ( ).
2. Contract Interpretation Rules. Confirmed chapter 11 plans are interpreted "under the rules governing the interpretation of contracts." Miller v. United States, 363 F.3d 999, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 2004); re Heartland Steel, Inc., 389 F.3d 741, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2004); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Dow Corning Corp. et al (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 456 F.3d 668, 676 (6th Cir. 2006); In re W. Integrated Networks, LLC, 322 B.R. 156, 160-61(Bankr. D. Colo. 2005) () (citations omitted). Plans may be interpreted according to either state or federal common law canons of contract interpretation.5 There does not appear to be any relevant difference between federal and New Mexico law on how to interpret ambiguous contracts.
A contract is ambiguous if it is "capable of more than one reasonable interpretation." Miller v. United States, 363 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004); see Smart v. Gillette, 70 F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1995) () (quoting Fashion House, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076, 1083 (1st Cir. 1989); Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 845 P.2d 1232, 1235 (N.M. 1993) ( ). The parties have admitted an ambiguity exists.
Generally, where an ambiguity exists courts consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent. If no such extrinsic evidence is available, however, courts apply rules of contract interpretation. See Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 845 P.2d at 1235-36 ().
3. Restatement (Second) of Contracts. New Mexico courts often refer to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (West 2009) (the "Restatement") for contract interpretation rules. See, e.g., Chisos, Ltd. v. JKM Energy, L.L.C, 258 P.3d 1107, 1111-12 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011); Farmington Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Farmington, 137 P.3d 1204, 1213 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). The Restatement also reflects federal common law. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2012) ( ); Castle v. Caldera, 74 F. Supp. 2d 4, 10 (D.D.C. 1999) ( ). The Restatement contains the following contract interpretation rules:6
1. The Plan Should Be Interpreted In Light of Circumstances and Principal Purpose. As with contracts, the Court must interpret the Plan in light of the circumstances andthe principal purpose of the parties. Restatement, § 203; Mark V., 845 P.3d at 1237 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial