In re T.K.Y.
| Decision Date | 28 August 2006 |
| Citation | 205 S.W.3d 343 |
| Parties | In re T.K.Y. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Eric J. Burch, Manchester, Tennessee, for the Appellant, T.P.
J. Stanley Rogers and Christina Henley Duncan, Manchester, Tennessee, for the Appellees, K.Y. and D.Y.
E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., and ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JANICE M. HOLDER, and CORNELIA A. CLARK, JJ., joined.
We granted review in this parental termination case to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the parentage petition filed by the minor child's biological father should be denied and that the husband of the child's biological mother should be declared the father. Having reviewed the record and applicable authority, we reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the biological father is both the "father" under the parentage statutes and the "legal father" for purposes of the adoption and termination statutes. We also modify the trial court's order of support under the unique circumstances of this case. We remand for a modification of the support order consistent with this opinion.
The facts in this case are straightforward and largely undisputed. Mr. and Mrs. Y.1 have been married since 1988. In November 1996, Mrs. Y. began an extra-marital affair with Mr. P. In January 1997, Mrs. Y. discovered that she was pregnant. She told Mr. P. that she believed he was the father. Mr. Y. assumed that he was the child's biological father, however, and Mrs. Y. did not disabuse him of his assumption.
The affair between Mrs. Y. and Mr. P. continued after the birth of the child, T.K.Y., on October 3, 1997. Mr. P. saw T.K.Y. approximately eighteen times over the next twenty-one months in conjunction with his clandestine meetings with Mrs. Y., but did not have any set parenting time with him. Mr. P. testified that he offered to provide support to Mrs. Y. for T.K.Y., but Mrs. Y. did not want to receive any money or support from Mr. P. because she did not want Mr. Y. to know that Mr. P. was T.K.Y.'s biological father. Mr. P. also testified that Mrs. Y. led him to believe that she was going to leave Mr. Y. to be with him, and so he acquiesced in her requests that the affair and his parentage be kept secret.
In early July 1999, losing patience with the situation, Mr. P. threatened to pursue a paternity action to establish that he was the father of T.K.Y. On July 7, 1999, Mrs. Y. told Mr. Y. that Mr. P. was the father of T.K.Y. Mr. and Mrs. Y. remained married after Mrs. Y. revealed her affair with Mr. P., and Mr. Y. has continued to hold T.K.Y. out to the world as his child.
Shortly thereafter, on August 23, 1999, Mr. P. filed a petition with the Coffee County Juvenile Court for the joint purposes of establishing his parentage, custody, visitation, and to set child support. T.K.Y. was then twenty-two months old. Mr. and Mrs. Y. filed an answer denying Mr. P.'s claim of parental rights. They also filed a counter-petition asserting that Mr. Y. was the legal father of T.K.Y. and seeking to terminate Mr. P.'s parental rights. In addition, on October 14, 1999, Mr. and Mrs. Y. filed a petition for a restraining order prohibiting any contact by Mr. P. with the Y. family. In early October of 2000, Mr. and Mrs. Y. amended the petition seeking a restraining order prohibiting contact by Mr. P. with Mr. and Mrs. Y. and T.K.Y. On December 12, 2000, the juvenile court entered an agreed mutual restraining order that prohibited each party from contacting the other and prohibited Mr. P. from contacting T.K.Y. in any manner.
Two and one-half years after Mr. P. filed the parentage petition, the case was finally tried before the juvenile court in March 2002. In that proceeding, the parties stipulated to the admissibility and accuracy of DNA tests that revealed a 99.95% probability that Mr. P. was the biological father of T.K.Y. However, the juvenile court did not hear or decide Mr. P.'s pending parentage petition. Rather, following a full evidentiary hearing on the counter-petition of Mr. and Mrs. Y., the court terminated Mr. P.'s parental rights by order entered March 13, 2002, and dismissed his parentage action. Mr. and Mrs. Y. had argued that Mr. P.'s parental rights should be terminated on the grounds of willful failure to support; willful failure to visit; and failure to file a petition within thirty days after notice that he was the father of the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi). The juvenile court decided that there was insufficient evidence to find willful failure to support or visit, but held that Mr. P. had failed to file his petition to establish parentage within thirty days of being informed by Mrs. Y. that he was the father of the child.
The court then conducted a best-interests analysis and found that termination was in the best interests of T.K.Y. because the child was "in a safe environment and safe home," and because Mr. Y. had "established a meaningful relationship" with the child and was able to provide financially for the child. Finally, the juvenile court noted that Mr. Y. "has demonstrated a stability and a perseverance that the Court feels is highly commendable and will have a long-term positive impact on [T.K.Y.]." The court acknowledged that there was "insufficient evidence to find willful failure to support or visit" by Mr. P., but nevertheless found that because there was no "regular visitation" or "regular support," the best-interests analysis weighed in favor of termination. From the juvenile court's decision, an appeal was filed by Mr. P.
Seventeen months after the juvenile court decision, on September 2, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. In re T.K.Y., No. M2002-00815-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 1733583 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept. 2, 2003). The Court of Appeals reasoned that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835 (Tenn.2002), the juvenile court had erred in terminating Mr. P.'s parental rights without first adjudicating his parentage petition. Jones held that the parentage and adoption statutes, as well as the state and federal constitutions, require that parentage be determined prior to determining the questions of termination or adoption. Jones, 92 S.W.3d at 839 (citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-117(b)). Because the grounds for termination available in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) do not apply to a person who is "the legal parent or guardian of a child," the Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court should have determined Mr. P.'s parentage petition before terminating his parental rights.2 In remanding the case "for an early hearing on Mr. P.'s Petition to Establish Paternity," the appellate court instructed, "[b]ased on the parties' prior stipulation that Mr. P. is the biological father of T.K.Y., then the Juvenile Court shall determine issues regarding the proper, primary residential parent, shared parenting, support and other issues for T.K.Y."
On remand, in April 2004, seven months after the Court of Appeals reversed, the juvenile court held a trial to determine Mr. P.'s parentage action. Mr. and Mrs. Y. contested the petition. Although they acknowledged that Mr. P. was the biological father, they argued that because Mr. Y. was married to Mrs. Y. and held T.K.Y. out to the world as his natural child, he had an equivalent claim to fatherhood. Following the April 2004 trial, the juvenile court ruled that Mr. P. was the "legal father" of T.K.Y. The court based its decision on the fact that Mr. P. is the biological father of the child and the fact that Mr. P. had made efforts to establish support and parentage. The court reasoned,
if there had been no effort to establish support, no prior petitions filed, no effort [by Mr. P.], I would find—probably find he is not the father, the legal father of the child. He started this. He started it with a petition asking the Court to legitimate the child and asking the Court to establish or set support. That began back in 19—August of 1999. So for me to say that he was not willing to support the child really flies in the face of the facts.
Having determined that Mr. P. was the legal father, the juvenile court set support and visitation, and ordered payment of child support back-dated to T.K.Y.'s birth, with the arrearage totaling $31,590.00. Child support was set at $405.00 per month based on Mr. P.'s average income of $28,500 earned from his work as a hairdresser. The court also ordered Mr. P. to pay one-half of Mrs. P.'s birthing and prenatal expenses, one-half of the cost of insurance for T.K.Y., and one-half of all future uncovered medical and dental expenses for T.K.Y.
Mr. and Mrs. Y. again appealed. On February 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's determination that Mr. P. was the child's legal father. Looking to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-304(a), which sets forth five circumstances under which "[a] man is rebuttably presumed to be the father of the child," the Court of Appeals reasoned that both Mr. Y. and Mr. P. were "armed with a rebuttable statutory presumption of parentage." Mr. Y. was married to Mrs. Y., the mother at the time the child was born, and he has received T.K.Y. into his home and held the child out to the world as his natural child. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-304(a)(1), (4). Mr. P., on the other hand, had been shown through genetic testing to be the child's father to a 99.95% probability. See id. § -304(a)(5). According equal weight to the presumptions, the Court of Appeals resolved the dispute in favor of Mr. Y. by balancing the stability of T.K.Y.'s family environment, the strength of his relationship with Mr. Y., and the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Y. have been his sole source of financial support against Mr. P.'s lack of relationship with the child and his lack of...
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