In re T-M-B-
| Decision Date | 20 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | Interim Decision No. 3307. |
| Citation | 21 I&N Dec. 775 |
| Parties | In re T-M-B-, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
In a decision dated August 8, 1995, an Immigration Judge determined that deportability on the charge set forth above was established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence in conformity with Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966). The Immigration Judge denied the respondent's applications for asylum and withholding of deportation pursuant to sections 208(a) and 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) and 1253(h) (1994), but granted the respondent's request for voluntary departure under section 244(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1994). The respondent timely appealed the decision of the Immigration Judge. The appeal will be dismissed.
The respondent is a 43-year-old native and citizen of the Philippines who entered the United States at San Francisco, California, on March 29, 1993, as a visitor for pleasure, authorized to remain in the United States until October 27, 1993. The respondent claims that she fled the Philippines because of her fear of harm from a guerrilla group known as the New People's Army ("NPA"). The respondent testified that the NPA sought her as a recruit as well as to obtain the financial support of her parents' shoe business. The respondent said that her contact with the NPA began in September 1992 and ended in February 1993, shortly before she left the Philippines.
According to the respondent's testimony, she was first approached by two NPA members in September 1992, while working at her parents' shoe store. She stated that the NPA representatives attempted to recruit her because they needed her "to help them with their costs." The respondent explained that she refused to pay "revolutionary taxes" to the NPA because she supported the government. The respondent testified that although she was never involved in any political activities, she opposed providing financial support to the NPA "because they kill people, women and children."
The respondent testified further that the NPA representatives became angry and subsequently demanded a "revolutionary tax" of 3,000 pesos at gunpoint. The respondent testified that she paid the requested amount and was informed by the NPA representatives that they expected a similar payment on a monthly basis thereafter. She continued to make monthly payments of 3,000 pesos through January 1993.
In February 1993, the NPA representatives demanded that her financial contribution double. She testified that when she told them that she was unable to provide the 6,000 pesos, the NPA members became angry and slapped and beat her. One of the NPA representatives then threatened her at gunpoint while the other member used a knife to cut her right arm. Before leaving, the NPA representatives informed her that they would return for the "tax" and failure to provide the money would result in her death. The respondent stated that she did not inform her parents that she was paying the NPA a "revolutionary tax" from their business until she was injured. She said that the injury caused her to make preparations to leave the country. She left the Philippines in March 1993.
The respondent indicated that she worked as an accountant for 15 years at a hospital in Manila during the time she was threatened by the NPA, although her encounters with the NPA occurred only at her parents' shoe store. The respondent stated that her parents are now retired and have closed their shoe store. The respondent explained that the NPA sought financial assistance generally from the businesses located in the same area as her parents' business, and she surmised that the NPA sought her out because of her position at her parents' successful business, as well as her family's high standard of living.
Included in the record is the country profile prepared by the Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, The Philippines — Profile of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions (June 1995) [hereinafter Profile]; see also 8 C.F.R. 208.11(a) (1996). The Profile reveals that Profile, supra, at 4. The Profile also provides evidence that the NPA's strength is at present substantially diminished. It states that the NPA has a "significant presence in only 2 percent of the 42,000 townships" within the Philippines and "[i]t is generally possible for Filipinos to seek internal resettlement." Id. at 4.
An applicant for asylum bears the burden of establishing that he or she meets the "refugee" definition of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994). The respondent must demonstrate that she is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail herself of, the protection of the Philippines, because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id. Even treatment that is regarded as "morally reprehensible" is not "persecution" within the meaning of the Act unless it occurs "on account of" one of the five enumerated grounds in the Act. Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995).
The burden of establishing eligibility for asylum lies with the applicant. We recognized in Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996), that an applicant for asylum need not show conclusively why persecution occurred in the past or is likely to occur in the future. However, the applicant must produce evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or imputed protected ground. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).1 In a claim of persecution based upon political opinion (either actual or imputed), the persecution must be "on account of" the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's. Id.
In determining the motivation for threats or harm in an actual or imputed political opinion asylum claim, the record must be examined for direct or circumstantial evidence from which it would be reasonable to conclude that those who threatened or harmed the respondent were in part motivated by an assumption that her political views were antithetical to their cause.
The respondent testified that the NPA initially approached her as part of their effort to finance their organization. She stated that when she told them that she would not provide funds because she supported the government, the NPA representatives threatened to harm her. She testified that the NPA representatives left without incident after she agreed to provide monthly financial contributions to their cause. The respondent continued providing monthly "revolutionary taxes" to the NPA without incident for several months. When the NPA demanded that the respondent double her contribution, she resisted and was harmed.
We find first that the respondent has failed to demonstrate that the abuse she suffered at the hands of the NPA was directed toward modifying or punishing political opinion. The United States Supreme Court has held that an asylum applicant must demonstrate that the persecutor inflicted the harm because of the victim's actual or imputed political opinion. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, supra. Although the respondent testified that she opposed the NPA, her actual political views, while relevant to the inquiry of whether she was harmed because of her political opinion, does not by itself answer the question. Id.
The statements and actions by the NPA, and the resulting harm, are consistent with the nonpolitical end of extorting money for their cause. The NPA's conduct towards the respondent is consistent with extortion, i.e., the illegal taking of money by anyone who employs threats, or other illegal use of fear or coercion in order to obtain the money. Cf. Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988) ().
The issue before us is not whether the NPA levied "revolutionary taxes," but rather how the NPA demands for money should be characterized. The respondent contends that the NPA targeted her for the infliction of financial harm on account of her political opinion. However, the evidence supports the conclusion that the imposition of "revolutionary taxes" (enforced by threats of harm and enforced by...
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