In re Termination of Parental Rights to CG, SG, JG and SG
Decision Date | 23 December 2003 |
Citation | 2003 WY 166,81 P.3d 208 |
Parties | In the Matter of the TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO CG, SG, JG and SG, minors. AMG, Appellant (Respondent), v. State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services, Appellee (Petitioner). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Ronald G. Pretty, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Wilde.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, JJ., and KALOKATHIS, DJ.
[¶ 1] The district court terminated the parental rights of AMG, the natural mother, to four of her children: CG, SG, JG, and SG. AMG (Mother) appeals only certain specific decisions made by the district court. We affirm.
[¶ 2] Mother raises the following issues:
[¶ 3] Because of the limited nature of the issues, only a brief outline of the facts is necessary. The Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother.2 At trial, DFS presented testimony from several mental health professionals who have been counseling the children. The mental health professionals testified about the mental health of the children and special needs of the children, and gave their professional opinion as to whether it would serve the best interests of the children to have Mother's parental rights terminated. The testimony from these experts and from others indicated that Mother was not capable of properly caring for the children. A jury returned a verdict terminating Mother's parental rights to each child.
[¶ 4] We summarily affirm the actions of the district court with regard to Mother's issues number two and three. Both of these issues question the propriety of the jury instructions. Mother, however, failed to designate for the record on appeal the jury instructions actually given. Our standard of review for jury instructions requires us to review the instructions as a whole. This Court recently provided, albeit in a criminal jury trial context, guidance with regard to our standard of review for jury instruction issues:
The applicable standard of review is well-established: Jury instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts, instructions should be written with the particular facts and legal theories of each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any one of several instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give an instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed. Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001). With specific regard to a defendant's "theory of the case" instruction we have held that:
.
Wheaton v. State, 2003 WY 56, ¶ 20, 68 P.3d 1167, ¶ 20 (Wyo.2003).
[¶ 5] The issue is not as simple as whether the jury instructions offered by Mother were correct. According to our standard of review, we must analyze the instructions actually given to the jury to see if, as a whole, they adequately informed the jury concerning the applicable law, allowing the jury to apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts. Mother had the burden of providing this Court with a complete record on which to base a decision. Orcutt v. Shober Inv., Inc., 2003 WY 60, ¶ 9, 69 P.3d 386, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2003). Because she has not done so, this Court has no other means to review the district court's decision. We must assume the decision was in accord with the law. Id. at ¶ 10.
[¶ 6] Mother's first issue is also inadequately presented. Her argument essentially is that the fields of child psychology and psychotherapy have no proper scientific basis. Her objection, as stated in her brief, is that the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing the mental health professionals to Not surprisingly, Mother offers no citation to authority to support the proposition that the general fields of child psychology and psychotherapy do not meet the legal standards for scientific or specialized knowledge.
[¶ 7] Despite the inadequacy of Mother's brief, because of the fundamental nature of parental rights, we will briefly comment upon Mother's concerns. Before trial, Mother filed a motion to either exclude any testimony from mental health providers or to hold a hearing pursuant to W.R.E. 1043 to determine the admissibility of the testimony of the mental health providers. The trial court denied the motion and did not hold a W.R.E. 104 hearing, but said it would consider specific issues as they arose at trial. Mother argues that, had the trial court held a Rule 104 hearing, it would have found the proposed testimony from the mental health professionals "was not hard science like 2+2 equals 4 but instead was only the meaningless meanders of people that couldn't be real scientists but could only be pseudo scientists which were specifically barred by Daubert."
[¶ 8] The admissibility of expert testimony is derived directly from W.R.E. 702, which states: "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." This Court, in previous opinions, has discussed at length the procedure that should guide the district court in reaching its decision regarding the admission of expert testimony. See generally Seivewright v. State, 7 P.3d 24 (Wyo.2000)
; Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo.1999). The analysis contained in Seivewright is directly on point to the arguments Mother makes in this appeal, and we quote from Seivewright at length:
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