In re Tetreault
| Decision Date | 13 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 2009-166.,2009-166. |
| Citation | 11 A.3d 635 |
| Parties | In re Edwin H. TETREAULT. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Joseph M. DiOrio, Esq., Providence, for Trustee.
Christopher M. Lefebvre, Esq., Pawtucket, for Edwin H. Tetreault.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and ROBINSON, JJ.
This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to four questions certified by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Island in accordance with Article I, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. The questions seek our advice on the interpretation of G.L.1956 § 9-26-4.1 (the homestead statute) as it applies to Edwin H. Tetreault (debtor), a devisee of real property under the residuary clause of a Rhode Island will. The debtor has claimed a homestead estate exemption in his one-half interest in the real property, and the trustee in bankruptcy has objected. The questions certified to us by the Bankruptcy Court are:
For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we answer questions one and two in the affirmative, we answer question three in the negative, and in light of our answers to the previous three questions, we see no need to answer question four.
The relevant facts are not in dispute and may be summarized as follows. 1 Mr. Tetreault and his sister, Anne M. O'Mara (executrix), are the joint heirs of their deceased mother's estate under the residuary clause of her will. Their mother, Ruth B. Tetreault (testatrix), passed away on June 4, 2006. Ms. O'Mara was appointedexecutrix of the estate on June 6, 2007. At the time of her death, testatrix was the sole owner of the disputed parcel of real property, located at 36 Lakeview Avenue, Lincoln, Rhode Island (the property). Disposition of the property was controlled by the residuary clause of testatrix's will, which provides that the rest, residue, and remainder of the estate be divided equally between Ms. O'Mara and Mr. Tetreault. After testatrix's death, Mr. Tetreault resided alone at the property, where he had lived for most, if not all, of his life.
Under another clause of the will, executrix claimed a power of sale over the property for the satisfaction of any debts and expenses of testatrix's estate, such as executrix may deem proper.2 On August 27, 2008, executrix mailed to Mr. Tetreault a notice of termination of tenancy based on G.L.1956 § 34-18-37, directing him to vacate the property by October 1, 2008. After Mr. Tetreault failed to vacate the property, executrix instituted an eviction action in the District Court on October 7, 2008.
On the next day, October 8, 2008, Mr. Tetreault filed in Bankruptcy Court a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Joseph M. DiOrio (trustee) was appointed bankruptcy trustee. In his bankruptcy schedules, debtor listed a one-half interest in the property, and claimed therein a homestead exemption under § 9-26-4.1. The debtor maintains that his claimed homestead interest in the property places any interest that he may have in the property beyond the laws of attachment, levy on execution and sale for payment of debts or legacies. On December 2, 2008, and December 3, 2008, trustee filed objections to debtor's claim of homestead exemption.
The trustee's position is that: (1) debtor lacked sufficient ownership interest in the property to claim the homestead exemption; (2) even if debtor's ownership interest were sufficient to claim the exemption, he does not fall within the statutory definition of "family" under the homestead statute; and (3) debtor lacked the legal standing to occupy or intend to occupy the property after executrix initiated the procedure to sell and/or evict debtor from the property.
As a result of debtor's bankruptcy filing, the probate estate's efforts to proceed with the eviction action in District Court were stayed by the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362.3 On January 5, 2009, the automatic stay terminated upon the Bankruptcy Court's entry of a discharge of debtor. Subsequently, on February 3, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order authorizing executrix to proceed with her efforts to evict debtor from the property. Thereafter, the District Court heard cross-motions for summary judgment relating to the probate estate's eviction action. A District Court judge granted summary judgment for possession of the property in favor of the estate, and debtor appealed from the judgment to the Superior Court.
In addition to the eviction efforts in District Court, Ms. O'Mara, acting in hercapacity as executrix, filed a petition in the Probate Court of the Town of Lincoln for sale of the property to effectuate the prompt and efficient administration of the estate and to pay the debts and expenses of the estate. On April 3, 2009, the Probate Court granted executrix's petition for sale of the property, from which order debtor also appealed to the Superior Court.
On April 29, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court judge certified and submitted to this Court the four enumerated questions, together with a statement of undisputed facts. Upon accepting the Bankruptcy Court's certification order, this Court declared that its decision to address the certified questions "should in no way be construed as requiring or justifying the delay or postponement of any other pending judicial proceeding involving the parties to this litigation."
Subsequently, debtor's appeals from the District Court and the Probate Court were consolidated in the Superior Court, and a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment was held on September 11, 2009. On February 26, 2010, a Superior Court hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of the estate on both appeals, thereby upholding the District Court's judgment of eviction and affirming the Probate Court's order authorizing executrix to sell the property. In granting summary judgment in favor of the estate, however, the Superior Court justice held that the orders of February 26, 2010, should not become final until this Court determined that the pendency of the certified questions did not prohibit the orders from becoming final or until this Court issued a final ruling in the present case.
Soon thereafter, executrix filed an emergency motion for reconsideration by the Superior Court of the court's entry of conditional orders, seeking removal of the conditions and entry of final orders and judgments. According to executrix, since testatrix's death, debtor continued to occupy the property alone without paying real estate taxes, insurance premiums, or rent to the estate or to executrix, coowner of the property. Since the date of the Superior Court's conditional order, executrix maintained that she became unable to continue paying the property's expenses and as a result the property had become uninsured and imperiled. Furthermore, the property's deteriorating condition was documented in two separate appraisals and an inspection report. In consideration of the aforementioned state and condition of the property, executrix argued that it was necessary to sell the property as soon as possible in order to limit the estate's liability, pay the debts and expenses of the estate, and to effectuate the estate's prompt and efficient administration.
After a hearing on executrix's emergency motion, the Superior Court justice ordered the removal of the conditions contained in the court's orders of February 26, 2010, and he entered final judgments in favor of the estate, thereby denying both of Mr. Tetreault's appeals. The court thus upheld the District Court's judgment of eviction and affirmed the Probate Court's order authorizing sale of the property. On the next day, the Superior Court justice granted Mr. Tetreault's motion to stay the enforcement of the court's final judgments, pending a timely appeal to this Court. Mr. Tetreault initially filed appeals from the final judgments; however, the appeals were withdrawn on May 27, 2010, and as such, the Superior Court's final judgments no longer are subject to attack.
Rule 6 authorizes this Court to answer questions of law certified to it by anyfederal court, including the United States Bankruptcy Court. In re D'Ellena, 640 A.2d 530, 531 (R.I.1994). Rule 6(a) provides in pertinent part:
"This Court may answer questions of law certified to it by * * * a United States District Court when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this Court."
Rule 6 affords this Court discretion in deciding whether it should respond to questions certified by a federal court. Jefferson v. Moran, 479 A.2d 734, 738 (R.I.1984).
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