In re: The Estate of Bennie J. Williams II, v. Williams
| Decision Date | 22 February 2000 |
| Citation | 12 S.W.3d 302 |
| Parties | (Mo.banc 2000) . In Re: The Estate of Bennie James Williams, II, Lisa Williams-Payton, Appellant-Respondent, v. Alyce M. Williams, Personal Representative of the Estate of Bennie James Williams, II, et al., Respondents-Appellants. Case Number: SC81769 Supreme Court of Missouri Handdown Date: 0 |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Pettis County, Hon. Robert L. Koffman
Counsel for Appellant: Max E. Mitchell
Counsel for Respondent: Thad R. Mulholland, James T. Bellamy, Clarence G. Williams, and Martin J. Williams
Opinion Summary:
The mother received annuity payments as the personal representative of her deceased son's estate and, later, in her personal capacity. The sister brought a discovery of assets action. The court granted summary judgment, finding the annuity payments belonged to the estate and not the mother. The court dismissed the punitive damages claim, finding that a discovery of assets action was not the proper vehicle for claims regarding a breach of fiduciary duty. The mother and sister appealed.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.
Court en banc holds:
(1) The court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the summary judgment. When the court withdrew the mother's letters of administration, it appointed the public administrator ad litem. By definition, the public administrator was substituted as a party, despite that the administrator did not appear or plead.
(2) The court erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction to award punitive damages.
(A) The circuit court's probate division has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a proceeding to discover assets pursuant to section 473.340. Thus, a common law action alleging the conversion of property belonging to a decedent's estate and seeking a common law claim for punitive damages associated with that conversion may be pursued in a discovery of assets proceeding in the probate division. The sister, as a beneficiary of the estate, has standing to assert such a claim.
(B) The dictionary meaning and standard rules of statutory construction lead to the conclusion that authorizing recovery of "damages sustained" in section 473.340 did not eliminate the common law claim for punitive damages for estate property conversion.
Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED. All concur.
This appeal rises from a discovery of assets proceeding filed in the probate division of the circuit court of Pettis County. That court granted summary judgment giving ownership of the assets in question to the estate and dismissed an additional claim for punitive damages. Both parties appealed. After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art V, sec. 10.
Bennie James Williams, II (Decedent) was the beneficiary of an annuity that provided a monthly payment of three thousand four hundred fifty-two dollars for Decedent's life or for twenty years, whichever was longer. The first payment was scheduled to be paid to Decedent on July 15, 1993. However, Decedent died intestate on July 7, 1993. On July 6, 1994, the probate division of the Pettis County circuit court appointed Decedent's mother, Alyce M. Williams (Mother), as the personal representative of Decedent's estate. On August 9, 1994, Mother wrote the issuer of the annuity, informing them that she was the personal representative of Decedent's estate and requested that the annuity payments be made to her personally. The issuer of the annuity began making the payments to Mother in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate. On August 21, 1995, Mother informed the issuer of the annuity that the checks should be made to her personally and not in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate. Subsequent annuity payments were made to Mother in her personal capacity.
On February 18, 1997, Decedent's sister, Lisa Williams-Payton (Sister), filed a petition for discovery of assets pursuant to sec. 473.340, RSMo 1994.1 All references to statutes are to RSMo 1994 unless specified otherwise. Sister alleged that Mother's designation of herself as the payee of Decedent's annuity was improper and that Mother had also improperly withheld most of the previous payments as her own. Sister alleged that all of the annuity payments belonged to the estate. Included in her petition for the discovery of assets of the estate, Sister alleged that Mother acted with "evil motive or reckless indifference" to the rights of the other beneficiaries of Decedent's estate and sought punitive damages. Sister also filed a petition for the removal of Mother as the personal representative of the estate. The docket sheet shows that on April 14, 1997, the trial court continued the motion for permanent removal of Mother as personal representative, but withdrew the letters of administration it had issued to Mother and appointed the public administrator as administrator ad litem pending the outcome of the discovery of assets proceeding.
Sister moved for summary judgment on the issue of the ownership of the annuity payments. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that each annuity payment after Decedent's death, plus interest, belonged to the estate and not to Mother. Sister then attempted to proceed on her claim for punitive damages, but Mother moved to dismiss Sister's claim for punitive damages. The trial court dismissed the claim for punitive damages, finding that a discovery of assets action was not the proper vehicle for claims regarding a breach of fiduciary duty. Mother appeals the summary judgment, and Sister appeals the dismissal of her punitive damages claim.
Mother argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the administrator ad litem was never made a party to the case. Section 473.340.4 states that in a discovery of assets proceeding:
If the court finds that a complete determination of the issues cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court may order them to be brought in by an amended or supplemental petition. The court shall order the joinder of the personal representative of the estate if he is not named as a party.Sister's original petition in this proceeding named Mother as a party in her capacity as personal representative and individually. As noted above, on April 14, 1997, the court withdrew the letters of administration that made Mother the personal representative and appointed an administrator ad litem. When appointed by the court to administer an estate, the public administrator "shall have the same powers as are conferred upon, and be subject to the same duties, penalties, provisions and proceedings as are enjoined upon or authorized against personal representatives, guardians and conservators." Sec. 473.750. However, the administrator ad litem in the present case never filed pleadings and does not appear to have been present at any stage of the proceedings.
Relying on In re Estate of Pilla, 735 S.W. 2d 103 (Mo. App. 1987), Mother argues that under sec. 473.340.4 the administrator ad litem was an indispensable party, and the failure to join her deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Sister counters with Simpson v. Shelker, 747 S.W. 2d 259 (Mo. App. 1988). Simpson reasoned that the purpose of sec. 473.340.4 was to protect the estate. Id. at 260. Therefore, that court held that if "no more advantageous outcome was possible" for the estate, the personal representative was not an indispensable party. Id. On the issue of ownership of the annuity payments, Sister argues correctly that no more advantageous outcome was possible for the estate. Therefore, she argues that Simpson supports a finding that the court retained subject matter jurisdiction. We need not decide here whether Simpson is inconsistent with the plain text of the statute and should be overruled, because here the public administrator was properly substituted for the personal representative of the estate.
The purpose of sec. 473.340.4 must be drawn from the plain or ordinary and usual meaning of the language. Sec. 1.090. The first sentence of sec. 473.340.4 gives the court discretion to join other parties that the court finds indispensable to a complete determination of the issues. However, the plain language of the second sentence creates a legislatively mandated indispensable party. Sec. 473.340.4. Despite the reasoning of Simpson, there is no ambiguity in the language in which to interject an exception when the best possible result for the estate has been reached.
In the present case, the court simultaneously withdrew Mother's letters of administration and appointed the public administrator as administrator ad litem. An administrator ad litem is "a special administrator appointed by court to supply a necessary party to an action in which deceased or his estate is interested." Black's Law Dictionary, 47 (6th ed. 1990). Therefore, by definition, the appointment to administrator ad litem substituted the public administrator into the place of Mother as personal representative. The administrator ad litem's apparent failure to appear or plead does not negate the fact that the court appointed her administrator ad litem. Thus, from the time of her appointment, the administrator ad litem was as effectively a substituted as a party as if she had been named a defendant in the original pleading in place of the original personal representative.2 The point relied on does not allege that the administrator ad litem was not served with appropriate notices and pleadings. Perhaps on remand the record may be made more clear as to whether appropriate service of notice was given or waived by the administrator ad litem. At this juncture, the Court does not address that question.
The court retained subject...
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