In re the Marriage of Amy Connerton

• Decision Date: 16 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09CA1642.,09CA1642.
• Citation: 260 P.3d 62
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Amy CONNERTON, Appellant,andSean NEVIN, Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

260 P.3d 62

In re the MARRIAGE OF Amy CONNERTON, Appellant,andSean NEVIN, Appellee.

No. 09CA1642.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.

Sept. 16, 2010.

Anne Whalen Gill, L.L.C., Anne Whalen Gill, Sharlene J. Aitken, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellant.Garfield & Hecht, P.C., Robert E. Kendig, Aspen, Colorado, for Appellee.Opinion by Judge DAILEY.

In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding between Amy Connerton (mother) and Sean Nevin (father), mother appeals the trial court's order modifying child support and imputing income to her based on its conclusion that she was voluntarily unemployed. Mother also appeals the court's order denying her C.R.C.P. 59 motion. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

The parties' marriage was dissolved in 2006. On March 22, 2006, the trial court entered permanent orders, requiring father to pay $2,280 per month in maintenance through May 1, 2008, and $654 per month in child support for the parties' two children.

On August 13, 2008, mother moved the court to modify child support, arguing that the termination of maintenance resulted in a change in father's child support obligation of more than ten percent. At the time, the children were three and five years old. Mother requested her attorney fees under section 14–10–119, C.R.S.2009.

Father responded, arguing that he had voluntarily paid additional child support since maintenance had terminated and that mother, who was a licensed real estate agent and an emergency medical technician (EMT), was voluntarily unemployed.

After a hearing, the trial court modified its support order, requiring father to pay $1,609 per month in child support. In making its determination, the court concluded that mother was voluntarily unemployed and imputed income of $3,010 per month to her based on potential full-time employment as an EMT. The court found that, although mother's educational goal of becoming a registered nurse was “admirable,” it did not meet the standard of reasonableness under section 14–10–115(5)(b)(III)(C), C.R.S.2009, because the educational program would take “about four and a half years from the date of the hearing,” when the oldest child would be “more than half way through her child support years.” The court noted that mother did not pursue her nursing degree while she was receiving maintenance. The court further found that mother had substantial job skills, because she was a licensed real estate broker, was qualified to work as an EMT, and had several certifications related to health and emergency care. The court denied mother's request for attorney fees, finding that the evidence at the hearing was insufficient to determine the reasonableness and necessity of the fees incurred by her in any particular amount.

Mother filed a verified C.R.C.P. 59 motion, correcting her hearing testimony to reflect that she would complete the nursing degree one year earlier and arguing that (1) section 14–10–115(5)(b)(III)(C) does not require a parent to pursue an educational goal while she receives maintenance; (2) there was no evidence in the record to support the court's finding that her educational goal was not reasonable; and (3) the court erred in denying her request for attorney fees because the parties stipulated that her attorney's rate was reasonable and she testified that she had paid $16,000 to her attorney at the time of the hearing. Mother's counsel filed an affidavit of attorney fees along with the motion.

The trial court denied mother's motion, finding that it did not “suggest [m]other should have been pursuing her education” during the time when her children were less than thirty months old ¹ but that her “choice not to pursue her education[al] goals at a time when, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, she could have done so was a factor in the reasonableness of the time period necessary for [her] to complete her education and obtain a higher income.” The court further found that “[m]other ha[d] significant job skills and income potential with her present abilities” and that “[p]ursuit of her education[al] goals would delay any income for a significant period of time.”

II. Voluntary Unemployment

Mother contends that the trial court erred in finding that she could not complete the nursing degree within a reasonable time because (1) the length of the program was reasonable; and (2) she began the program at a reasonable time given the children's very young ages at the time of the dissolution, the overlap between the period of maintenance awarded and the thirty-month milestone for imputation of income, the youngest child's illness, the need to foster a relationship between father and the youngest child to establish overnights, and her move to Glenwood Springs to be closer to the children's school. Mother further argues that the court's ruling “penalized her effort at self-sufficiency” and was “contrary to the public policy of encouraging [her] financial independence.”

We agree that the trial court erred in finding that four and a half years was not a reasonable time to complete a registered nursing degree. However, because the court did not determine whether mother pursued the degree in good faith or whether her pursuit of the degree unreasonably reduced the support available to the children, we remand the case for the court to make those determinations.

A. Standard of Review

Whether a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed “requires the trial court to make factual findings and apply a legal standard to those findings.” People v. Martinez, 70 P.3d 474, 476–77 (Colo.2003). We give deference to the court's findings of fact but review de novo its application of governing legal standards and legal conclusions. See id. at 476; City of Colorado Springs v. Andersen Mahon Enterprises, LLP, 260 P.3d 29, –––– (Colo.App.2010).

B. Governing Law

“[B]oth parents have a duty to support their children.” Martinez, 70 P.3d at 477; see also In re Marriage of Mackey, 940 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Colo.App.1997). Thus, a trial court may calculate child support based on a parent's potential income if the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. See § 14–10–115(5)(b)(I), C.R.S.2009; In re Marriage of Atencio, 47 P.3d 718, 720 (Colo.App.2002); In re Marriage of Foss, 30 P.3d 850, 852 (Colo.App.2001).

“The intent of the income imputation provision ... is to impute income when the parent shirks his or her child support obligation by unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment that he or she could obtain.” Martinez, 70 P.3d at 480; see also In re Marriage of Swing, 194 P.3d 498, 500 (Colo.App.2008).

A court may not deem a parent voluntarily unemployed or underemployed if it finds:

(1) the parent “is enrolled in an educational program that is reasonably intended to result in a degree or certification within a reasonable period of time and that will result in a higher income”;

(2) “the educational program is a good faith career choice that is not intended to deprive the child of support”; and

(3) the parent's pursuit of the career “does not unreasonably reduce the support available to the child.”

§ 14–10–115(5)(b)(III)(C).

Each of these conditions must be met before a parent will not be deemed voluntarily unemployed or underemployed pursuant to section 14–10–115(5)(b)(III)(C). Hence, if there is evidence that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed and a court finds that any of these conditions is not satisfied, the court may deem the parent to be voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.

C. Application

Here, mother testified that she was attending a college where she was taking the prerequisites she needed to enroll in a registered nursing program, that she would complete the prerequisites in February 2010, and that she would complete the nursing program in the spring of 2013.

The trial court observed that mother did not pursue her degree while she was receiving maintenance and that by the time mother completed the degree, one of the children would be “more than half way through her child support years.” On this basis, the court concluded that the length of mother's education plan, four and a half years, was not reasonable and that she was voluntarily unemployed.

“Reasonable” means “[f]air, proper, or moderate under the circumstances” or “[a]ccording to reason.” Black's Law Dictionary 1293 (8th ed. 2004).

In our view, although the reasonableness of the length of mother's education plan must be determined in the context of the circumstances that are known or expected to exist during that time, it appears that the court's observation regarding mother's failure to pursue her degree while she was receiving maintenance reflected the court's concern about mother's good faith rather than the reasonableness of the length of the plan. The court's only consideration of circumstances known or expected to exist during mother's education was its observation that one of the children would be “more than half way through her child support years.” We conclude that this consideration is not sufficient to support the conclusion that the length of mother's plan was not reasonable.

The court also found that

(1) “[m]other's desire to further her education and career is an admirable goal”; and

(2) mother already had “substantial job skills.”

Although these findings and the court's observation that mother did not pursue her degree while she was receiving maintenance relate to mother's intentions, the court did not find that mother's plan was (1) not reasonably intended to result in a degree or certification; or (2) not a good faith career choice. Nor did it find that mother's plan (1) was intended to deprive the child of support, or (2) unreasonably reduced the support available to the child.

Because the court's only relevant consideration is not sufficient to support its finding regarding the reasonableness of the length of mother's education plan and the court did...