In re the Marriage of Quock, A117767 (Cal. App. 9/30/2008), A117767
| Decision Date | 30 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | A117767 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of THERESA LEAVER QUOCK and LESLIE QUOCK. LESLIE QUOCK, Appellant, v. THERESA LEAVER QUOCK, Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Contra Costa County, Super. Ct. No. MSD96-03056.
Pursuant to interlocutory and final judgments, the marriage of Theresa and Leslie Quock was dissolved, permanently resolving issues relating to division of property and child and spousal support. Both parties now contend the final judgment must be reversed based on a variety of purported errors. We reverse the final judgment in part, affirm it in part, and remand the matter to the trial court for further consideration of certain issues in light of the conclusions we reach below.
Theresa and Leslie Quock were married June 1, 1986, and permanently separated November 1, 1998. They have three children, ages 15, 17 and 20.
During and after marriage, Leslie was employed as a senior vice president and trust director for Wells Fargo Bank.1 Theresa was employed as an accountant from 1976 through 1993, and as a general auditor and vice president for Safeway Corporation in 1993 until she voluntarily left the workforce at the end of that year to care for the children.
At the time of separation, Leslie and Theresa together owned a significant amount of assets, including investment accounts, real property (including a time-share vacation property), checking and savings accounts, equity lines, stock options, retirement funds, and various other forms of deferred compensation.
In May 2001, the trial court filed an order after hearing concerning, among other things, child and spousal support. Theresa was awarded temporary spousal support in the amount of $3,500 per month, but was warned by the trial court to return to full-time employment within 6 months. Leslie, who had custody of the three children, was awarded offsetting child support in the amount of $1,533 per month.
In September 2001, the parties stipulated to the appointment of John Mangini, a certified public accountant, as a joint accounting expert. As accounting expert, Mangini was given the task to, among other things, trace and calculate community and separate property, trace all flows of income available for support, determine the parties' claims to certain credits, reimbursements and charges, and account for and characterize the parties' retirement and other investment funds.
In October 2002, the trial court held another hearing in this matter to address issues of spousal and child support. At the hearing, the trial court again warned Theresa that she must return to full-time employment within a reasonable period of time, and found that, effective September 1, 2002, employment income in the amount of $5,000 was to be imputed to her for purposes of calculating support.
Mangini submitted his initial report in June 2004. In November 2004, the trial court set a one day trial regarding the characterization and division of property identified in Mangini's report. At the 2004 trial, Mangini appeared as a witness and his report was admitted into evidence, but before he completed his testimony, trial was interrupted by a criminal trial that had calendar preference. During recess, however, the parties were able to resolve several issues by stipulation, including issues related to the division of certain stock, dividends and other property.
Trial was continued on January 23, 24 and 25, 2006, at which time several remaining issues were heard. The parties submitted lengthy declarations in lieu of live testimony in advance of trial. In addition, the parties submitted exhibits and appeared with Mangini as witnesses at trial.
On June 6, 2006, the trial court filed a tentative statement of decision. Both parties filed lengthy objections to that tentative decision and, on January 11, 2007, the trial court entered the final judgment regarding child and spousal support, property division, retirement accounts and attorney's fees, attaching the final statement of decision as an exhibit. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
Theresa contends the final judgment must be reversed on appeal because the trial court erred in: (1) calculating spousal support; (2) failing to reimburse her or the community for certain interest payments; (3) treating certain commingled accounts as Leslie's separate property; (4) applying an erroneous tax rate when calculating the community's interest in certain stock; (5) applying the so-called "time rule" when calculating the community's interest in certain deferred compensation; (6) reimbursing Leslie for amounts paid for life insurance policy premiums; (7) failing to calculate the community's interest in certain assets as of the date of trial; (8) crediting Leslie for amounts paid to experts; (9) crediting Leslie for a $30,000 payment made to her; (10) failing to credit her for Leslie's purchase of certain stock; (11) relying on a flawed expert report; (12) reimbursing Leslie for child support add-ons; (13) violating her right to due process; and (14) declining to sanction Leslie for his breach of fiduciary duty.
On cross-appeal, Leslie contends the trial court erred in apportioning his Wells Fargo Bank 401k plan between community property and separate property. In addition, Leslie contends that, should we reverse the final judgment on any ground raised by Theresa, we should also remand for reconsideration of the spousal support and attorney's fees orders based on the change in wealth distribution resulting from such reversal.
Where a party challenges the trial court's factual findings in support of its final judgment in a marriage dissolution case, our review is limited to a determination of whether substantial evidence exists in support of such findings. (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) (In re Marriage of Drake, supra, at p. 1151.)
Further, we acknowledge "the trial court has broad discretion to achieve equity in the distribution of marital assets." (In re Marriage of Zaentz (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 154, 164.) "Courts have frequently pointed out that the disposition of marital property is within the trial court's discretion, by whatever method or formula will `achieve substantial justice between the parties.' (Tassi v. Tassi (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 680, 691 ; see also In re Marriage of Poppe [(1979)] 97 Cal.App.3d [1,] 11.) Similarly, ` "`In making such apportionment between separate and community property our courts have developed no precise criterion or fixed standard, but have endeavored to adopt that yardstick which is most appropriate and equitable in a particular situation . . . "[Citations.]' (Beam v. Bank of America (1971) 6 Cal.3d 12, 18 [98 Cal.Rptr. 137, 490 P.2d 257].)" (In re Marriage of Hug (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 791.)
Theresa first contends the trial court erred by imputing employment income to her in the amount of $112,500 per year when calculating child and spousal support. According to Theresa, the trial court's decision in this regard was erroneous because it conflicted with an October 2002 court order, based on a stipulation by the parties, to impute to her an employment income of $5,000 per month when calculating support. Theresa further argues the trial court's decision was not supported by any evidence that she was capable of earning an income of $112,500 per year. We disagree with both claims.
We first consider whether the trial court was bound to follow the October 2002 order when imputing income to Theresa for purposes of setting spousal and child support. That order provided in relevant part:
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In seeking to reverse the trial court's decision to impute a higher income to her than that provided for in the October 2002 order, Theresa argues that "[a]n agreement as to support may not be modified except by the parties." In doing so, Theresa relies upon Family Code section 3651.2 Under that statute, however, a presumption exists that both child and spousal support agreements are indeed modifiable by court order.3 (In re Marriage of Hufford (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 825, 828.) In fact, with respect to child support orders, "[t]he court's jurisdiction over child support issues may not be restricted by the parents, and any agreement purporting to modify or divest the court's jurisdiction over child support is void as contrary to public policy." (In re Marriage of LaBass & Munsee (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1341.)
California courts have likewise recognized that public policy favors flexibility in adopting spousal support awards. " `[F]lexibility in the administration of judgments which will affect the lives of the parties far into the future, especially after very lengthy marriages, is to be...
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