In re the Marriage of Aaron R. Swain And Kimberli A. Swain.Aaron R. Swain
| Decision Date | 08 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 30738.,SD 30738. |
| Citation | 348 S.W.3d 804 |
| Parties | In re: The MARRIAGE OF Aaron R. SWAIN and Kimberli A. Swain.Aaron R. Swain, Petitioner–Respondent,v.Kimberli A. Swain, Respondent–Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James R. Sharp, Springfield, MO, for Appellant.J. Matthew Miller, Springfield, MO, for Respondent.DON E. BURRELL, Judge.
In a single point relied on, Kimberli A. Swain (“Mother”) appeals the judgment that: (1) denied her motion to increase and extend the duration of child support; and (2) granted Aaron R. Swain's (“Father”) counter-motion to decrease child support and declare the parties' eldest child emancipated. As best we discern Mother's point,1 she claims the trial court erred by misstating the law in “finding that it did not have jurisdiction to order child support and college expenses past the parties' children's eighteenth birthdays” because “Washington law allows a court to order the parties to pay a portion of a child's post-secondary educational expenses up until the child turns twenty-three years of age as well as guideline child support[.]” Because the trial court's judgment may be interpreted as having been based on other valid grounds not challenged by Mother, we affirm.
Standard of Review
We must affirm the judgment in a court-tried case unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law. Thomas v. Thomas, 171 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Mo.App. W.D.2005). “[U]nder the scope of review of Rule 73.01(c),[ 2] the trial court's judgment is presumed valid and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate the judgment was incorrect.” Crawford v. Crawford, 986 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Mo.App. W.D.1999). We view the evidence and all inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Blair v. Blair, 147 S.W.3d 882, 885 (Mo.App. W.D.2004). McAllister v. McAllister, 101 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Mo.App. E.D.2003) (internal citations omitted).
Facts
Mother and Father were married in California. At some point, Father, who was in the military, was transferred to an Air Force base in the state of Washington. Mother and the parties' two children had moved to Missouri. The parties' marriage was later dissolved in the state of Washington in March 2001. The Washington dissolution decree made Mother the residential custodian of the children and ordered Father to pay child support of $2,600 per month. Mother signed the decree on its last page under a caption entitled: “Approved for entry: Notice of presentation waived[.]”
The decree provided that child support “shall be paid [ ][u]ntil the children reach the age of eighteen, or as long as the children remain enrolled in high school, whichever occurs last, except as otherwise provided below in [p]aragraph 3.14.” Paragraph 3.14 stated:
3.14 POST SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT.
Other:
The obligor parent [Father] shall maintain one or more investment accounts into which he shall make regular deposits for purposes of post-secondary educational support of the children. [Mother] shall be entitled to a written report as to the balance of any such account, and the identity and performance of the investments therein, within 30 days after mailing a written request to the obligor parent.
On July 11, 2001, Father registered the parties' Washington dissolution decree as a foreign judgment in the circuit court of Christian County, Missouri, where Mother and the children were residing, and filed a motion to modify its terms. Father's motion was tried on December 6, 2002. On October 2, 2003, the court entered its “Modification Judgment” as to Child Support and Parenting Plan (“first modification judgment”). The first modification judgment changed the parties' contact schedule with the children, lowered Father's monthly child support obligation from $2,600 to $1,614, and found that Father had contemptuously failed to make any contributions to the children's college fund accounts as required by the Washington decree. The court then further found that Father had purged himself of that contempt by “depositing some funds into said college fund accounts[ ]” and Neither party appealed the first modification judgment.
On June 13, 2008, Mother filed a Motion for Contempt—which accused Father of having violated the terms of the first modification judgment—along with a motion to modify the first modification judgment pursuant to section 452.340 RSMo, Cum.Supp.2006.3 Mother's motion to modify alleged there had been a substantial and continuing change in the circumstance of the parties and the children and sought, among other things, an order “making the parties responsible for a proportionate amount [of the children's college expenses] [based on] their respective gross income.” Father's “answer” to Mother's motion alleged the trial court lacked “jurisdiction” to modify either the post-secondary education provisions of the Washington decree or the duration of the child support award set forth therein. Father also filed an amended counter-motion to modify that requested a reduction of his child support obligation based on allegations that his income had decreased, that Mother's income had increased, and that their eldest child had “reached the age of majority for the State of Washington and, according to the [original Washington decree], she [wa]s [there]by emancipated as of [the date of her 18th birthday].”
The competing motions were tried on June 11, 2009, and the trial court entered its judgment on March 19, 2010. As relevant to the issue raised on appeal, the judgment included the following findings:
1. A Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage was entered in the Superior Court of Washington, County of Pierce[,] on March 23, 2001. In said Decree, the Court ordered child support to be paid “until the children reach the age of 18 or as long as the children remain enrolled in high school, whichever occurs last, except as otherwise provided below in Paragraph 3.14.” Paragraph 3.14 of the Judgment states that
....
8. [Mother's] Motion to Modify Judgment of Child Support, filed June 13, 2008, in which [Mother] alleges that there has been a substantial improvement in [Father's] financial condition; that the children have expressed a desire to enroll in college and the needs for educational expenses have increased; and, inter alia, that the age of majority is now 21 years of age, is denied.
....
10. [Father's] Counter Motion to Modify is sustained regarding child support. The Court finds that substantial and continuing changes of circumstance have occurred in regard to [Father's] income. The Court finds [the parties' current incomes and sets child support in the presumed amount as set forth in its attached Form 14].
11. The Court finds that the minor children will [sic] are emancipated by law at age 18. The Court finds that the emancipation language of the Washington Decree is controlling and cannot be modified or otherwise changed in the State of Missouri. Accordingly, the Court finds the minor child, [eldest child], to be now emancipated and [youngest child] is emancipated as of October 29, 2009, the date upon which he turned age 18.
Analysis
Neither party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law. In a court-tried case, “[a]ll fact issues upon which no specific findings are made shall be considered as having been found in accordance with the result reached.” Rule 73.01(c); Walker v. Walker, 631 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Mo.App. E.D.1982).
Section 454.973(c) RSMo 2000, a portion of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act as enacted in Missouri, states, “A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state.” This section prohibits a Missouri court from extending the duration of a child support order beyond that allowed under the law of the issuing state. Kerr v. Kerr, 100 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Mo.App. W.D.2003); Lunceford v. Lunceford, 204 S.W.3d 699, 708–09 (Mo.App. W.D.2006). The parties agreed at oral argument that Washington state law governs whether the trial court had the ability to modify the Washington decree's provisions concerning post-secondary education expenses and the age at which the children would no longer be eligible to receive child support.
Mother's motion alleged that a child support modification was necessary because there had been a substantial and continuing change in the circumstances of the parties and the children since the first modification judgment was entered. Washington, like Missouri, also allows a modification in child support “upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances.” Section 26.09.170( l )(b) of the Revised Code of Washington.4 Another subsection of the Washington statute provides that “[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child...
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