In re The Marriage of Wells
| Decision Date | 30 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 12-21-00152-CV |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF RONALD WELLS AND DEBORAH WELLS |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
Greg Neeley Justice.
Deborah Wells appeals from a final decree of divorce in which the trial court granted Ronald Wells' petition for divorce and divided the parties' marital estate. Deborah presents three issues on appeal. We affirm the portion of the decree granting a divorce, and reverse and remand for a new trial on the property division and related claims.
Ronald and Deborah were married on January 19, 1982. The couple separated in August or September 2014. Ronald filed for divorce on December 7, 2018, and Deborah counter-petitioned for divorce on October 15, 2019. The couple had children who are now adults. The trial court held a bench trial and signed a final decree of divorce on June 11, 2021, and subsequently signed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court also signed temporary orders concerning the parties' use and possession of real estate pending appeal on November 8, 2021. The trial court granted the divorce and divided the parties' property. The trial court confirmed separate property for both parties.
The primary subject of this appeal is the trial court's reimbursement claims awarded to Ronald for the community estate's debt reduction, real estate tax payments capital and noncapital improvements, and uncompensated time toil, talent, and effort (TTT&E) for the benefit of Deborah's separate property. Specifically, Deborah owns two tracts of irrigated farmland as her separate property in Cochran County, Texas, of 177 acres and 160 acres (Cochran County property), operating as B&W Farms, which she inherited. Deborah also owns separate property in Van Zandt County (Van Zandt County property)-a three-quarters interest in four tracts of land subject to three separate promissory notes (the Musselwhite, McCrae, and McGehee notes), which Deborah alleges are subject to a coownership buy-sell agreement that requires one owner to make an offer to another owner, and the offeree can accept the offer or buy the offeror's property for that price. Deborah acquired the Van Zandt County property with relatively small down payments from her separate funds. Ronald, a practicing attorney with his own law practice, has made all the payments on the Van Zandt County property since they initially purchased it. Deborah has a law license and a master's degree but left the corporate workforce to raise their children. Since their separation, Deborah has worked as a flight attendant for the military.
Ronald has lived at the Van Zandt County property since the couple's separation. The Van Zandt County property is 236 acres, which contains an approximately 30-acre lake. Deborah purchased the property initially in hopes to operate it as a tree farm and to pass along eventually to their children. The Van Zandt County property has a home that the parties renovated and repaired through the years. Moreover, Ronald made several notable improvements to the property, including among other things described later in this opinion, the construction of a large barn with living quarters, extensive repairs to the lake's spillway and dam, along with repairs and modifications to the boathouse, dock, and pier. Deborah visits the property infrequently, and has lived at an apartment, with friends, or in her vehicle since the couple's separation.
The trial court awarded Ronald equitable reimbursement for one-half of the community estate's following eight equitable reimbursement claims that are the primary subject of this appeal:
In relevant part, the trial court thus awarded Ronald as part of its judgment $366,504.00, ordering Deborah to execute a real estate lien note and deed of trust in that amount and secured by an equitable reimbursement lien on the Van Zandt County property. This amount reflects Ronald's half of the community estate's total reimbursement claims related to the Van Zandt County property. The trial court also awarded $4,166.00 for the remaining reimbursement claim relating to Ronald's payment of real estate taxes on the Cochran County real estate, and ordered that Deborah execute a promissory note and deed of trust for that amount.[2] The trial court also granted Ronald continued use and possession of the residence located on Deborah's separate property in Van Zandt County. This appeal followed.
In her first issue, Deborah contends that the trial court abused its discretion in its award and valuation of all eight of Ronald's equitable reimbursement claims.
We review a trial court's award of reimbursement under an abuse of discretion standard. Matter of Estate of Baker, 627 S.W.3d 523, 526-27 (Tex. App.-Waco 2021, no pet.). Abuse of discretion is when a trial court's decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding principles. In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271 282 (Tex. 2019). If there is some evidence of substantive and probative character to support the trial court's decision, there is no abuse of discretion. Ayala v. Ayala, 387 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Great latitude must be given to the trial court in applying equitable principles to value a claim for reimbursement. Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988). An equitable claim for reimbursement is not merely a balancing of the ledgers between the marital estates. Id. The discretion to be exercised in evaluating a claim for reimbursement is equally as broad as that discretion subsequently exercised by the trial court in making a "just and right" division of the community property. Id. However, a trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). Accordingly, a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). Although not independent grounds of error, the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of McCoy, 488 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
In an appeal from a judgment after a bench trial, we accord the trial court's findings of fact the same weight as a jury's verdict. Milton M. Cooke Co. v. First Bank & Trust, 290 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no. pet.); see Brown v. Brown, 236 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or there is no evidence to support the finding. Walker v. Anderson, 232 S.W.3d 899, 907 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2007, no pet.); see McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); Mullins v. Mullins, 202 S.W.3d 869, 874, 876-77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied). However, when an appellant contests a trial court's findings of fact, an appellate court reviews those fact findings by the same standards it uses to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's findings. See Pulley v. Milberger, 198 S.W.3d 418, 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
To determine whether legally sufficient evidence supports a challenged finding, we must consider evidence that favors the finding if a reasonable factfinder could consider it, and we must disregard evidence contrary to the challenged finding unless a reasonable factfinder could not disregard it. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We sustain a legal insufficiency, or "no evidence," point when the record demonstrates (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) that the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) that the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) that the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Id. at 810. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence supporting the finding, as a whole, rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a...
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