In re Thompson
| Citation | 11 S.W.3d 913 |
| Parties | In re Jeffrey Allen THOMPSON, a minor child. Pamela Kay White, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Patricia Teresa Thompson, Respondent/Appellee, and Debbie Coke & Donald Dooley, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defts./Appellees, v. Mary Helen Looper, Defendant/Counter-Pltf./Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 24 January 2000 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Tennessee |
Susan MacKenzie, Memphis, for Appellants.
Deborah L. Pagan, David R. Huggins, The National Legal Foundation, Memphis, for Teresa Thompson.
Debbie L. Coke, Memphis, pro se.
Stephen M. Crampton, Michael J. DePrimo, American Family Association Law Center, Tupelo, MS, for Amicus Curiae, American Family Association, Inc.
Abby R. Rubenfeld, and Rubenfeld & Associates, Shannon Minter, National Center For Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, CA, for Amici Curiae, The National Center for Lesbian Rights, The American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee, Tennessee National Organization for Women, Memphis National Organization for Women, LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund.
Application for Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court January 24, 2000.
This consolidated appeal stems from two separate cases, each involving a nonparent's claim to visitation where the nonparent and the child's biological mother previously maintained a same-sex relationship and where the nonparent previously provided care and support to the child. In White v. Thompson, Patricia Teresa Thompson is the biological mother to a son, who will be hereafter referred to by his first and last initials, "J.T.," and Pamela Kay White is the nonparent who previously provided care and support to J.T. White commenced the action by filing a Petition for Visitation, which was ultimately dismissed by the trial court. In Coke v. Looper, Debbie Coke is the biological mother to a daughter, who will hereafter be designated by her first and last initials, "J.C.," Donald Dooley is the biological father to J.C., and Mary Helen Looper is the nonparent who previously provided care and support to J.C. Although Coke and Dooley originally commenced the action by filing a "Complaint for Permanent Restraining Order and for Damages," Looper filed a "counter-complaint" that asserted, among other things, visitation rights. This claim to visitation was ultimately dismissed by the trial court, and Coke's and Dooley's claims were voluntarily nonsuited. On appeal, White's and Looper's jointly filed brief states the following:
There is a single issue presented for review in this consolidated appeal: Whether a petition for visitation may be brought by a woman who, in the context of a long-term relationship, planned for, participated in the conception and birth of, provided financial assistance for, and until foreclosed from doing so by the biological mother, acted as a parent to the child ultimately borne by her partner.
Based upon the following, we affirm the trial court in each case.
On June 20, 1996, White filed a "Petition for Visitation" against Thompson in the Shelby County Circuit Court. In the petition, White alleged that she and Thompson "were involved in a committed intimate relationship beginning in 1987," and that "throughout the course of the relationship the parties discussed having a child together." According to White's petition, Thompson successfully underwent artificial insemination on November 2, 1992, and White contributed to Thompson's support both during and after Thompson's pregnancy. Thompson's son, J.T., was born July 10, 1993. J.T.'s first name was based upon White's brother, and his middle name was based upon Thompson's father. After J.T.'s birth, both Thompson and White provided care and support to J.T. In June of 1994, however, the relationship between Thompson and White ended, and they ceased living together in August 1994. After the termination of these parties' relationship, however, White continued to provide care and support to J.T. until Thompson began "to interfere with White's relationship with the minor child by refusing and/or interfering with visitation and denying White the opportunity to talk with the minor child on the telephone." White's petition seeking visitation alleged, "It is in the best interest of the minor child ... that White have regular and ongoing visitation with the minor child."
On October 4, 1996, Thompson filed a response to White's Petition for Visitation, wherein she asserted that White "lacks standing to assert visitation rights." She further asserted that White had not alleged any threat of substantial harm to J.T. so as to overcome Thompson's constitutionally protected parental rights.1 As such, on November 7, 1996, Thompson filed a motion to dismiss White's petition. White thereafter responded to Thompson's motion to dismiss, asserting, among other things, that she had stood in loco parentis to the minor child, and that she therefore had standing to assert a claim to visitation.
Ultimately, on January 9, 1998, the trial court entered an order which granted Thompson's motion to dismiss and which stated, in part, the following:
Thereafter, White appealed.
On August 15, 1996, Coke and Dooley jointly filed a "Complaint for Permanent Restraining Order and for Damages" against Looper in the Shelby County Chancery Court. Thereafter Looper filed an "Answer and Counter Complaint for Breach of Contract, Permanent Restraining Order and for Damages." Looper's answer admitted that Coke and Dooley are the natural parents of J.C., who was born September 18, 1992, and that J.C. had been legitimated by order of the Shelby County Juvenile Court on July 30, 1996. In Looper's counter-complaint, she alleged that J.C. "was born as the result of artificial insemination after two years of joint efforts by ... Coke and ... Looper to produce a child that they would raise together...." According to Looper's counter-complaint, on April 30, 1993, Coke and Looper entered a "co-parenting agreement," which provided in part the following:
Looper's counter-complaint further alleged that Looper and Coke ceased living together in December 1995, and that these parties voluntarily implemented a visitation arrangement that was followed each week until Coke and Dooley commenced this action. Looper's counter-complaint sought damages based upon breach of contract and tort claims. Looper's counter-complaint also requested, however, that Coke and Dooley "be permanently enjoined from interfering with Looper's relationship and visitation with the minor child and establish a visitation schedule."
On March 24, 1997, Dooley individually filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein he asserted that Looper had failed to allege any actions by Dooley that would support any breach of contract or tort claim against him. Dooley further asserted that Looper failed "to state any legally cognizable interest ... as to the minor child, who is not the child of Looper either by blood or adoption, such as would support a claim for rights to the child or for visitation with such child." On November 7, 1997, Coke filed a separate motion to dismiss, which sought dismissal of Looper's claims as against Coke.
After a November 14, 1997 hearing, the chancery court entered an order providing "That the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Counter-Complaint against Donald Dooley is hereby granted, and the Counter-Complaint filed by Mary Helen Looper against Donald Dooley is hereby dismissed, with prejudice." (III R. at 64.) The chancery court also entered a separate order that provided, "The Motion to Dismiss filed by ... Coke is granted as to ... Looper's claim for visitation...." This order reflected the following statements made by the chancellor at the November 14, 1997 hearing:
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