In re Thompson

Decision Date30 October 2000
Docket NumberNo. 25205.,25205.
Citation539 S.E.2d 396,343 S.C. 1
PartiesIn the Matter of David Reed THOMPSON, Respondent.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Attorney General Charles M. Condon, and Senior Assistant Attorney General James G. Bogle, Jr., both of Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Sherwood M. Cleveland and Clifford O. Koon, both of Rogers Townsend & Thomas, PC, of Columbia, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") appeals the Panel's decision to indefinitely suspend David Reed Thompson ("Thompson") from the practice of law and requests disbarment.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Thompson was a single practitioner in Charleston, South Carolina. He exercised sole and exclusive control over his firm's financial records, client funds, and client files. Before practicing law in South Carolina, Thompson attended the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill where he was awarded the John Motley Morehead Scholarship. After he completed his undergraduate education, Thompson was commissioned as an officer in the United States Marine Corps and served two tours of duty in Vietnam. He then graduated from the University of North Carolina School of Law in 1973. He subsequently married and is the father of three children. He practiced law in Goldsboro and Durham, North Carolina before settling in Charleston where he practiced law continuously until his temporary suspension on August 22, 1996.

Thompson began experiencing emotional problems in the early 1970s shortly after his return from Vietnam. In 1988, he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was hospitalized at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Charleston, South Carolina. His mental illness was exacerbated by the fact that he was also experiencing financial and marital difficulties.

On July 11, 1996, Thompson self-reported to the Supreme Court Commission on Lawyer Conduct that he had imbalances in his trust account he could not resolve. He met with George Tansil ("Tansil"), the chief investigator for the Commission, on August 9 and 15, 1996. On August 15, 1996, Thompson consented to: (1) a temporary suspension from the practice of law; (2) the appointment of a trustee to administer his bank account; (3) the freezing of his accounts; and (4) an audit of his trust accounts. On August 22, 1996, the Supreme Court temporarily suspended Thompson from the practice of law and designated Kenneth C. Krawcheck ("Krawcheck") as trustee.

Thompson then moved to Washington, Pennsylvania where he attempted suicide. On August 25, 1996, he was involuntarily committed and hospitalized at the Medical University of South Carolina Medical Center ("MUSC") for the treatment of severe bipolar disorder. Thompson was released on September 9, 1996, pursuant to an order of the Probate Court finding him mentally ill and lacking "sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to his treatment," and ordering that he undergo an outpatient treatment program at Charleston Area Mental Health Center for at least six months.

The Panel concluded that "based on the medical evidence in this case, during the period prior to and including 1995 and 1996, Mr. Thompson, by reason of his manic depressive state, did not have the requisite mental capacity and judgment to manage and direct his law practice or his financial affairs."

On September 13, 1996, the ODC filed a complaint alleging the following:

The First Union Matter: Thompson maintained a trust account with First Union that was closed on June 28, 1996, on the suspicion of check kiting.1 Between July 1995 and June 1996, Thompson's First Union Trust Account showed negative balances on six occasions with the maximum overdraft of $23,031.00. Between December 1994 and May 1996, Thompson wrote eighteen checks from his First Union account for personal use totaling $62,184.00, including checks for an office painting, car maintenance, college tuition, the Boy Scouts, and his wife's property taxes.
First Citizens Matter: Thompson's First Citizens Trust Account reflected negative balances on twenty-five occasions with a maximum overdraft of $83,591.00. Eighteen trust account checks were returned for insufficient funds. As a result of an audit by Chicago Title, as of October 4, 1996, there was shortage of $128,923.00 in his First Citizens Trust Account.

The Complaint also alleges that Thompson engaged in a complicated check kiting scheme and that he commingled personal funds into his trust accounts.

Thompson filed an Answer admitting to all of the factual allegations in the Complaint, but denying that he was capable of forming the requisite intent to engage in check kiting and denying all specific allegations pertaining to check kiting. He admitted that Chicago Title's audit showed a shortage of $128,923.00, but did not admit to the accuracy of the audit or to the amount of the shortage.

In 1997, pursuant to an interpleader action brought by Krawcheck, two accountants and the law firm Rogers, Townsend & Thomas were retained to analyze the trust accounts and determine the precise amount of the shortfall in the accounts. The total claims against the trust accounts were $319,773.00, which consisted of several small claims and the claims of Chicago Title and Green Tree Financial. All claimants were paid in full out of the trust account, pursuant to an order by the Master in Equity, except for Chicago Title and Green Tree Financial, each of which received a substantial amount of their claims from Thompson's malpractice carrier. Chicago Title and Green Tree Financial bore the $63,016.00 shortfall.2

On August 22, 1996, this Court placed Thompson on Temporary Suspension. On February 12, 1997, Thompson was transferred to Incapacity Inactive Status pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR. Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts, Associate Professor of the University of South Carolina School of Medicine in the Department of Neuropsychology and Director of Forensic Services, examined Thompson in October 1998 to determine whether he should remain on Incapacity Inactive Status. Although she testified that Thompson had bipolar disorder, Dr. Schwartz-Watts testified that, in her opinion, Thompson knew the difference between right and wrong while committing acts of misconduct.

On April 2, 1999, this Court removed Thompson from Incapacity Inactive Status by Order consented to by Thompson and the Attorney General and returned him to Interim Suspension. A Panel Hearing was held in Columbia on August 19, 1999. Thompson did not attend the hearing because he currently lives in Japan, where he teaches English to Japanese students at Roosevelt University in Tokyo. However, Thompson was represented by counsel at the hearing.

Based on the testimony and uncontested medical evidence, the Panel concluded that Thompson suffered from "an aggravated and severe case of bipolar disorder beyond his control and ability to cope for a period of ten years." On December 10, 2000, the Subpanel issued a Report recommending an Indefinite Suspension from the practice of law until "he is able to demonstrate by competent medical evidence that he has sufficiently recovered from bipolar disorder disease to the point of being able to exercise the discretion and judgment necessary to practice law." The ODC filed Exceptions and a Supporting Brief on January 10, 2000. On February 15, 2000, the Panel advised the parties that it was adopting the Subpanel's Report. The ODC appealed the decision of the Panel and requests that this Court disbar Thompson. The following issues are before this Court:

I. Did the Panel err by failing to present findings of fact in support of misconduct, proven by clear and convincing evidence, as required by Rule 26(c)(7) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR?
II. Did the Panel err by failing to present violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR, where Thompson admitted to these violations in his interview with Tansil, and where the violations were supported by the record?
III. Did the Panel err in finding Thompson lacked the mental capacity to commit the misconduct?
IV. Did the Panel err by failing to recommend disbarment?
V. Did the Panel err by failing to assess the costs of these proceedings?
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Findings of Fact

The ODC argues the Panel erred by failing to present findings of fact in support of misconduct, proven by clear and convincing evidence, as required by Rule 26(c)(7) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR. We agree.

Rule 26(c)(7) directs the Subpanel or hearing officer to "file a report with the hearing panel setting forth the findings of fact and conclusions of the subpanel or hearing officer." The Panel presented several examples of Thompson's misconduct, including examples of check kiting, overdrafts, and commingling. Thompson admitted to all of the factual allegations in the Complaint except for his ability to form the requisite intent to engage in check kiting. The Panel, therefore, focused primarily on the mitigating facts of: (1) Thompson's severe bipolar disorder; (2) his cooperation with the investigation; and (3) his efforts to effect restitution.

While the Panel's recommendation included the details of the First Union and First Citizens Matters, the recommendation did not sufficiently detail all of Thompson's misconduct. The ODC describes the following acts of misconduct in its brief:

1. Depositing $11,755.17.00 of personal funds into his First Citizens trust account to cover client funds that may have been insufficient due to his misconduct.
2. Obtaining loans from other banks and placing them into his trust account at First Citizens.
3. The Blanding Matter: Thompson's Disbursement Sheet does not show a $300,000.00 check for the Blanding real estate transaction. A trust account check, made payable to Thompson in the amount of
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    ...authority to discipline attorneys and to decide the appropriate sanction after a thorough review of the record.” In re Thompson, 343 S.C. 1, 10, 539 S.E.2d 396, 401 (2000) (citations omitted). “Although this Court is not bound by the findings of the Panel and Committee, these findings are e......
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