In re Vora
| Decision Date | 12 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 25664.,25664. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re Anant A. VORA, M.D. Anant A. VORA, M.D., Respondent, v. LEXINGTON MEDICAL CENTER, Appellant. |
Andrew F. Lindemann, of Davidson, Morrison and Lindemann, P.A., and Ernest J. Nauful, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent.
Deborah R.J. Shupe, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Lexington County Medical Center (Hospital) appeals an order of the circuit court requiring it to reinstate the privileges of Anant A. Vora, M.D., to practice pediatric medicine at its facility. We reverse.
In September 1997, Hospital's Chief of staff, Dr. Givens, advised Dr. Vora that its Medical Executive Committee (MEC) had received a recommendation from the Quality Assessment Committee (QAC) to initiate corrective action in regard to Dr. Vora's clinical privileges. An ad hoc committee was appointed to investigate Dr. Vora's clinical practice and report to the MEC. In January 1998, the ad hoc committee found, after reviewing a number of his cases, that Dr. Vora had 1) a pattern of inappropriate hospitalization, stays which could have either been shortened or which could have utilized outpatient treatment, 2) use of set protocols inappropriately in cases of like diseases, regardless of the degree of impairment, 3) inappropriate use of antibiotics and outdated modalities, 4) a pattern of overstating the severity of illness, and 5) a missed diagnosis which resulted in unnecessary hospitalization and surgical intervention. Based on these findings, the ad hoc Committee recommended Dr. Vora's clinical privileges be terminated indefinitely, and corrective action be taken.
The matter was reviewed by the MEC, which concluded there had been "a continual pattern of clinical deficiencies since 1988." Pursuant to Hospital's Medical Staff By-Laws, Dr. Vora requested and was given a hearing by the Fair Hearing Committee, which took place over six separate days with witnesses and evidence. The Hearing Committee found as follows:
Based on these findings, the Fair Hearing Committee recommended Dr. Vora's staff privileges be temporarily suspended until completion of certain corrective measures. The MEC upheld the findings of the Fair Hearing Committee, and imposed a temporary suspension while corrective measures were undertaken, to be accomplished within 18 months. Dr. Vora sought an appellate review of the MEC's findings, which was conducted by a committee (the Appellate Review Board) of the Board of Directors of Lexington Medical Center on April 19, 1999. On May 27, 1999, the Appellate Review Committee issued its report, recommending the action taken by the MEC be affirmed. The Board of Directors thereafter issued its final decision unanimously adopting the Report of the Appellate Committee. Dr. Vora appealed the final decision of the Board to the circuit court, which reversed the Board's decision, finding certain procedures employed by Hospital's various panels, boards and committees deprived Dr. Vora of due process; the court ordered Dr. Vora's privileges be reinstated. Hospital appeals.
ISSUES
1) Did the circuit court err in ruling Dr. Vora's due process rights had been violated?
1) Should the circuit court have reversed on the ground that the disciplinary action taken by the Hospital was not supported by the evidence?
A physician's interest in being reappointed to a hospital staff is a property interest which may not be denied without compliance with the procedural and substantive due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Huellmantel v. Greenville Hosp. System, 303 S.C. 549, 402 S.E.2d 489 (Ct.App.1991), citing In Re: Zaman, 285 S.C. 345, 329 S.E.2d 436 (1985). Procedural due process requirements are not technical; no particular form of procedure is necessary. Id. The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that at a minimum certain elements must be present. These include (1) adequate notice; (2) adequate opportunity for a hearing; (3) the right to introduce evidence; and (4) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. We find these criteria were amply met in this case.
The circuit court found a violation of Dr. Vora's due process rights for several reasons. It found a) Hospital had imposed an unreasonable burden of proof on Dr. Vora, b) Dr. Vora was denied the right to voir dire members of the Fair Hearing Panel, and c) he was denied the right to meaningfully crossexamine one of the Hospital's witnesses. We hold these deprivations do not rise to the level of a due process violation.2
The burden of proof set forth in Hospital's Fair Hearing Plan states:
When a hearing relates to Section 2.1(a), (e), (h) or (i),3 the practitioner who requested the hearing shall have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the adverse recommendation or action lacks any factual basis, or that such basis or the conclusions therefrom are either arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. Otherwise, the body whose adverse recommendation or action occasioned the hearing shall4 thereafter be responsible for supporting his challenge to the adverse recommendation for action by clear and convincing evidence that such basis or conclusions drawn therefrom are either arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious.
(emphasis supplied). The circuit court found the burden of proof set forth in the Fair Hearing Plan "plainly ambiguous, unintelligible, arbitrary, capricious, and therefore violated due process requirements of notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard." It then found it "manifestly clear that [Hospital] has imposed an unreasonable burden of proof on [Dr. Vora], such that the decision of the Board of Directors must be reversed." Contrary to the circuit court's finding, the evidence simply does not demonstrate that the Hospital placed an unreasonable burden of proof on Dr. Vora.
The Appellate Review Committee, in reviewing the MEC's imposition of sanctions against Vora, stated that "In all fairness to the Practitioner, this committee has reviewed the record before the hearing committee by imposing the same standard of proof, i.e., by clear and convincing evidence, upon the MEC, even though this is not strictly required by... the Fair Hearing Plan." (Emphasis supplied). Given the complete and independent review by the Appellate Review Committee, we find any alleged inappropriate burden at earlier stages was harmless. Cf Ross v. Medical University of South Carolina, 328 S.C. 51, 492 S.E.2d 62 (1997) (). See also Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.1987)
(); Davis v. Mann, 721 F.Supp. 796 (S.D.Miss.1988) (). The circuit court erred in finding the burden imposed upon Dr. Vora resulted in a due process violation.5
The circuit court also held Dr. Vora was denied due process by the trial court's refusal to ask members of the Fair Hearing Panel whether they had been represented by the prosecuting attorney. We do not find this deprived Dr. Vora of due process.
Dr. Vora was advised in advance as to the names of the physicians who had been appointed to the Hearing Committee. Dr. Vora objected and had one panel member, Dr. Mubarek, removed from the panel.6
At the hearing, Dr. Vora sought to inquire as to whether any panel member had any relationship with Hospital's attorney, Attorney Nauful. Although the Hearing Officer would not allow Dr. Vora's counsel to pose this specific question, the officer did ask at the outset whether "any member of the five member panel know[s] of any reason why they would be biased or prejudiced in any way so as to be unable to render a fair hearing to the physician in this matter?" No member of the panel responded.
The parties liken the situation to voir dire of a jury panel. As noted by the Court in Thompson v. O'Rourke, 288 S.C. 13, 14, 339 S.E.2d 505, 506 (1986), a party seeking a new trial based upon the disqualification of a juror must show: (1) the fact of disqualification; (2) the grounds for disqualification were unknown prior to verdict; and (3) the moving party was not negligent in failing to learn of the disqualification before verdict. We recognized in Thompson, that "there is no absolute rule of disqualification based on a juror's relationship to an attorney in the case." 288 S.C. at 15, 339 S.E.2d at 506.
Dr. Vora has presented no evidence that any of the panel members had any relationship with Hospital's attorney, let alone that any possible relationship would have disqualified them. There is simply no evidence in the record any of the panel members had any relationship with Hospital's attorney, or that, even if they did, they were somehow prejudiced against Dr. Vora. We find the trial court erred in finding a due...
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