In re Warren Crandall
| Decision Date | 08 October 1898 |
| Docket Number | 11144 |
| Parties | In re WARREN CRANDALL, JR., Petitioner |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Decided July, 1898.
Original proceedings in habeas corpus.
Lamb & Hogueland, for petitioner.
Joe Rolston, for respondent.
Warren Crandall, jr., seeks release from imprisonment through the writ of habeas corpus. The history of the prosecution and the imprisonment is briefly as follows: On May 3, 1897, Lizzie Hinds filed a complaint before a justice of the peace charging that Crandall did feloniously use and cause and procure to be used, certain instruments, which were thrust in and upon the body and womb of Lizzie Hinds, a woman pregnant with a quick child, with intent to destroy such child. That the use of the instruments was not necessary to preserve the life of the mother, and was not advised by a physician to be necessary for that purpose. There were six counts in the complaint. The first five of which charged the attempt to destroy the unborn quick child and the last charges that the attempt was successful, and that the unborn quick child was destroyed by the use of the instruments. These several offenses are alleged to have occurred in the months of April, May and June, and the last on the fifth day of July, 1895. The warrant for the defendant's arrest was issued on May 3, 1897, under which he was arrested on July 22, 1897. In a preliminary examination held August 10, 1897, the petitioner was bound over to the district court, and required to give a bond for his appearance at the September term following.
On September 7, 1897, the petitioner appeared, but the county attorney of Coffey County declined to file an information against him, and filed his reasons in writing with the clerk of the court, why no information would be filed; and upon his motion, the district court dismissed the prosecution and discharged the petitioner. On the same day of the dismissal, a lawyer who had been employed by the prosecuting witness, moved the court to reinstate the case against the petitioner. This motion was taken under advisement, and on September 30, 1897, the motion was sustained, and an attempt was made to reinstate the case. The petitioner was again taken into custody upon a commitment issued by the clerk of the court, and failing to give bail, he was imprisoned in the jail of the county. On October 2, 1897, he applied to the probate judge of Coffey County for the writ of habeas corpus, and after a trial of the issues raised by the petition and answer therein, the probate judge discharged him from imprisonment. On January 4, 1898, upon the order of the district court, an information was filed which charged the petitioner with the commission of an offense substantially in the language of the last count of the complaint which had been previously filed, and upon this information a bench warrant was issued, under which the petitioner was arrested. He gave bond in the sum of one thousand dollars for his appearance at the April, 1898, term of the court; but on January 31, 1898, the bondsmen surrendered the petitioner to the sheriff, and he thereupon applied to the probate judge for a discharge upon the writ of habeas corpus.
On February 10, 1898, after a trial upon the issues joined, the petitioner was again discharged by the probate court. On February 23, 1898, an amended information was filed, charging the petitioner with the same offense, in substantially the same language as that employed in the complaint. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest and his bond fixed at $ 2500. Having been placed under arrest, he applied to this court for release on the writ of habeas corpus.
The contention of the petitioner is that no felony was charged against him; that the preliminary examination had and the binding over to the District Court were invalid; and that the District Court acquired no jurisdiction by reason of the proceedings before the justice of the peace; that if the filing of the information in the District Court is to be treated as the commencement of a prosecution, it was then barred by the Statute of Limitations, and further, that the order of the probate court discharging the petitioner was valid and effectually terminated the prosecution. It is manifest from the language used in the complaint and...
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Cain v. Moore
...Ill. 232, 236-37, 199 N.E. 124 (1935) (warrant and affidavit disagreed and thus were insufficient requisition papers); In re Crandall, 59 Kan. 671, 676, 54 P. 686 (1898); In re Maldonado, 364 Mass. 359, 364, 304 N.E.2d 419 (1973); In re Ray, 215 Mich. 156, 183 N.W. 774 (1921); Debski v. Sta......
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Kimler, Application of
...been held that a discharge upon habeas corpus for failure of proof does not bar further prosecution upon another indictment. In Re Crandall, 59 Kan. 671, 54 P. 686, it is accordingly held that, where a court discharges a petitioner because no offense was alleged for which he could be prosec......
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Rouse v. State
... ... Erving, 19 Wash. 435, 53 ... P. 717; In re Griffith, 35 Kan. 377, 11 P. 174; ... In re Clyne, 52 Kan. 441, 35 P. 23; In re ... Crandall, 59 Kan. 671, 54 P. 686; State v ... Howard, 15 Rich. Law, 274; State v. Keifer, 90 ... Md. 165, 44 A. 1043; Flick v. State, 22 Ind.App ... 550, ... ...
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Sanders v. McHan
... ... prosecuted, its order not only restores him to his liberty, ... but terminates the pending proceeding against him. In re ... Crandall, 59 Kan. 671, 54 P. 686, 687. The discharge of ... a party under a writ of habeas corpus, from the process under ... which he is imprisoned, ... ...