In re Waters' Estate
| Decision Date | 08 July 1941 |
| Docket Number | No. 25784.,25784. |
| Citation | 153 S.W.2d 774 |
| Parties | In re WATERS' ESTATE. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Joseph J. Ward, Judge.
"Not to be reported in State Reports."
Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Ella M. Waters, deceased, wherein Lloyd Waters was administrator, and wherein Lee, Fricke & Lee filed a petition for legal services rendered the estate. From a judgment in favor of Lee, Fricke & Lee, the administrator appeals.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Roby Albin, of St. Louis, for appellant.
Lee, Fricke & Lee, of St. Louis, pro se.
This proceeding had its origin in the Probate Court of the City of St. Louis. On March 27, 1939, respondents presented a petition to the Probate Court asking for an allowance in the sum of $200 for legal services rendered the estate of Ella M. Waters, deceased, stating in their petition that said estate was then ready for final settlement, and that they had rendered services from January 17, 1938. On the date said petition was filed, which was during the March, 1939, term, the Probate Court determined that the $200 asked for was a fair amount as a fee for said services, and entered an order allowing said sum to respondents out of the assets of said estate. On January 16, 1940, which was in the December, 1939, term of the Probate Court, the court of its own motion made an order setting aside the order of March 27, 1939, allowing said fee, stating in the last-mentioned order that said allowance was made without notice of record to Lloyd Waters, administrator of said estate. At the same time, with the consent of said administrator, the Probate Court ordered that the petition of respondents for said attorneys' fee be placed upon the claim docket. From the order of January 16, 1940, setting aside the judgment making the allowance, respondents appealed to the Circuit Court.
The record shows that, on the 13th of April, 1940, respondents appeared in the Circuit Court by their counsel, and that Lloyd Waters, administrator of the estate, appeared by counsel; that no evidence was adduced nor was any testimony heard, the cause being submitted on the pleadings; that the court heard arguments of counsel, took the cause under advisement, and, on May 1, 1940, rendered judgment for respondents in the sum of $200 and costs, and ordered said judgment certified to the Probate Court. After an unavailing motion for a new trial in the Circuit Court, Lloyd Waters, administrator, duly appealed to this court.
Appellant contends that the order of the Probate Court of March 27, 1939, allowing respondents the $200 fee was not such a final judgment as the Probate Court could not set aside at a later term. It is argued that said estate was a pending matter in process of continuing administration, and that the order was not made in or in connection with a settlement; that the order, having been made ex parte and without any notice to the administrator or other parties interested in the estate, was void. On the other hand, respondents contend that the attorneys' fee was a legal charge against the estate and could be allowed directly to the attorneys, and that the judgment obtained therefor upon a sufficient petition and sufficient evidence could not be vacated by the Probate Court of its own motion even during the term, except upon some legal ground; and that the giving of notice of said motion for allowance not being a statutory requirement, failure to give it was not such legal ground.
It appears that the Probate Court itself, recognizing that the order allowing the attorneys' fee had been made without any notice to the administrator and the interested parties, treated it as an order void upon its face because of lack of such notice, and, to clear the record, set the same aside of its own motion at a term subsequent to that at which the order making the allowance had been made.
A fundamental principle of procedure recognized and applied by courts in every country where judgments are rendered only upon notice and inquiry, as distinguished from those countries where a dictator's will is the law, is that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is not a final and binding judgment Furthermore, an indispensable prerequisite to the lawful exercise of power by our courts is reasonable notice to parties whose interests are to be affected by the action of the court. The fact that fees to an attorney for services rendered in the administration of an estate are made by law a part of the expense and cost of administration, and that such charges may be allowed directly to the attorneys and judgment obtained therefor upon a sufficient petition and sufficient evidence does not and cannot dispense with the giving of notice, to all parties interested, of the filing of the motion or request for such allowance. Reasonable notice of proceedings and an opportunity to be heard constitute the foundation of all procedure which makes any pretense of being fair and just. An old maxim of the law, applied in countless cases, is stated thus: "Audi alteram partem", the law hears before it decides.
It being conceded in this case that there was no notice given to the administrator or to any other interested person of the motion for an allowance of attorneys' fees, the order making such allowance was void and was properly set aside by the Probate Court of its own motion, and the motion for allowance ordered to be placed upon the claim docket for hearing. Respondents lost no real right whatsoever by the Probate Court's action, while on the other hand the order allowing the fee being void upon the face of the record was merely set aside. Such action by the Probate Court merely supplied the basis for a valid judgment or order to allow or disallow the fee by giving all parties an opportunity to be heard, whereas the order which was set aside had no such basis.
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