In re Welfare of J.M.

Decision Date22 December 2005
Docket NumberNo. 23594-7-III.,23594-7-III.
Citation130 Wn. App. 912,125 P.3d 245
PartiesIn re the WELFARE OF J.M.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Susan M. Gasch, Attorney at Law, Spokane, WA, for Appellant.

Lisa L. Simonsen, Attorney at Law, Washington State Attorney General's Office, Spokane, WA, for Respondent.

SWEENEY, J.

¶ 1 A parent faced with the prospect of termination of parental rights to his or her child is entitled to a meaningful hearing, and that includes effective representation of counsel. The rights at stake are both fundamental and constitutional. Here, a mother's lawyer stipulated to the admission of relevant but highly damaging written reports by nontestifying experts. The reports all came into court by way of witnesses who were not experts in the relevant fields and could not be cross-examined as to the substance of the reports. This was not effective representation. And we reverse the judgment terminating this mother's parental rights and remand for another hearing.

FACTS

¶ 2 The superior court terminated the parental rights of RC to her six-year-old daughter, JM. The termination hearing was held on October 25, 2004. RC discussed the case with her appointed counsel in the hallway before the hearing. She became distraught and left the building. And the hearing proceeded without her. The State called the only witnesses — Department of Social and Health Services social worker Julia Ross and guardian ad litem Amy Hoyt.

¶ 3 The court admitted the State's proffered exhibits, including written reports by several experts. Defense counsel reviewed the exhibits and approved their admission.

¶ 4 Ms. Ross testified that the department had received nine previous referrals dating back to 1997, mostly involving JM's two older siblings. There had been three additional referrals that also alleged domestic violence involving RC's former domestic partner. In the current proceedings, RC was tested for substance abuse. The diagnosis was "deferred." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 16, 20. She nevertheless continued to submit urinalysis samples. These were consistently negative. But RC was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and third degree assault in resisting arrest in September 2003. She had also been cited for DUI in August 2002.

¶ 5 RC had engaged fully in the services offered with regard to the dependency of JM with the exception of visitation.

¶ 6 Ms. Ross testified to the observations and opinions expressed in written reports by psychologist Andrew B. Forsyth, PhD; child mental health specialist Carol Thomas; therapist Barbara Folden; and visitation therapist Mary Anne Sacco. Ms. Ross testified about interactions between RC, Ms. Folden, and Ms. Sacco.

¶ 7 From Dr. Forsyth's reports, Ms. Ross testified that RC exhibited an unspecified personality disorder with histrionic and narcissistic features and also "child neglect, failing to protect." RP at 22. As to her parenting abilities, Ms. Ross testified that RC appeared to Dr. Forsyth to be "`an intelligent and socially poised individual whose apparent psychological defenses include denial, defensiveness, and externalizing responsibility, projecting blame on others for her actions.'" RP at 22 (quoting Ex. 5). Ms. Ross testified that Dr. Forsyth's prognosis was "very poor because [RC] was not motivated to engage in counseling." RP at 22. Based on additional information provided by Ms. Ross, Dr. Forsyth had added "a number of borderline personality features" to his diagnosis. RP at 25. Ms. Ross testified that Dr. Forsyth recommended treatment with someone experienced with "borderline personality disordered people." RP at 25.

¶ 8 Ms. Ross also testified about a parent-child attachment assessment performed by Ms. Thomas. Ms. Ross said Ms. Thomas stated that JM had shown "anxious and avoidant attachment and considers mom to not be reliable to meet her need for safety, security, or physical needs that she had." RP at 23. Ms. Thomas, according to Ms. Ross, had recommended visitation in a "therapeutic" setting. RP at 23.

¶ 9 Ms. Ross also testified about the interactions between RC and Ms. Sacco, a visitation therapist. JM had entered shelter care in April 2003. RC began visits in June and visited regularly. The visits stopped in September. In February 2004, Ms. Sacco became involved and RC began another period of regular visitation that lasted until May 24. Ms. Ross testified that to all outward appearances these visits were successful. But Ms. Sacco concluded that the apparent success was because JM was "accommodating" her mother. RP at 32.

¶ 10 Ms. Sacco's contract was solely to observe and evaluate the success of visitation sessions. RP at 32. But on May 24 she met with RC to "discuss the case plan" and "identify the problems or issues of why [JM] was removed and to look at progress and or services that would address any issues that were unresolved." Ex. 9 at 1. Through Ms. Ross, the court heard Ms. Sacco's report, including her opinion that RC was completely relaxed for two hours with JM. Within minutes with Ms. Sacco, however, RC became enraged. Ex. 9 at 1. The department terminated all visitation until RC sorted things out with Ms. Sacco. This never happened, and RC had not resumed visitation as of the October hearing date. Defense counsel asked Ms. Ross no questions.

¶ 11 Ms. Hoyt, the current guardian ad litem, testified. She saw JM several times in the home of the proposed adoptive foster parents and once with her mother during visitation at a day care center. Ms. Hoyt thought JM appeared to have a relationship of greater "comfort and a safety" with the foster mother. RP at 43. Ms. Hoyt also testified about Ms. Thomas's statements regarding JM's statements to Ms. Thomas about wanting one mom instead of two. RP at 48. Apparently relating her understanding of Ms. Thomas's observations, Ms. Hoyt testified that JM showed physical signs of distress — night terrors and bed-wetting, for example — during periods of visitation with RC but not during the periods of no contact with her. Ms. Hoyt testified to "the mother's lack of insight into her own self and her child's well being, her continued troubles with substance abuse, the anger and denial, the escalating anger that has been reported of late, her inconsistent participation." RP at 47. Again, there was no cross-examination.

¶ 12 The State also introduced the written report of a previous guardian ad litem in unrelated non-State custody proceedings regarding RC's older children. Ex. 1.

¶ 13 Substance abuse is cited repeatedly throughout the testimony and reports. Yet exhibit 6 contains 21 pages of 21 urinalysis tests done between March and June 2004. Of the 21 results, all are negative for alcohol. In 21 of 21, the concentration of propoxyphene1 is 300 ng/ml.2 This is reported as a negative result in 17 of the 21 tests. In 4 tests, the same concentration is reported as positive. All 21 results for opiates are 300 ng/ml. This is reported as negative in all but 1 of the 21 tests. Ex. 6. There was, however, no challenge to or explanation of this discrepancy. The defense consisted of the following statement by counsel:

Thank you, your Honor, may it please the Court, I will not be calling any witnesses. I would make the following comment: I did have occasion to speak to my client, Ms. . . . . Her position has been consistent all the way along. She disputes — emphatically disputes any and all of the allegations and contentions in this matter, does not understand why the State is desirous of taking [JM] away from her, and just feels this is totally wrong.

Thank you, your Honor.

RP at 51-52.

¶ 14 The court incorporated data from the reports of Dr. Forsyth, Ms. Thomas, Ms. Folden, and Ms. Sacco in its findings of fact. The court called the reports clear, cogent, and convincing. The court ordered JM into the permanent legal custody of the department.

DISCUSSION

¶ 15 RC assigns error to her counsel's failure to object to the introduction of crucial evidence from absent witnesses with no possibility for cross-examination.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN PARENTAL TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS

¶ 16 RC contends that she was denied due process of law, specifically, effective representation of counsel. She contends competent counsel would at a minimum have: challenged the qualifications of the social worker and the guardian ad litem to offer expert opinions; objected to the admission of the exhibits (experts' reports) as substantive evidence; objected to the admission of a report by a different guardian ad litem for RC's older children in prior non-State custody proceedings; and challenged the admission of any criminal history.

¶ 17 The State responds that RC applies the wrong test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The test RC relied on, Strickland v. Washington,3 applies to criminal cases. This is a termination case. The correct standard, the State submits, is set out in In re Moseley.4 And under the Moseley standard, unless the parent can show that she did not receive a meaningful hearing, counsel's effectiveness is presumed. In re Moseley, 34 Wash.App. 179, 184, 660 P.2d 315 (1983).

Standard of Review

¶ 18 Whether a proceeding satisfies constitutional due process is a question we review de novo. City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 668, 91 P.3d 875 (2004).

Test for Effective Representation

¶ 19 The State argues that the standard for effective legal representation in a deprivation proceeding under chapter 13.34 RCW is less stringent than that required in criminal proceedings. Specifically, the State contends that, to show prejudice, a parent must show that he or she did not receive a meaningful hearing. RC would instead apply the Strickland test.

¶ 20 No published Washington case has expressly held that Strickland applies to the performance of counsel representing parents in proceedings to terminate their parental rights. We do not pass on the issue directly, however, because the issue...

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