In re Williams

• Decision Date: 17 August 2021
• Docket Number: No. 53879-2-II,53879-2-II
• Citation: 493 P.3d 779
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE the Personal Restraint Petition of: Raymond Mayfield WILLIAMS, Jr., Petitioner.

493 P.3d 779

IN RE the Personal Restraint Petition of: Raymond Mayfield WILLIAMS, Jr., Petitioner.

No. 53879-2-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Filed August 17, 2021

Jessica Levin, Melissa R. Lee, Robert S. Chang, Seattle University School of Law, 901 12th Ave., Korematsu Center For Law & Equality, Seattle, WA, 98122-4411, for Petitioner.

Thomas A. Ladouceur, Cowlitz County Prosecutor's Office, 312 Sw. 1st Ave. Rm. 105, Kelso, WA, 98626-1799, for Respondent.

Ulrike Buschbacher Connelly, Lindsay Jeanne Mcaleer, Perkins Coie LLP, 1201 3rd Ave. Ste. 4900, Seattle, WA, 98101-3099, Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU-WA Po. Box 2728, Seattle, WA, 98111-2728, Cindy Arends Elsberry, Washington Defender Association, 110 Prefontaine Pl S. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98104-2626, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of The American Civil Liberties Union of Washington.

Kimberly Noel Gordon, Law Offices of Gordon & Saunders PLLC, 1000 2nd Ave., Suite 3140, Seattle, WA, 98104, Marsha L. Levick, Juvenile Law Center, 1800 Jfk Boulevard, Suite 1900 B., Philadelphia, PA, 19103, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Juvenile Law Center and Teamchild.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Maxa, J.

¶1 In this personal restraint petition (PRP), Raymond Williams seeks relief from personal restraint imposed for his 2008 guilty plea to second degree assault. Because this was his third strike offense under Washington's Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), chapter 9.94A RCW, Williams was given a mandatory sentence of life without release.

¶2 Under the POAA, a person is classified as a persistent offender pursuant to RCW 9.94A.030(37)¹ when he or she has been convicted of a felony that is considered a most serious offense for the third time after two previous convictions of most serious offenses. Williams was 16 years old when he pled guilty to his first strike offense, first degree burglary. His second strike offense, also first degree burglary, occurred when he was 23 years old. His third strike offense occurred when he was 28 years old.

¶3 Williams argues that his PRP meets two different exceptions to the one-year time bar for PRPs. He claims that (1) RCW 10.73.100(2) applies because the use of a juvenile strike offense as a predicate offense to impose a life without release sentence under the POAA is unconstitutional, and (2) RCW 10.73.100(6) applies because State v. Bassett , 192 Wash.2d 67, 428 P.3d 343 (2018), which held that a life without release or parole sentence for a juvenile offender is unconstitutional, was a significant change in the law that is retroactive and material to his sentence.

¶4 On the merits, Williams argues that the POAA violates the cruel punishment provision of article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution because it requires a life without release sentence even when one of the predicate strike offenses was committed as a juvenile.

¶5 We hold that Williams's PRP claim is untimely and does not meet the exceptions provided under (1) RCW 10.73.100(2), because Williams challenges only the constitutionality of the POAA, not the statute under which he was convicted; and (2) RCW 10.73.100(6), because the holding in Bassett is not material to Williams's POAA sentence for an offense he committed when he was an adult. Accordingly, we deny Williams's PRP.

FACTS

¶6 In May 1997, the State charged Williams in juvenile court with first degree burglary for an incident that occurred in February 1997 when he was 16 years old. Williams waived his right to a decline hearing and his case was transferred to adult court. Williams ultimately pled guilty to one count of first degree burglary and one count of custodial assault and was sentenced as an adult. He was sentenced to 31 months of confinement.

¶7 In a declaration attached to his PRP, Williams explained that at the time of his 1997 conviction he was emotionally unstable and had a long history of mental illness, trauma, and drug addiction. He finished only the sixth grade, had lived in several foster and group homes, and had been placed in mental health lockdown facilities three times. He also was hospitalized at least twice for attempted suicides.

¶8 Williams stated that he did not understand the consequences of being tried in adult court when he waived his right to be tried in juvenile court, and neither the court nor his attorney explained those consequences. He was just desperate to be transferred out of the abusive juvenile detention facility where he had been confined.

¶9 In April 2004, Williams was convicted of first degree burglary for an incident that occurred in September 2003. He was sentenced to 48 months of confinement. Williams was 23 years old when he committed this offense.

¶10 In October 2008, Williams pled guilty to second degree assault under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c), assault with a deadly weapon. Williams was 28 years old at the time of the plea and sentencing. Because this was his third strike under the POAA, the superior court imposed a mandatory sentence of confinement for life without the possibility of release. Williams did not appeal his conviction or his sentence.

¶11 In 2016, Williams filed his first PRP, arguing that the 1997 conviction should not have counted as a strike offense. In re Pers. Restraint of Williams , No. 49894-4-II, slip op. at *1-2, 2019 WL 949431 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2% 2049894-4-II% 20Unpublished% 20Opinion.pdf. He argued that his PRP was not time barred because his sentence was imposed in excess of the superior court's jurisdiction and that a significant change in the law had occurred. Id. This court held that neither exception to the one-year time bar applied and denied his PRP. Id.

¶12 Williams filed his second PRP in September 2019, almost 10 years after his judgment was final. His PRP included his declaration, which showed that he had been rehabilitated to a significant degree while in prison.

ANALYSIS

A. POAA PROVISIONS

¶13 Under RCW 9.94A.570, a person classified as a "persistent offender" must be sentenced to "total confinement for life without the possibility of release." RCW 9.94A.030(37) defines "persistent offender" to include an offender who has been convicted of a "most serious offense" and who previously has been convicted at least two separate times for most serious offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(32) defines "most serious offense" as all class A felonies and a number of other listed felonies, including second degree assault.

¶14 RCW 9.94A.030(34) defines "offender" to include only adults and juveniles who have been convicted in adult court. Therefore, adjudications in juvenile court are not counted as strikes under the POAA. State v. Moretti , 193 Wash.2d 809, 819, 446 P.3d 609 (2019).

B. PRP TIME BAR

1. Legal Principles

¶15 RCW 10.73.090(1) provides that a petitioner generally must file a PRP within one year after a trial court judgment becomes final. A judgment is final on the date that it is filed with the clerk of the trial court. RCW 10.73.090(3)(a). However, RCW 10.73.100 lists six exceptions to the one-year time limit.

¶16 The two exceptions that potentially are applicable here are RCW 10.73.100(2) and RCW 10.73.100(6). RCW 10.73.100(2) states that the time bar does not apply if "[t]he statute that the defendant was convicted of violating was unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the defendant's conduct." (Emphasis added.)

¶17 RCW 10.73.100(6) states that the time bar does not apply if:

[t]here has been a significant change in the law , whether substantive or procedural, which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order entered in a criminal or civil proceeding instituted by the state or local government, and either the legislature has expressly provided that the change in the law is to be applied retroactively, or a court, in interpreting a change in the law that lacks express legislative intent regarding retroactive application, determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed legal standard.

(Emphasis added.)

¶18 Here, Williams's judgment and sentence became final in 2009. But he did not file the current PRP until 2019. Therefore, the question is whether Williams's PRP is exempt from the one-year time bar under either RCW 10.73.100(2) or (6).²

2. Applicability of RCW 10.73.100(2)

¶19 Williams argues that his PRP meets the exception provided under RCW 10.73.100(2) because the application of the POAA is unconstitutional when it is based on a strike offense committed when the offender was a juvenile. The State argues that RCW 10.73.100(2) is inapplicable because the exception only applies to the particular substantive criminal statute that Williams was convicted of violating – second degree assault under RCW 9A.36.021 – not the life without release sentence itself as imposed under the POAA. We agree with the State.

a. Statutory Language

¶20 As stated above, RCW 10.73.100(2) states that the time bar does not apply if "[t]he statute that the defendant was convicted of violating was unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the defendant's conduct." (Emphasis added.)

¶21 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, which we determine by first looking to the plain language of the statute. In re Pers. Restraint of Pugh , 7 Wash. App. 2d 412, 418, 433 P.3d 872 (2019). To determine legislative intent, we focus on the plain meaning of the statutory language, the context of the provision within the statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Id. If the plain meaning of a statute is unambiguous, then we must apply that plain meaning without further construction. In re Pers. Restraint of Dove , 196 Wash. App. 148, 155, 381 P.3d 1280 (2016). When interpreting a statute, every word must be given meaning to avoid rendering any language meaningless or superfluous. State v. Larson , 184 Wash.2d 843, 850, 365 P.3d 740 (2015).

b. Monschke Split Decision

¶22 In In re...