In re Williams

• Decision Date: 30 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2008–331.,2008–331.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Parties: In re GUARDIANSHIP OF Paul T. WILLIAMS.

159 N.H. 318

986 A.2d 559

In re GUARDIANSHIP OF Paul T. WILLIAMS.

No. 2008–331.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: March 12, 2009.

Opinion Issued: Oct. 30, 2009.

Diane Williams Galebach, by brief and orally, pro se.

McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton, P.A., of Portsmouth (David Wolowitz and Andrea L. Daly on the brief, and Mr. Wolowitz orally), for the appellees.

BRODERICK, C.J.

The appellant, Diane Williams Galebach, appeals orders of the Merrimack County Probate Court (King, J.), which, among other things, established a guardianship over her brother, Paul T. Williams. See RSA ch. 464–A (2004 & Supp.2008). We dismiss her appeal.

The record supports the following. Paul Williams was born in 1973 and is the second youngest of fifteen children. He lived with his parents until sometime in 2006, when they became unable to care for him. Williams then lived with different siblings in order to determine if any of the living arrangements was a good fit. The appellees, Mary Vicinanzo and Margaret Pince, are two of Williams' older siblings. Both have large families and live next to each other in Concord. Williams has consistently expressed a strong preference to live with both families and to have Vicinanzo and Pince appointed as his co-guardians.

In November 2007, Vicinanzo and Pince filed a petition for guardianship of an incapacitated person. Galebach filed a cross-petition for limited guardianship, requesting that her brother's guardianship be limited in scope. She did not challenge, however, the need for a guardianship, nor did she oppose the appointment of her sisters as co-guardians. Galebach's cross-petition made a request for discovery before any guardianship was authorized. She also filed a motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for her brother, served requests for interrogatories and production of documents on Pince, and served a notice of deposition on her father. Vicinanzo and Pince moved to strike the discovery requests on the grounds that they were "inappropriate ... oppressive and unduly burdensome ... and largely focused on [Galebach's] personal issues with their family and their religious interests."

Following a preliminary hearing in March 2008, the probate court denied Galebach's motion to appoint a GAL, and granted the sisters' motion to strike discovery. The probate court reasoned that while Probate Court Rule 36 contemplates discovery by adverse parties, the parties before it did not dispute the need for a guardianship or the proper persons to serve in that capacity, and found that "the discovery sought is not reasonable and will serve only to further delay a final resolution to the case." Further, the court determined that Galebach would be allowed to participate in the final hearing, to examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence on relevant issues, but that neither discovery nor the hearing could be used "as a forum to air out family disputes which have been ongoing for several years."

Prior to the final guardianship hearing in April 2008, Galebach filed a motion for a limited guardianship over her brother, reiterating the statements of her earlier cross-petition. She also informed the probate court that she would be unable to attend the final hearing due to an out-of-state trip. Subsequent to the April 8, 2008 final guardianship hearing, at which Williams was present and represented by counsel, the probate court appointed Vicinanzo and Pince as co-guardians over his person, and denied Galebach's motion for limitations, stating:

The purpose of this order is to address the Motion for Limitations on Guardianship filed by Mrs. Galebach. In her motion, Mrs. Galebach asks the court to allow Paul to retain the right to make decisions concerning four specific issues.... [C]ounsel for [Vicinanzo and Pince] and counsel for Paul Williams addressed the issues raised by Mrs. Galebach during the course of the final hearing.

The court had an opportunity during the course of the hearing to observe the credibility and demeanor of the petitioners as well as Paul Williams, and to see the interaction between Paul, the petitioners, and several other family members. Having considered the issues raised in the motion in light of the evidence presented, the court is not going to limit the guardians' powers beyond the findings and orders contained in the Guardian over the Person Order issued this date. The court is convinced that the guardians well understand their obligations as Paul's guardians and that they will allow their brother the greatest amount of personal freedom and civil liberties consistent with his mental and physical limitations. The motion for limitations is therefore DENIED, subject to Paul retaining all rights that he has under the guardianship order and RSA Ch. 464–A.

On appeal, Galebach contends that the probate court failed "to protect and give value to ... Williams's rights." Terming herself an "Interested Party," Galebach argues that the probate court erred in: (1) refusing to limit the guardianship; (2) denying discovery; (3) refusing to appoint a GAL; and (4) violating the ward's "rights to due process, free exercise of religion, and associational rights of speech and self-expression" under the United States and New Hampshire Constitutions. Vicinanzo and Pince seek to dismiss Galebach's appeal, contending that she lacks standing to appeal because she is not an aggrieved person within the scope of RSA 567–A:1 (2007).

In response to the contention that she lacks standing to pursue this appeal, Galebach states that she "participated as an [i]nterested [person] in the [probate court]," and "made motions that were addressed on the merits, in the course of ... seeking to preserve [her brother's] rights and seeking due process and discovery for his benefit." She contends that because her sisters did not challenge her standing in the probate court, they have waived their right to do so now. We disagree.

RSA 464–A:4, I, provides that "[a]ny ... interested person ... may file a verified petition for finding of incapacity and appointment of a guardian." RSA 464–A:2, XIII defines "Interested person" as "any adult who has an interest in the welfare of the person to be protected under this chapter." We do not question that Galebach was an "interested person" in these proceedings and had the right to file her petition for a limited guardianship over her brother. Given her status as an interested person, she had the right to participate fully in the probate court proceedings. That she was an interested person, however, does not necessarily mean that she was "a person ... aggrieved" by the probate court's guardianship order, thereby giving her standing to appeal under RSA 567–A:1. Consequently, the appellees have not waived their right to challenge her standing to appeal the guardianship order. Moreover, even if the appellees had not challenged Galebach's standing, we could raise the issue sua sponte. See Libertarian Party of N.H., 158 N.H. 194, 195, 965 A.2d 1078 (2008).

Whether a party has standing presents a question of subject matter jurisdiction, which may be addressed at any time. Id. In this case, the answer to that question turns on our interpretation of the relevant statutes.

"We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute. When construing the statute's meaning, we first examine its language, and where possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used. If the language used is clear and unambiguous, we will not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent. We will, however, construe all parts of the statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and to avoid an absurd or unjust result." Garand v. Town of Exeter, 159 N.H. 136, 140–41, 977 A.2d 540 (2009) (quotation omitted). Further, "[t]he legislature is not presumed to waste words or enact redundant provisions and whenever possible, every word of a statute should be given effect. We also presume that the legislature does not enact unnecessary and duplicative provisions[, and] we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation." Id. at 141, 977 A.2d 540 (quotations and citations omitted). Finally, "[w]e acknowledge that the legislature's choice of language is deemed to be meaningful, and that we generally assume that whenever the legislature enacts a provision, it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. Therefore, unless the context indicates otherwise, words or phrases in a provision that were used in a prior act pertaining to the same subject matter will be construed in the same sense. Conversely, where the legislature uses different language in related statutes, we assume that the legislature intended something different.

" State Employees Assoc. of N.H. v. N.H. Div. of Personnel, 158 N.H. 338, 345, 965 A.2d 1116 (2009) (quotations, citations, and brackets omitted; emphasis added).

As earlier noted, RSA 464–A:4, I, governs standing to file a petition for guardianship and provides that "[a]ny ... interested person ... may file a verified petition for finding of incapacity and appointment of a guardian." RSA 464–A:47 mandates that appeals from guardianship orders are to this court under RSA chapter 567–A (2007). RSA 567–A:1 governs who has standing to appeal a probate court's guardianship order: "A person who is aggrieved by a decree, order, appointment, grant or denial of a judge of probate which may conclude that person's interest in a matter before the court may appeal therefrom to the supreme court on questions of law in accordance with rules of the supreme court." Consequently, we consider RSA 464–A:4, I, and RSA 567–A:1, to be "related" for the purpose of our statutory analysis.

RSA chapter 567–A does not further define the phrase "a person ... aggrieved." While we have previously adopted varied constructions of the phrase under different circumstances, we have not...