In re Wilson

Decision Date03 June 1884
Citation19 N.W. 723,32 Minn. 145
PartiesIN RE WILSON.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Writ of certiorari.

J. N. Cross and F. H. Carleton, for city.

Gordon E. Cole, E. M. Wilson, P.M. Babcock, and C. A. Ebert, for Wilson.

MITCHELL, J.

Section 5, c. 4, of the charter of the city of Minneapolis, provides: “The city council shall have full power and authority to make, ordain, publish, enforce, alter, amend, or repeal all such ordinances for the government and good order of the city, for the suppression of vice and intemperance, and for the prevention of crime, as it shall deem expedient; and in and by the same to declare and impose penalties and punishments, and enforce the same against any person or persons who may violate the provisions of any ordinance passed and ordained by it; and all such ordinances are hereby declared to be and to have the force of law, provided that they be not repugnant to the laws of the United States, or of the state. And for these purposes the said city council shall have authority by such ordinances-First, to license and regulate, among others, all persons vending, dealing in, or disposing of spiritous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors.”

The mode in which these powers are to be exercised is specified as follows in sections 8 and 9 of the same chapter: “The style of all ordinances shall be, ‘The city council of the city of Minneapolis do ordain.’ The subject of every ordinance shall be expressed in its title, and no ordinance shall embrace more than one subject. Section 9. All ordinances and resolutions of the city council shall be passed by an affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the council by ayes and noes, which shall be entered on the records of the council. No ordinance shall be passed at the same meeting of the council at which it shall have been presented, except by unanimous consent of all the members present, which shall be noted in the record. When approved, they shall be recorded by the city clerk in books provided for that purpose; and before they shall be in force they shall be published in the official paper of the city.”

Section 1 of chapter 3 provides that “all ordinances and resolutions shall, before they take effect, be presented to the mayor, and if he shall approve thereof he shall sign the same. If he returns it with objections, the council may pass it by a two-thirds vote; and if he retains it five days, it shall have the same force and effect as if approved by him.”

On the twenty-eighth of April, 1884, the city council passed “An ordinance to license and regulate all persons vending, dealing in, or disposing of spirituous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors;” section 1 of which reads: “No person shall sell, vend, deal in, or dispose of any spirituous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors, or beverages, for any use or purpose whatever, in or at any building or other place within the limits of the city of Minneapolis, without having obtained a license therefor in the manner herein provided.” Section 2 reads: “No person shall be licensed to sell, vend, deal in, or dispose of any spirituous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors or beverages, for any use or purpose whatever, in or at any building or other place within the limits of the city of Minneapolis, *** who intends, if licensed, to carry on his business, or who will, when licensed, carry on his business, outside of those districts in said city which shall hereafter be designated and known as ‘active patrol districts,’ to be designated as hereinafter required.” Section 3 reads: “Any person desiring a license to sell, vend, deal in, or dispose of any spirituous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors or beverages in said city of Minneapolis, shall make an affidavit and file the same with the city clerk of said city, in which affidavit said person shall state fully and explicitly *** whether or not said room or rooms, where he intends to and will carry on his business if licensed, is within those districts in said city which have been duly designated as ‘active patrol districts' of said city.” Section 9 reads: “The mayor of said city shall designate such portions of said city as he shall deem best, to be known and designated as ‘active patrol districts,’ and shall submit the same to the city council for its approval; and, when approved by said city council, the same shall be and become the districts of said city, which shall be constantly patrolled by the police force of said city, under the instructions of said mayor. Said active patrol districts may be changed at any time by said mayor, by the like approval of said city council.” The other provisions of the ordinance need not be here cited. After its passage and publication, the mayor, in pursuance of the provisions of section 9, designated certain portions of the city (embracing a district two or more miles in length, and of an average width of about half a mile, and including most of the business portion of the city) as “active patrol districts,” and submitted the same to the council, which approved the same by resolution.

The petitioner, after setting out all these proceedings, alleges that he is a citizen of Minneapolis, engaged in the business of dealing in and selling spirituous, vinous, fermented, and malt liquors in said city; that desiring to continue in such business he applied to the city council for a license so to do, but was refused solely for the reason that his place of business is not situated within the limits of the “active patrol districts” designated by the mayor as aforesaid. He asks that a writ of certiorari issue to the mayor and city council to bring up for review by this court their action in passing this ordinance, against the validity of which numerous objections are raised. If a writ of certiorari would lie in such a case, and the validity of this ordinance were properly before us, there is one, and only one, objection here made to it, which, as at present advised, we would hold well taken.

We have no doubt whatever of the power of the city council to determine where, and within what portions of the city the business of selling and dealing in intoxicating liquors may be carried on. This right is implied and included in the power to regulate. And if they deem that the good order of the city requires that this traffic shall be excluded from the suburban and residence portions of the city, and confined to the more central and business portions, where it can be kept under more effectual police surveillance, their power to do so is, in our judgment, undoubted. Under a grant of police power to regulate, the right of the municipal authorities to...

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    • March 28, 1907
    ... ... The decisions of this court have abundantly settled this ... question in the negative. State v. Iverson, 92 Minn ... 355; Moede v. Stearns County, 43 Minn. 312; ... Christlieb v. Hennepin County, 41 Minn. 142; ... Lemont v. Dodge County, 39 Minn. 385; In re ... Wilson, 32 Minn. 145, 150; Secombe v ... Kittelson, 29 Minn. 555; State v. Dike, 20 ... Minn. 314, (363); Western R. Co. of Minnesota v ... DeGraff, 27 Minn. 1; State v. Whitcomb, 28 ... Minn. 50; State v. Braden, 40 Minn. 174 ...          (e) The ... provisions of the law that ... ...
  • Fuller Brush Co. v. Town of Green River
    • United States
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    • July 15, 1932
    ...U. S. 79, 87, 30 S. Ct. 493, 54 L. Ed. 673, 676, 18 Ann. Cas. 865; Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318, 321, 37 Am. Rep. 564; In re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145, 148, 19 N. W. 723; City of St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 248, 253, 22 S. W. 470, 20 L. R. A. Again, in Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville,......
  • Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna
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    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • August 30, 1946
    ...council and thus usurp the function of local governing bodies." And Mr. Justice Mitchell, speaking for this court in In re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145, 148, 19 N.W. 723, 725, "* * * Of course, such regulations must be reasonable, of which fact the courts must judge. But, in assuming the right to d......
  • Howland v. State
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    • December 8, 1908
    ...their own judgment against that of the municipal authorities, when there is a reasonable ground for a difference of opinion. In re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145, 19 N.W. 723. It unnecessary to allege or explain in the ordinance the reason for its enactment or the exigency out of which it grew. Croni......
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