In re Wilson
Decision Date | 03 June 1884 |
Citation | 19 N.W. 723,32 Minn. 145 |
Parties | IN RE WILSON. |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Writ of certiorari.
J. N. Cross and F. H. Carleton, for city.
Gordon E. Cole, E. M. Wilson, P.M. Babcock, and C. A. Ebert, for Wilson.
Section 5, c. 4, of the charter of the city of Minneapolis, provides:
The mode in which these powers are to be exercised is specified as follows in sections 8 and 9 of the same chapter:
Section 1 of chapter 3 provides that
On the twenty-eighth of April, 1884, the city council passed “An ordinance to license and regulate all persons vending, dealing in, or disposing of spirituous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors;” section 1 of which reads: “No person shall sell, vend, deal in, or dispose of any spirituous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors, or beverages, for any use or purpose whatever, in or at any building or other place within the limits of the city of Minneapolis, without having obtained a license therefor in the manner herein provided.” Section 2 reads: “No person shall be licensed to sell, vend, deal in, or dispose of any spirituous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors or beverages, for any use or purpose whatever, in or at any building or other place within the limits of the city of Minneapolis, *** who intends, if licensed, to carry on his business, or who will, when licensed, carry on his business, outside of those districts in said city which shall hereafter be designated and known as ‘active patrol districts,’ to be designated as hereinafter required.” Section 3 reads: “Any person desiring a license to sell, vend, deal in, or dispose of any spirituous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors or beverages in said city of Minneapolis, shall make an affidavit and file the same with the city clerk of said city, in which affidavit said person shall state fully and explicitly *** whether or not said room or rooms, where he intends to and will carry on his business if licensed, is within those districts in said city which have been duly designated as ‘active patrol districts' of said city.” Section 9 reads: The other provisions of the ordinance need not be here cited. After its passage and publication, the mayor, in pursuance of the provisions of section 9, designated certain portions of the city (embracing a district two or more miles in length, and of an average width of about half a mile, and including most of the business portion of the city) as “active patrol districts,” and submitted the same to the council, which approved the same by resolution.
The petitioner, after setting out all these proceedings, alleges that he is a citizen of Minneapolis, engaged in the business of dealing in and selling spirituous, vinous, fermented, and malt liquors in said city; that desiring to continue in such business he applied to the city council for a license so to do, but was refused solely for the reason that his place of business is not situated within the limits of the “active patrol districts” designated by the mayor as aforesaid. He asks that a writ of certiorari issue to the mayor and city council to bring up for review by this court their action in passing this ordinance, against the validity of which numerous objections are raised. If a writ of certiorari would lie in such a case, and the validity of this ordinance were properly before us, there is one, and only one, objection here made to it, which, as at present advised, we would hold well taken.
We have no doubt whatever of the power of the city council to determine where, and within what portions of the city the business of selling and dealing in intoxicating liquors may be carried on. This right is implied and included in the power to regulate. And if they deem that the good order of the city requires that this traffic shall be excluded from the suburban and residence portions of the city, and confined to the more central and business portions, where it can be kept under more effectual police surveillance, their power to do so is, in our judgment, undoubted. Under a grant of police power to regulate, the right of the municipal authorities to...
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