In re Wright
| Decision Date | 14 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | C094514 |
| Parties | In re CHEVAL SHANNON WRIGHT on Habeas Corpus. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Defendant Cheval Shannon Wright's 1995 convictions included murder attempted murder and robbery. Various subsequent proceedings have modified defendant's legal accountability for his involvement in the robbery, during which two people were shot. The instant matter involves the People's appeal from the trial court's ruling granting defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus and vacating the robbery-murder specialcircumstance finding. The People argue that the trial court erred in applying the wrong standard of review by relying on the jury's negative finding on the personal use of a firearm allegation to discount evidence that defendant was the shooter and, in doing so, reached a conclusion not supported by the record. In response defendant argues that the jury's verdicts point to only one conclusion; defendant's actions in restraining the actual shooter do not demonstrate a reckless disregard for human life. Because under our deferential standard of review, substantial evidence supports the jury's true finding on the special circumstance allegation at issue here, we shall reverse.
This court first affirmed the convictions of defendant and codefendant Christian Abernathy in People v. Wright (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203. Four years later, a federal trial court adopted the findings of its magistrate who sustained defendant's petition for habeas corpus, set aside defendant's convictions and granted a new trial. On retrial, a jury again convicted defendant of first degree murder and attempted second degree robbery of Kevin Brown and second degree robbery of Marlin Moore. (Pen. Code, §§ 187-189, 211-212.5, 664.)[1] In contrast with the previous jury, however, it acquitted defendant of the attempted murder and the lesser included offenses of attempted voluntary manslaughter and assault with a firearm of Moore (§§ 187, 192, 245, 664), rejected all allegations that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and instead sustained lesser included allegations that a principal was armed during the crimes (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). It also found the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) The trial court again sentenced defendant to prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal, this court affirmed defendant's convictions. While we did not address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the special circumstances finding, we did note that the jury resolved the issue of the identification of the shooter in favor of defendant. (People v. Wright (Dec. 11, 2002, C039121) [nonpub. opn.].)[2] After defendant's conviction became final, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), and later In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 (Scoggins), which clarified the meaning of the special circumstance statute. That statute provides that a person who is not the actual killer but "who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant" aids or abets an enumerated felony that results in a death may be convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole. (§ 190.2, subd. (d).) Banks and Clark clarified that fact finders must examine an aider and abettor's personal culpability that led to a death during the commission of a felony before imposing a sentence of death or life without parole, and the Supreme Court provided guidance on how to make that evaluation. (Banks, at pp. 800-803; Clark, at pp. 618-623.)
Also subsequent to defendant's conviction, the Legislature adopted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, eff. Jan. 1, 2019) (Senate Bill 1437). Senate Bill 1437 limited felony-murder liability to those who in the course of committing an enumerated felony were the actual killer, aided and abetted the actual killer with the intent to kill, or were major participants in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e).) Senate Bill 1437 also provided in former section 1170.95,[3] a procedure for defendants previously convicted of felony murder to petition for resentencing if they could not have been convicted under the amended felony-murder statute.
Defendant unsuccessfully sought relief under the resentencing provisions of former section 1170.95. We affirmed the trial court's denial of the postjudgment motion, concluding that a prerequisite to relief for defendants who, like Wright, are convicted of murder with a special circumstance finding that the murder was committed in the course of the robbery is to have the special circumstance finding vacated through a habeas corpus proceeding. (People v. Wright (Sept. 28, 2021, C091633) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Dec. 15, 2021, S271574, vacated &trans. for reconsideration in light of People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 Oct. 26, 2022.)[4]
Defendant has done so, and we now review that ruling. Because there was no evidentiary hearing in the habeas corpus proceeding, we are bound by the facts established at the second trial. Like the trial court, we rely on the relevant facts recounted in the appellate opinion from defendant's second trial, clarifying with evidence from the record where we deem appropriate.
In 1993, defendant drove a Hyundai to the home of acquaintances, where he joined a group drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. Five of the partiers, including defendant, departed in the Hyundai to buy more alcohol. Defendant was too inebriated, so he asked someone else to drive. Codefendant was also high. Prior to this, another partier saw codefendant with a gun.
The two victims were among the four occupants of an Oldsmobile convertible that was dropping off one of the passengers in the North Highlands area. As the convertible neared the passenger's home, it passed the Hyundai, which was heading the opposite direction. Defendant told the Hyundai driver to make a U-turn. As the convertible began its own U-turn to drop off the passenger, the Hyundai stopped in front of it.
According to a bystander who witnessed the crimes, a man got out of the Hyundai and approached the convertible. The Oldsmobile's convertible top was lowered or open. The man from the Hyundai yelled at the occupants in the Oldsmobile, then pointed a gun at them. A second man got out of the Hyundai and attempted to restrain the first. The first man (who was darker-complected) broke free and fired two or three shots. The bystander identified defendant as the second man, based primarily on his lighter complexion and physical appearance in comparison with codefendant. In 1993, the bystander was not able to identify either codefendant or defendant in photo lineups.
A deputy assigned to the jail in October 1994 testified that he conducted a random search of codefendant's mail. He found an outgoing letter bearing codefendant's return address and signature in which was written, "Just 'cause I got out of the car with the [gun], that don't prove shit."
The convertible driver, Marlin Moore, was deceased by the time of the retrial. His testimony from the first trial was read to the jury in the retrial. Moore testified that he and some of his passengers smoked marijuana and drank alcohol that day, but he was not high at the time of the incident.[5] On their way to take someone home, a Hyundai pulled in front of him, stopped and cut him off. Two men simultaneously got out of the Hyundai. Both of them wore blue colored rags at their waists, which suggested gang membership. The first, who was dark-complected and later identified as codefendant, walked up to the convertible and asked where the occupants lived. He was holding a gun.[6] Moore said he was from Oakland and did not "gang bang." Codefendant then demanded money and nudged or tapped Moore on the forehead with the gun. The other man, who had a lighter complexion and was later identified as defendant, hung back, did not say anything or take any money, but also did not try to stop the robbery. Moore was in the process of offering the $10 or so in cash he had in his pocket when he heard gunfire.
Moore looked behind him and saw that Kevin Brown, the murder victim, was grimacing. Defendant looked "shocked," "startled" and "stunned." Defendant grabbed codefendant from behind in a bear hug and said something to the effect of "stop," "cut it out," "you already shot him." Moore grabbed at the gun. Defendant pulled at codefendant, pulling him back. Codefendant waived the gun around and tried to point it at Moore's head. Moore got hold of the gun, but as the barrel began to slip out of his hand, he pushed it away and floored the accelerator. From the rearview mirror, Moore saw codefendant fire a shot in the direction of the convertible as it drove off. After traveling about half a block, Moore discovered he had been shot. He had a bullet wound in his stomach.
A couple of weeks later, Moore viewed two photo lineups. He identified codefendant as the shooter, but could not recall making the recorded statement "he's the one that shot at me, that looks like the fool right there, I'm sure." As to defendant, Moore testified that he recognized defendant's photo in the lineup but told the officer he did not recognize anyone. He explained, "I felt he tried to stop it, and I didn't feel as though he should get in any trouble for anything he did." He credited defendant for saving his life and the lives of the rest of the people in his car.
Moore was an...
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