In re Zamora
| Decision Date | 26 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 80806-1,80806-1 |
| Citation | 14 Wash.App.2d 858,474 P.3d 1072 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the Personal Restraint of: Isaac L. ZAMORA, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
C. Wesley Richards, Skagit County Public Defender, 121 Broadway, Mount Vernon, WA, for Petitioner.
Skagit County Prosecuting Atty., Attorney at Law, 605 So. Third St., Courthouse Annex, Mount Vernon, WA, Rosemary Hawkins Kaholokula, Skagit County Prosecuting Attorney, 605 S 3rd St., Mount Vernon, WA, for Respondent(s).
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶1 In 2008, Isaac Zamora stole a number of weapons, killed six people, and attempted to kill six more. Zamora subsequently pleaded guilty to eighteen crimes, including four aggravated first-degree murder charges. He pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to another two aggravated first-degree murder charges. In exchange for these pleas, the State agreed not to seek the death penalty and the court sentenced Zamora to life in prison without the possibility of parole on the four aggravated first-degree murder charges.
¶2 In 2018, the Washington State Supreme Court invalidated the state's death penalty in State v. Gregory.1 In 2019, Zamora filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing he would not have accepted the plea deal had he known he would not be at risk of execution. The trial court transferred that motion to this court to be reviewed as a personal restraint petition. We dismiss Zamora's petition as time-barred under RCW 10.73.090(1).
¶3 This court previously described Zamora's crimes:
Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Zamora, 198 Wash. App. 44, 51-52, 392 P.3d 1124 (2017).
¶4 On September 29, 2008, the State charged Zamora with six counts of aggravated murder in the first degree, six counts of attempted murder in the first degree, three counts of burglary in the first degree, one count each of residential burglary and robbery in the first degree, two counts of theft of a firearm, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree.
¶5 Zamora was eligible for the death penalty for the aggravated murders under RCW 10.95.040. Under that provision, the State had thirty days in which to file a "notice of special sentencing" to indicate whether, after reviewing mitigating circumstances, it intended to seek the death penalty. RCW 10.95.040(2). The trial court extended the statutory deadline for filing this notice on several occasions because Zamora underwent a competency evaluation at Western State Hospital (WSH) and was deemed incompetent to stand trial, and later, after competency restoration, Zamora and his counsel needed more time to prepare a mitigation package for the State.
¶6 On October 19, 2009 the defense provided the State a 155-page mitigation report. The prosecutors then "extensively discussed the contents of that report" and "conducted [their] own follow up regarding the defendant's mental status."
¶7 On November 9, 2009, defense counsel met with the prosecutor to discuss the case, shortly after which Zamora offered to plead guilty to some of the murder charges and to plead not guilty by reason of insanity to others. Before the State received this plea offer, it had not decided whether it would in fact pursue the death penalty. The State agreed to Zamora's offer and agreed not to seek the death penalty "[i]n recognition of the defendant's acceptance of culpability by entry of the pleas of guilty in conjunction with those factors considered in the mitigation package and the opinions of the mental health experts who examined the defendant."
¶8 On November 17, 2009, the trial court accepted Zamora's guilty pleas to all charges except two counts of aggravated first-degree murder, to which he pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. On November 30, 2009, Zamora was sentenced to life without the possibility of release on the four aggravated murder counts, and received high-range sentences on the remaining fourteen counts. Pursuant to his acquittals by reason of insanity, Zamora was committed to the custody of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) and transferred to WSH.
¶9 On October 18, 2018, the Supreme Court held the death penalty was unconstitutional under Washington's state constitution. State v. Gregory, 192 Wash.2d 1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018). On April 15, 2019, Zamora filed a hand-written motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, stating that he had changed his mind about the pleas due, in part, to the unconstitutionality of the death penalty. The court appointed counsel, who subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas under CrR 7.8(b)(1), (3), and (5). In his motion, Zamora asserted that he only accepted the plea bargain out of fear of the death penalty, which violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution. He further contended the threat of the death penalty impermissibly deterred him from exercising his right to a trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution and article I, section 21 of the Washington State Constitution.
¶10 The trial court concluded Zamora had not made a substantial showing he was entitled to relief and transferred the motion to this court to be considered as a personal restraint petition, pursuant to CrR 7.8(c)(2).
¶11 Zamora contends that his personal restraint petition, although filed more than ten years after entry of final judgment, is timely under RCW 10.73.100(6). We disagree.
¶12 As a general rule, a defendant may not collaterally attack a judgment more than one year after the judgment becomes final. RCW 10.73.090(1). This one-year time limit does not apply where:
There has been a significant change in the law, whether substantive or procedural, which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order entered in a criminal or civil proceeding instituted by the state or local government, and either the legislature has expressly provided that the change in the law is to be applied retroactively, or a court, in interpreting a change in the law that lacks express legislative intent regarding retroactive application, determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed legal standard.
RCW 10.73.100(6). To fall within the scope of this statutory exception to the time-bar, a defendant must demonstrate (1) a significant change in the law; (2) material to his conviction or sentence; (3) which applies retroactively. The parties do not dispute that Gregory was a significant change in the law or that it applies retroactively. The only question before us is whether Gregory was material to Zamora's conviction or sentence.
¶13 Whether a change in the law is material "depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." In re Pers. Restraint of Hartzell, 108 Wash. App. 934, 940, 33 P.3d 1096 (2001). Zamora contends that the invalidation of the death penalty is material to his conviction and sentence because avoiding the death penalty was the "controlling consideration" in his decision to plead guilty to the aggravated first degree murder charges. The State disputes this assertion, arguing that Zamora had alternative motivations for his pleas. But in focusing on Zamora's motivation for pleading guilty, both the State and Zamora misunderstand the concept of materiality in RCW 10.73.100(6). Zamora's argument is predicated on the notion that the availability of the death penalty was material to him in making the decision to plead guilty. But the case law demonstrates that the controlling consideration is how the change in law impacts the authority of the courts to convict a defendant of a particular crime or to impose a particular sentence. The relevant inquiry in assessing the materiality of a change in the law is not whether a particular legal issue was important to Zamora or motivated him into accepting the plea deal, but whether the change in the law, had it occurred before Zamora's plea, would have altered the crimes of which he was convicted or the sentences he received.
¶14 Several decisions illustrate this concept of materiality. In some cases, courts have deemed a change in law to be material, for example, when the change affected the legal elements of the crime of conviction. In In re Pers. Restraint of Andress, 147 Wash.2d 602, 610, 56 P.3d 981 (2002), our Supreme Court concluded that assault could not serve as the predicate felony for felony murder. In Bowman v. State, 162 Wash.2d 325, 172 P.3d 681 (2007), the defendants contended Andress was a significant change in the law material to their convictions. The court disagreed because the defendants were convicted of felony murder with the predicate crime of drive-by shooting, not assault. 162 Wash.2d at 327, 172 P.3d 681. Andress was deemed immaterial to the defendants’ conviction because that case did not affect the law applicable to these...
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