In re Zenga
Decision Date | 17 January 2017 |
Docket Number | Nos. 16–8022/8023,s. 16–8022/8023 |
Citation | 562 B.R. 341 |
Parties | IN RE: Vincent ZENGA; Robin Zenga, Debtors. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: Steven L. Lefkovitz, LEFKOVITZ & LEFKOVITZ, Nashville, Tennessee, for Debtors. Gene L. Humphreys, BASS, BERRY & SIMS PLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Steven L. Lefkovitz, LEFKOVITZ & LEFKOVITZ, Nashville, Tennessee, for Debtors. Gene L. Humphreys, BASS, BERRY & SIMS PLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: HUMPHREY, OPPERMAN, and PRESTON, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges.
Creditor Ivan Qi ("Qi") filed involuntary petitions against husband and wife, Vincent and Robin Zenga (the "Zengas").1 The Zengas filed a motion to dismiss the involuntary petition in each of their respective cases, arguing that 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) required a minimum of three petitioning creditors to institute an involuntary bankruptcy against them because they each had 12 or more creditors. At the hearing on the motions, Qi argued that the Zengas were estopped from asserting that they had more than 11 creditors because in response to a post-judgment interrogatory asking them to identify their other creditors, they listed ten creditors. The bankruptcy court agreed with Qi, denied the Zengas' motions to dismiss the petitions, and entered orders for relief against them. The Zengas obtained stays of the orders for relief pending disposition of these appeals. For the reasons that follow, the Panel REVERSES the bankruptcy court's decision and vacates the orders for relief and REMANDS the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Zengas raised the following issues on appeal:
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit has jurisdiction to decide this appeal. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee has authorized appeals to the Panel, and a final order of the bankruptcy court may be appealed as of right pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). For purposes of appeal, a final order "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States , 489 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 1497, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989) (citation omitted). An order for relief in an involuntary case is a final order. Mktg. & Creative Sols., Inc. v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co . (In re Mktg. & Creative Sols., Inc .), 338 B.R. 300, 302 (6th Cir. BAP 2006). As this Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has previously noted:
The standard of review regarding the application of estoppel has been called into question recently by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In Lewis v. Weyerhaeuser , 141 Fed.Appx. 420, 423–24 (6th Cir. 2005), we questioned the continuing viability of our de novo standard for judicial estoppel, noting the Supreme Court's characterization of the doctrine as an equitable remedy "invoked by the court at its discretion," New Hampshire v. Maine , 532 U.S. 742, 750, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) (citation omitted), and recognizing that the "majority of federal courts" review for abuse of discretion.
Kimberlin v. Dollar Gen. Corp ., 520 Fed.Appx. 312, 313 n.1 (6th Cir. 2013). Other circuits have held that the standard of review for equitable estoppel is abuse of discretion. See Radio Sys. Corp. v. Lalor , 709 F.3d 1124, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ; Bah. Sales Assoc., LLC v. Byers , 701 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit B.A.P. has previously held that "[e]quitable estoppel involves mixed questions of law and fact." Rossi v. Westenhoefer (In re Rossi) , No. 11–8048, 2012 WL 913732, at *2 (6th Cir. BAP Mar. 20, 2012) . However, the result of each of the Zenga appeals is the same whether the bankruptcy court's application of estoppel is reviewed de novo, as a mixed question of law and fact, or for an abuse of discretion because, by definition, it is an abuse of discretion to apply an erroneous legal standard. The bankruptcy court's use of estoppel was erroneous because Qi failed to establish the elements of either judicial or equitable estoppel.
Qi obtained judgment against the Zengas for $2,500,000 in state court and filed separate involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions against each of them. The Zengas filed motions to dismiss the involuntary petitions, asserting that because they have 12 or more creditors, the involuntary petitions required at least three petitioning creditors. The Zengas also assert that the cases should be dismissed because the cases are not in the best interest of creditors.
The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss at which Qi argued that the Zengas were estopped from presenting evidence that they had more than 11 creditors due to their responses to post-judgment sworn interrogatories which were previously served in the state court proceedings. The bankruptcy court agreed with Qi, denied the motions to dismiss, and entered orders for relief against them. The Zengas filed separate appeals.
Bankruptcy Code § 303 provides for the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions, stating in part:
11 U.S.C. § 303(b).
In this case, the involuntary petitions were filed by Qi alone after he relied on the answers to the post-judgment interrogatory responses provided by the Zengas which described ten creditors in addition to Qi—one creditor under the 12 creditor threshold requiring three or more petitioning creditors. In addition to the original responses to the interrogatories, prior to filing the bankruptcy petitions, Qi also requested the Zengas to supplement their responses. The Zengas failed to do so. Based upon these facts, the bankruptcy court determined that the Zengas were estopped from establishing in the bankruptcy court that they had more than 11 creditors. The Zengas contest that determination, asserting that: the numerical threshold of § 303(b)(1) is jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, cannot be overridden through use of an equitable doctrine; the Supreme Court's decision in Law v. Siegel , –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194–95, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014), precludes the use of equitable doctrines such as estoppel in the bankruptcy courts; the bankruptcy cases should be dismissed because they are not in the best interest of their creditors; and the bankruptcy court erroneously applied the doctrines of judicial and equitable estoppel.
The Zengas argue that the number of petitioning creditors required to file an involuntary petition is jurisdictional and, therefore, equitable doctrines such as estoppel may not be utilized to supplant the statutory requirement of three petitioning creditors. Courts that have examined this issue following the Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp ., 546 U.S. 500, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), have determined that the threshold is not jurisdictional. The Panel agrees with the post–Arbaugh decisions which hold that the threshold requirement is not...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Popular Auto, Inc. v. Reyes-Colon (In re Reyes-Colon)
...§ 303(b). Siegel forecloses employing equity to waive this plain statutory requirement.The Banks nonetheless point to In re Zenga, 562 B.R. 341 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2017), a decision by the Sixth Circuit BAP, to support their argument that the "special circumstances" doctrine can be utilized to......
-
In re On-Site Fuel Serv., Inc.
...later are deemed ineligible." 602 F. App'x at 646. Most recently, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit in In re Zenga, 562 B.R. 341 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2017), also applied the bright line test set forth in Arbaugh and found that "the creditor threshold requirement of § 303(b)(1)......
-
In re Zenga, Case No. 316-01661
...on the misrepresentation by the party asserting estoppel; and (3) detriment to the party asserting estoppel." In re Zenga, 562 B.R. 341, 350 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2017), citing Michigan Express, Inc. v. United States, 374 F.3d 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2004, LaBonte v. United States, 233 F.3d 1049, 105......
-
In re Harrison
...by the party asserting estoppel; and (3) detriment to the party asserting estoppel." Mich. Express, 374 F.3d at 427; In re Zenga, 562 B.R. 341, 350 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2017). The Debtor's argument regarding the application of equitable estoppel focuses on statements Fifth Third made regarding ......