In The Circuit Court For Baltimore City v. Holmes

• Decision Date: 25 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 141,Case No. 24-C-07-007817,141
• Parties: In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City WAL*MART STORES, INC., et al. v. LARRY HOLMES, SR., et ux.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore CityWAL*MART STORES, INC., et al.

v.LARRY HOLMES, SR., et ux.

Case No. 24-C-07-007817

No. 141

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2009

Filed: October 25, 2010

HEADNOTE — LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT — SURVIVAL OF DISABILITY BENEFITS UNDER MARYLAND WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT

When a surviving spouse asserts a claim for permanent disability benefits according to the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act, Md. Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol.) § 9-632 of the Labor and Employment Article, that spouse must either show dependency, as defined in the Act or in case law, or, alternatively, evidence of a legal obligation of support that was owed to him or her by the decedent, covered employee. A legal obligation of support is one that arises either by an order or decree from a court of competent jurisdiction, or from a legally enforceable agreement between the spouses.

Bell, C.J.

Harrell

Battaglia

Greene

Murphy

Adkins

Barbera,

JJ.

Opinion by Greene, J.

Bell, C.J., and Adkins, J., dissent.

Larry Holmes, Sr., ("Mr. Holmes") Respondent in this case, seeks to collect permanent partial disability benefits under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act, Md. Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol.) §§ 9-101-9-1201 of the Labor and Employment Article (the "Act")¹ that would have been due to his wife, Patricia L. Holmes ("Mrs. Holmes"), had she not died of causes unrelated to the injuries she sustained in the course of her employment with Wal Mart Stores, Inc., Petitioner ("Wal Mart"). Mr. Holmes relies upon § 9-632(d) of the Act, which provides for the survival of benefits to a non-dependent spouse where the deceased worker had "a legal obligation to support" the surviving spouse on the date of death. Respondent contends that "a legal obligation to support" a surviving spouse is inherent in the marital relationship and continues until given up, either voluntarily or by court order. We disagree with Respondent's position, and hold that for purposes of § 9-632(d) "a legal obligation to support" a surviving spouse does not arise by virtue of the marital tie alone and, for that reason, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in Holmes v. Wal Mart, 187 Md. App. 690, 979 A.2d 744 (2009) and remand to that court with directions to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. and Mrs. Holmes were married in 1969. They were not living together at the time of Mrs. Holmes's compensable injury, which occurred on November 3, 1999 in the course of her employment with Wal Mart. The Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission") awarded Mrs. Holmes temporary total disability benefits following her timely claim.² Mr. and Mrs. Holmes reunited in 2003 and were living as husband and wife for approximately three years until her death on December 4, 2006.³

Mrs. Holmes received compensation for her injury until November 28, 2006, when she was found to have reached maximum medical improvement from her injuries.⁴ At that time, Mrs. Holmes could have applied to the Commission for an award of either permanentpartial or permanent total disability benefits. Unfortunately, on December 4, 2006, Mrs. Holmes died of causes unrelated to her work-related injuries before she could seek such benefits. On May 7, 2007, Mrs. Holmes's attorney filed post-mortem issues with the Commission seeking permanent disability benefits and alleging that the right to collect those benefits should pass to Larry Holmes, Sr., as Mrs. Holmes's surviving spouse.

The Commission held a hearing on September 19, 2007 to consider whether Mrs. Holmes's unexercised right to collect permanent benefits would inure to the benefit of Mr. Holmes. At that hearing, the Commission determined that Mr. Holmes was not a dependent⁵of Mrs. Holmes and that Mrs. Holmes had no surviving minor children. Consequently, Mr. Holmes ability to pursue his wife's claim is controlled by § 9-632(d) of the Act:

§ 9-632. Survival of compensation.

(a) Scope of section.-This section does not apply to compensation paid under Title 10, Subtitle 2 of this article.

(b) In general.-If a covered employee dies from a cause that is not compensable under this title, the right to compensation that is payable under this Part IV of this subtitle and unpaid on the date of death survives in accordance with this section.

(c) Surviving dependents.-If there are surviving dependents of the covered employee, the right to compensation survives to the surviving dependents as the Commission may determine.

(d) No surviving dependents; obligation to support surviving spouse.-If there are no surviving dependents of the covered employee and, on the date of death, the covered employee had a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives jointly to:

(1) the surviving spouse of the covered employee; and

(2) the surviving minor children of the covered employee.

(e) No surviving dependents or obligation to support surviving spouse.-If there are no surviving dependents and, on the date of death, the covered employee did not have a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives only to the surviving minor children of the covered employee.

(Emphasis added.).

On October 3, 2007, the Commission found that Mr. Holmes had presented insufficient evidence to show that Mrs. Holmes had "a legal obligation to support" him at the time of her death and therefore, any right to claim her permanent partial benefits did not pass to him. The Commission heard and considered substantially similar arguments presented in Mr. Holmes's reply brief in this Court, particularly that "a legal obligation to support" arises as a result of the marital bond, exists until given up by either spouse, andexists by implication from Md. Code (1991, 2006. Repl. Vol.), § 10-201 of the Family Law Article, which imposes criminal penalties for willful non-support of a spouse.

Subsequent to the Commission's determination that Mr. Holmes was ineligible to claim benefits under § 9-632(d), Mr. Holmes filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. On February 29, 2008, the Circuit Court granted Wal Mart's motion for summary judgment and affirmed the Order of the Commission.

Mr. Holmes then filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On September 2, 2009, following oral arguments, the Court of Special Appeals issued its opinion reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Holmes v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 187 Md. App. 690, 979 A.2d 744 (2009). The Court of Special Appeals held that benefits survive to the spouse "unless the spouse has agreed to or has been adjudicated to have given up his or her right of support." Holmes, 187 Md. App. at 714, 979 A.2d at 748.

On December 9, 2009, we granted certiorari, Walmart v. Holmes, 411 Md. 599, 984 A.2d 244 (2009), to answer the following question posed by Wal Mart, which we have reworded slightly for clarity:

Did the Court of Special Appeals err when, in a case of first impression, it held that for the purposes of § 9-632 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland a spouse has a legal obligation to support his or her surviving spouse solely by virtue of the marital tie and in the absence of a court order, decree, or other adjudication establishing a legal obligation to pay support?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 9-745(b) of the Labor and Employment Article, provides that the decisions of the Commission are presumptively correct. This presumption, however, does not extend to questions of law. See Beyer v. Decker, 159 Md. 289, 291, 150 A. 804, 805 (1930) (stating "when the facts are undisputed, as here, the only remaining question, that of the effect of the act on such a state of facts, is one of statutory construction, and one of law for the court; and no presumption could control the conclusion as to the meaning of the statute.") (citations omitted).

In Baltimore v. Kelly, we considered the appropriate standard of review on appeal from a grant of summary judgment by a Circuit Court engaged in judicial review of a decision by the State Workers' Compensation Commission:

The general standards for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate are well established. Under Maryland Rule 2-501(a), "any party may file at any time a motion for summary judgment on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." While summary judgment motions exist to facilitate the efficient disposition of litigation, where appropriate, we have recognized that "the function of a summary judgment proceeding is not to try the case or to attempt to resolve factual issues, but to ascertain whether there is a dispute as to a material fact sufficient to provide an issue to be tried." Peck v. Baltimore County, 286 Md. 368, 381, 410 A.2d 7, 13 (1979) (citing Honaker v. W.C. & A.N. Miller Development Company, 285 Md. 216, 231, 401 A.2d 1013, 1020 (1979)). Thus, "in a summary judgment proceeding even where the underlying facts are undisputed, if those facts are susceptible of more than onepermissible inference, the choice between those inferences should not be made as a matter of law, but should be submitted to the trier of fact." Fenwick Motor Company, Inc. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 138, 265 A.2d 256, 258 (1970) (Citations omitted.).

* * * *

[W]e necessarily consider the complication of § 9-745 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.), which provides the procedure for the conduct of proceedings in a circuit court for "appeals" from decisions from the Workers' Compensation Commission. Specifically, § 9-745(c) states that "the court shall determine whether the Commission: (1) justly considered all of the facts...; (2) exceeded the powers granted to it under this title; or (3) misconstrued the law and facts

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