In the Guardianship of Raquel Cantu De Villarreal, An Incapacitated Person.

• Decision Date: 18 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 13–08–00708–CV.,13–08–00708–CV.
• Citation: 330 S.W.3d 11
• Parties: In the GUARDIANSHIP OF Raquel CANTU DE VILLARREAL, An Incapacitated Person.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

330 S.W.3d 11

In the GUARDIANSHIP OF Raquel CANTU DE VILLARREAL, An Incapacitated Person.

No. 13–08–00708–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi–Edinburg.

Nov. 18, 2010.

Susan A. Kidwell, Michael A. Hatchell, Sarah B. Duncan, Locke, Lord, Bissell & Liddell, Austin, Horacio L. Barrera, Martinez, Barrera & Martinez, Brownsville, for Appellants.Craig S. Smith, Gilberto Hinojosa, Magallanes & Hinojosa, Brownsville, for Appellees.Before Justices YAÑEZ, RODRIGUEZ, and GARZA.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice RODRIGUEZ.

Appellants, Ignacio Villarreal Cantu, Fernando Villarreal Cantu, Martha Guadalupe Villarreal Cantu, and Consuelo Villarreal Cantu, seek to reverse an order confirming an arbitration award in favor of appellees, Raquel Villarreal Cantu, individually and in her capacity as guardian of the person of Doña Raquel Cantu de Villarreal, Marcelo Villarreal Cantu, and Carlos Villarreal Cantu. By three issues, appellants contend that the award should be vacated because the arbitrator exceeded his powers in several respects and refused to postpone the arbitration hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

Doña Raquel Cantu de Villarreal (“Doña Raquel”), an elderly widow, is the mother of seven adult children, including appellants and appellees. Disputes between the children regarding Doña Raquel's care and custody and the disposition of her sizeable estate have given rise to a series of highly contentious legal proceedings, including four appeals and two original proceedings.¹ We will not address the factual and procedural underpinnings of these disputes except as necessary to address the legal issues pertinent to this appeal. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1, 47.4.

Following a court-ordered mediation to resolve some of the familial disputes, Doña Raquel's children entered into an “Irrevocable Family Settlement Agreement, Assignment, and Release and Rule 11 Agreement.” This agreement was entered into and signed by all seven of the children. The agreement provides that it was made:

[F]or the purpose of settling the various claims, controversies, and disputes, in Mexico and the United States, civil and criminal, among these parties arising out of the facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to the transfer and/or gifting of property of [Doña Raquel] and/or Ignacio Villarreal, the care and support of [Doña Raquel], and all other claims, controversies, and disputes, civil and criminal, between the parties arising prior to the date of this Agreement.

The agreement defines the scope of Doña Raquel's estate and puts various properties into “hotchpotch” ² for distribution to the seven children, and further includes provisions pertinent to the guardianship, care, and welfare of Doña Raquel. The agreement contains an arbitration provision and provides that Reynaldo Garza, Jr., the mediator for the mediation resulting in the agreement, “shall be the arbitrator of any dispute regarding the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement.” The agreement expressly states that Garza's “determination of any dispute regarding this Agreement and its implementation ... shall be final with no party having the right to appeal,” and the “implementation of this [A]greement includes the manner in which the [h]otchpotch is to be distributed to the seven children....”

The trial court approved the settlement agreement and incorporated it into the final judgment in the case by a first amended order signed on February 14, 2008. Soon after the agreement was signed, however, the children began arguing about the agreement's implementation. Alleging that appellants breached the agreement and failed to abide by the judgment, Raquel moved for an accounting, contempt, a temporary restraining order, and temporary and permanent injunctions. The gravamen of Raquel's complaint was that appellants withdrew 34 million pesos, which was referenced in and allocated by the settlement agreement, from the possession of a Mexican court, but failed to deposit the monies into a Mexican trust as required by the agreement and judgment.

On June 11, 2008, the trial court entered an order granting Raquel's motion and: ordering appellants to deposit the money into an account created for the benefit of the trust referenced in the agreement and to provide a detailed accounting regarding the money; enjoining appellants from selling, encumbering, or otherwise transferring any of the real estate properties described in the agreement in any manner inconsistent with the agreement; setting a final hearing for June 27, 2008; and ordering appellants to appear at that time “to show their compliance with this Court's Order herein to show why this Court's Order should be vacated.” On June 27, Ignacio, Fernando, Consuelo and Martha failed to appear, and accordingly, the trial court entered an order for issuance of writs of attachment against them.

On June 9, 2008, the trial court entered an order clarifying some of its previous orders and compelling arbitration. The matter was arbitrated on August 18, 2008. Appellants did not submit proposals, comments, or responses to the arbitrator regarding the issues subject to arbitration and did not personally appear at the arbitration, although they were represented by counsel at the hearing. On September 25, 2008, the arbitrator issued an eighteen page arbitration award, including extensive factual and legal conclusions, which generally collected and divided the estate of Doña Raquel and provided for her care. After appellees moved to confirm the award and appellants moved to vacate it, the trial court entered an order confirming the award. This appeal ensued.

II. Standard and Scope of Review

Review of a trial court's decision as to vacatur or confirmation of an arbitration award is de novo and the appellate court reviews the entire record. Chestnut Energy Partners v. Tapia (In re Chestnut Energy Partners, Inc.), 300 S.W.3d 386, 397 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied); Statewide Remodeling, Inc. v. Williams, 244 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); see Hisaw & Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cornerstone Concrete Sys., Inc., 115 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).

III. Vacatur of Arbitration Award

Because Texas law favors arbitration, judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co. v. Werline, 307 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex.2010); see CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado, 95 S.W.3d 234, 238 (Tex.2002); Statewide Remodeling, Inc., 244 S.W.3d at 568; GJR Mgmt. Holdings, L.P. v. Jack Raus, Ltd., 126 S.W.3d 257, 263 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied); IPCO–G.&C. Joint Venture v. A.B. Chance Co., 65 S.W.3d 252, 256 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). “Subjecting arbitration awards to judicial review adds expense and delay, thereby diminishing the benefits of arbitration as an efficient, economical system for resolving disputes.” CVN Group, Inc., 95 S.W.3d at 238. But see Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 669–70 (6th Cir.2003) (noting that arbitration can often be much more expensive for consumers than a comparable case in litigation); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1177, 1178–84 (Ohio App.Div.2004) (discussing prohibitive costs of arbitration compared to litigation for many consumers); see also Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act, It's All About Separation of Powers, 12 J. Consumer & Com. L. 151, 154 n. 55 (2009) (“Although most small claims courts provide a judge and jury for less than $100, the costs of arbitration far exceed this amount. A recent study by Public Citizen concludes that the costs of arbitration almost always exceed the costs of litigation.”); Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871, 895 (2008) (stating that “corporations' selective use of arbitration clauses against consumers, but not against each other, suggests that their use of mandatory arbitration clauses may be based more on strategic advantage” in defending against consumer claims); Mark Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 133, 133 (2004) (concluding that the cost of mandatory arbitration is often prohibitively high).

The Texas Supreme Court has “long held that ‘an award of arbitrators upon matters submitted to them is given the same effect as the judgment of a court of last resort. All reasonable presumptions are indulged in favor of the award, and none against it.’ ” CVN Group, Inc., 95 S.W.3d at 238 (quoting City of San Antonio v. McKenzie Constr. Co., 136 Tex. 315, 150 S.W.2d 989, 996 (Tex.1941) (“The courts will not overthrow an award such as this, except in a very clear case.”)). Review of an arbitration award is so limited that an award may not be vacated even if there is a mistake of fact or law. Univ. Comp. Sys., Inc. v. Dealer Solutions, L.L.C., 183 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Stieren v. McBroom, 103 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied); Vernon E. Faulconer, Inc. v. HFI, Ltd. P'ship, 970 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.). The arbitrator's award is “conclusive on the parties as to all matters of fact and law.” Pheng Invs., Inc. v. Rodriquez, 196 S.W.3d 322, 328 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). Where there is no allegation of a statutory or common law ground to vacate or modify the arbitration award, we lack jurisdiction to review the arbitrator's decision. Fogal v. Stature Constr., Inc., 294 S.W.3d 708, 721 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Providian Bancorp Servs. v. Thomas, 255 S.W.3d 411, 415 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.); Pettus v. Pettus, 237 S.W.3d 405, 418 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).

The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code dictates that, unless grounds are offered for vacating,...