In the Interest of E.G., No. 5-184/05-0131 (IA 4/13/2005)
| Decision Date | 13 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 5-184/05-0131,5-184/05-0131 |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF E.G., Minor Child, P.G., Mother, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, G. R. Noneman, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to one child. AFFIRMED.
Curtis Dial, Keokuk, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Katherine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Short, County Attorney, and David Andrusyk, Assistant County Attorney, for Appellee-State.
Thomas Marion of Marion Law Office, Keokuk, for appellee-father.
Kendra Abfalter, Keokuk, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her daughter.1 She contends (1) the State did not provide reasonable services to promote reunification, (2) termination violates her constitutional rights, and (3) termination is not in the child's best interest. On de novo review, we affirm.
Pamela is the mother and Carl the father of Zachary, born in March 2001 and Emily, born in February 2003. The parents began voluntary participation in parenting skill training in January 2002. Two problem areas identified were possible substance abuse and anger management. After three confirmed protective reports and several incidents of improper supervision, the State petitioned to have Zachary found to be in need of assistance. He was removed from his parents' care in January 2003 and placed in foster care. In February he was found to be in need of assistance and placed with his maternal grandmother.
When Emily was two months old, the State petitioned to have her found in need of assistance because Pamela was refusing voluntary services, she had missed medical appointments for Emily, her doctor raised concerns about Pamela's parenting ability, and Carl's brother, who is a registered sex offender, was spending time at the home. Following an uncontested adjudicatory hearing, the court found Emily was in need of assistance, but allowed her to remain in her parents' care subject to supervision by the Department of Human Services. The court ordered the parents to participate in services. In August 2003 Emily was removed from the home following a contested hearing because services to prevent or eliminate the need for removal had been unsuccessful.
After a rule-to-show-cause/contempt hearing in October, the court found Pamela was in willful contempt for failing to abide by court orders in the juvenile cases and a criminal case and sentenced her to thirty days in jail, suspended. Pamela left Iowa for over a month from mid-October to late November. In December the State sought to have Pamela's suspended sentences revoked for leaving the State and not complying with the juvenile court orders. Following a review and permanency hearing in January 2004, the court continued Zachary's and Emily's placement in foster care, gave the parents an additional six months to improve their parenting skills so the children could be returned to their care, ordered the parents to "actively and fully participate in and cooperate with all services offered," and ordered supervised visitation "consistent with the best interests of the child." Pamela left Iowa for Arkansas on Easter weekend and did not return until May 17.
The permanency hearing following the six-month extension of time for the parents occurred on July 1 and October 13. The court found the continued removal of the children was necessary "for a number of reasons, many of which are similar to the situation that has existed throughout this case." It found Pamela remained unstable, had no permanent home of her own, could not take her psychiatric medications because she was pregnant again, had little or no bond with Emily due in large part to Pamela's departure from Iowa at a time critical to bonding, and was viewed as a stranger by Emily. Visitation was restricted because of Emily's negative reactions to Pamela during visits. The court found Pamela's deficiencies and difficulties as a parent were ongoing. It stated:
Unfortunately, in spite of an array of reasonable efforts being made by DHS, the service providers, the court, counsel, and foster parents very little of substance has changed with regard to [Pamela's] attitude, capacity, or competence to parent from these early observations [of parenting deficiencies] made approximately 20 months ago.
The court changed the permanency goal from reunification to termination and ordered that Pamela did not appeal from this order.
A contested hearing on the petition to terminate both parents' rights to both children was held in December 2004. Concerning Pamela, the court found:
The natural mother as of the date of the termination of parental rights hearing remains unstable, is unable to take custody of the children, has no employment, has no residence for the family and is in essentially the same position she was at the time of the permanency hearing. She remains without a "permanent" home of her own and continues by her own admission to be unstable and without a job or means of supporting herself and her children. She indicated in her testimony that she believed the best interests of both children would be to place them with their father.
. . . Pam recognized in her testimony her continuing unreadiness and current inability to resume her parental duties.
Pam's difficulties and deficiencies as a parent were ongoing throughout the CINA proceedings . . . .
. . . .
. . . Emily . . . would gain little or nothing from continuing a parent-child relationship with her biological parents, and would lose a great deal from being separated from the foster family to which she has now become bonded and into which she is fully integrated. Her best interests require termination of the biological parents parental rights.
In analyzing whether termination was proper under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) the juvenile court concluded:
As indicated above, Emily has been removed from home for so much of her life that for practical purposes her biological mother is a stranger to her and her biological father simply someone who she sees occasionally. Her "parents" in the sense that she knows what a parent is are her foster parents, . . . They raise and nurture her and she is bonded to them in a parent child relationship. Clear and convincing evidence as shown in the record and discussed in both this ruling and the permanency ruling shows that the biological parents cannot resume Emily's custody now or at any time in the near future. Pam has demonstrated a marked inability to even take care of herself, let alone her children. She has exercised very poor judgment and clearly has not given primacy to her duties as Emily's mother.
Concerning Pamela's ability to parent her children, the court concluded:
Pam, though she has the "capacity" to parent if she made major changes in her lifestyle, behavior, and attitude, has not demonstrated anything except behavior that is largely irresponsible and personally destructive to her and her relationships with Carl and her children. In spite of these extensively reasonable efforts, little of value has been achieved that would allow the successful reunification of the children with Pam.
By order filed in January 2005, the juvenile court terminated Pamela's parental rights to both children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2005), terminated Carl's parental rights to Emily under the same section, and continued Zachary in relative placement.
Pamela does not challenge the statutory ground on which the juvenile court terminated her parental rights to both children. Rather, with reference only to Emily, Pamela raises three issues. First, she contends the State refused to provide adequate services by not providing necessary visitation after August 11, 2004, even though Pamela requested more visitation at the permanency hearing. Second, she claims termination violated her constitutionally-protected fundamental right to parent her children. Third, she contends the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. The State responds that error was not preserved concerning any of the issues Pamela raises on appeal.
Our review is de novo. In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993); In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). The grounds for termination must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re M.W., 458 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1990). The issue of whether or not to legally sever the biological ties between parent and child is an issue of grave importance with serious repercussions to the child as well as the biological parents. In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
Reasonable efforts.
Pamela claims there was no realistic way she could be reunited with her children when visitation was reduced to one and one-half hours per month of supervised visitation. She argues there was no rational reason for the dramatic reduction in visitation and this prevented her from developing a bond with Emily. There is a requirement that reasonable services be offered to preserve the family unit. See In re A.L., 492 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); In re B.L., 491 N.W.2d 789, 791-93 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). "Visitation between a parent and child is an important ingredient in the goal of re-unification." In re S.W., 469 N.W.2d...
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