In the Matter of Farraj, 2009 NY Slip Op 50684(U) (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 4/14/2009)

• Decision Date: 14 April 2009
• Docket Number: 4803/07
• Citation: 2009 NY Slip Op 50684
• Parties: IN THE MATTER OF the petition for a compulsory accounting in the ESTATE OF DAOUD FARRAJ A/K/A DAVID I. FARRAJ, Deceased.
• Court: New York Surrogate Court

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2009 NY Slip Op 50684(U)

IN THE MATTER OF the petition for a compulsory accounting in the ESTATE OF DAOUD FARRAJ A/K/A DAVID I. FARRAJ, Deceased.

4803/07

Surrogate's Court of the City of New York, Kings County.

Decided April 14, 2009.

Peter Piddoubny, Esq. Astoria, NY, for Petitioner

Alexander M. Dudelson, Esq., Brooklyn, NY, for Respondent.

MARGARITA LÓPEZ TORRES, J.

In this proceeding for a compulsory accounting, Saed Farraj ("respondent") has moved for an order pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(3) dismissing the petition of Rabaa M. Hanash ("petitioner"). Respondent argues that petitioner lacks standing to petition the Court as she was never the lawful spouse of the decedent and, therefore, lacks the requisite standing to compel an accounting. SCPA § 103 (39). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that under choice of law principles, New York law governs the validity of the marriage and that the couple were validly and legally married under the laws of New York.

BACKGROUND

Daoud Farraj ("decedent") died intestate on July 14, 2007, leaving five adult children from a previous marriage, including respondent, and a purported surviving spouse, petitioner. Respondent obtained Letters of Administration on January 3, 2008. On March 23, 2008, petitioner commenced a proceeding to compel an accounting of the estate. On September 25, 2008, respondent moved to dismiss the petition, challenging petitioner's status as surviving spouse by contending there was no valid marriage between decedent and petitioner.

It is undisputed that, on May 2, 2003, decedent and petitioner were married. On that date, decedent, a resident of New York, traveled from New York to petitioner's brother's home in New Jersey for the marriage ceremony. Petitioner asserts that the ceremony occurred in New Jersey because Islamic law dictates that the marriage ceremony occur at the premises of the bride's eldest male relative. Here, petitioner's brother was her eldest male relative and he resided in New Jersey. An imam traveled from New York to solemnize the marriage. When the ceremony was complete, the wedding party returned to New York for the wedding reception. From that day forward, decedent and petitioner lived in New York as husband and wife.

Respondent asserts New Jersey law governs the legal status of the marriage because the marriage occurred in New Jersey. Under New Jersey law the marriage would not be valid¹ because the couple failed to obtain a valid state license as is required by New Jersey law.² As evidence that the marriage occurred in New Jersey, respondent submits the affidavit of the imam who presided over the ceremony, in which the imam confirms that the marriage certificate was signed in New Jersey.³

Petitioner argues that New York law should control because the couple were domiciled in New York, owned property in New York, and had no connection to New Jersey other than the fact that the ceremony occurred there. Petitioner also argues that she and the decedent believed themselves married, had an expectation that they were married, and believed that their marriage ceremony had resulted in a valid marriage. Petitioner argues, inter alia, that under New York law their marriage would be valid despite the absence of a state license.⁴

DISCUSSION

The statutory requirements for a valid marriage differ in New York and New Jersey. Under the laws of New Jersey, a marriage is void without a state issued marriage license. N.J. Stat. § 37:1-10 (2008) ("[N]o marriage shall be valid unless the contracting parties shall have obtained a marriage license and failure in any case to comply shall render the purported marriage absolutely void."). Although a marriage license is also required under New York Domestic Relations Law § 13, a marriage is not void for failure to obtain a marriage license if the marriage was solemnized. NY Dom. Rel. Law § 25 ("Nothing in this article contained shall be construed to render void by reason of a failure to procure a marriage license any marriage solemnized ."). A marriage is solemnized when "the parties solemnly declare in the presence of a clergyman or magistrate and the attending witness or witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife." NY Dom. Rel. Law § 12. Accordingly, there is a conflict of law with regard to the validity of this marriage.

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that in New York there is a "strong presumption favoring the validity of marriage." In re McDonald, 276 AD2d 631, 632 (2d Dep't 2000); Fisher v. Fisher, 250 NY 313, 317 (1929) ("Every presumption lies in favor of the validity of a marriage."); Hynes v. McDermott, 91 NY 451, 459 (1883) ("The presumption of marriage, from a cohabitation, apparently matrimonial, is one of the strongest presumptions known to the law."); Persad v. Balram, 187 Misc 2d 711, 717 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 2001) (noting "plaintiff ha[d] failed to overcome the strong presumption favoring the validity of marriages"). "Wherever possible the courts have endeavored to sustain the validity of a marriage." Helfond v. Helfond, 53 Misc 2d 974, 977 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1967). Respondent has a heavy burden in overcoming the presumption that favors the validation and legitimization of marriage, and even more so here because the parties completed a ceremony, cohabitated, and held themselves out as being married. See Hynes, 91 NY at 459 ("Where there is enough to create a foundation for the presumption of marriage, it can be repelled only by the most cogent and satisfactory evidence.").

The general rule is that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law of the state where the marriage itself took place. In re May's Estate, 305 NY 486, 490 (1953) ("[T]he legality of a marriage between persons sui juris is to be determined by the law of the place [of contract]."). This rule is derived from the general principle that a marriage is a type of contract, Dom. Rel. Law § 10, and that the validity of a contract is governed by the laws of the state where it was formed. Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 NY 18, 24 (1881) ("[I]t is a general rule of law that a contract entered into in another State or country, if valid according to the law of that place, is valid everywhere . . . .").

However, it has long been recognized that a marriage is not merely an ordinary contract. Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 NY 282, 284 (1874) ("[Marriage] is more than a contract . . . It partakes more of the character of an institution regulated and controlled by public authority, upon principles of public policy; for the benefit of the community."). Marriage creates a personal status that carries with it non-transferable rights, duties, and obligations that are recognized and imposed by the state. Wade, 58 NY at 285 ("Neither the rights, duties nor obligations created by or flowing from [marriage] can be transferred, and the action scarcely resembles, in its main features, an action upon contract."). Marriage works as an important social institution that provides a cultural and religious infrastructure fundamental to our society. See Fearon v. Treanor, 272 NY 268, 272 (1936) ("It constitutes an institution involving the highest interests of society. It is regulated and controlled by law based upon principles of public policy affecting the welfare of the people of the State.").

Because a marriage is more than a contract and other states may have an interest in a particular marriage, there are exceptions to the traditional rule that the validity of a marriage is governed by the laws of the state where the marriage occurred. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922, 926 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977) (determining that the laws of Connecticut governed the validity of a marriage that was contracted in Maryland); McPeek v. McCardle, 888 N.E.2d 171 (Ind. 2008) (applying Indiana law to uphold a marriage where domiciles of Indiana went to Ohio to have their marriage solemnized and then returned to Indiana, even if it would have been invalid under Ohio law); In re Estate of Shippy, 37 Wn. App. 164, 678 P.2d 848(Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (applying Washington law to uphold a marriage even though it would have been invalid in the state where it took place). For example, the state where the parties are domiciled has a strong interest in the marriage, even if it is not the state where the marriage occurred. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) ("Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its borders."); Bell v. Little, 204 A.D. 235, 237 (4th Dep't 1922) ("The State has unquestioned jurisdiction over the marital status of its own citizens."); In re Palmer's Estate, 192 Misc. 385, 390 (Sur. Ct. Monroe Co. 1948) ("[I]f the parties are not domiciled in the State where the marriage is celebrated, to some extent the law of the domicile will control.").

In order to resolve conflicts such as the one now before the Court, the Court turns for guidance to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.⁵ Section 283 of the Restatement provides that the laws of the state with the most significant relationship with the parties and the marriage govern the validity of a marriage; this is not necessarily the state where the marriage ceremony occurred.⁶ If the domicile state has the most significant relationship with the parties and the marriage, then the laws of the domicile state can be used to determine the validity of the marriage even if it would be invalid in the state where it was celebrated. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283, cmt. I ("[E]ven if the requirement is a mandatory one, the marriage should not necessarily be held invalid in other states provided that it would be valid under the local law of some other state having a substantial relation to the parties and the marriage.").

Courts look to general principles of choice of law in determining the state with the most significant relationship...