In the Matter of Anonymous v. Commissioner of Health
Decision Date | 27 September 2005 |
Docket Number | 6452. |
Parties | In the Matter of ANONYMOUS, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH et al., Respondents. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
In September 2004, following a lengthy investigation, the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct presented petitioner with a draft statement of charges stating numerous allegations of professional misconduct. By late October, in lieu of a hearing before an administrative law judge, petitioner and respondents agreed upon a 36-month suspension of petitioner's medical license, all but 10 months of which would be stayed. Following this, the parties entered negotiations on what allegations petitioner would and would not contest. It was eventually agreed upon that petitioner would simply acknowledge that he "cannot successfully defend against at least one of the acts of misconduct alleged."
On October 28, 2004, petitioner received a proposed consent agreement. The agreement was prepared by respondent Office of Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC), and was approved by its Director, Dennis Graziano, before it was sent to petitioner. The agreement did not make any provision respecting publication of the statement of charges, and respondents had made no request on this matter. After some minor changes, also approved by Graziano, the final consent agreement was sent to petitioner on November 1, 2004.
On November 2, 2004, petitioner executed the consent agreement. On December 8, 2004, the Director's office received it. The following day, prior to Graziano executing the agreement, petitioner commenced the first of two CPLR article 78 proceedings. The proceeding was brought to prevent respondents from publishing the charges against petitioner on their Web site.
After the commencement of this first article 78 proceeding, Graziano refused to sign the consent agreement. He averred that there had been no "meeting of the minds" due to the disagreement concerning publication. Graziano maintained that he had expected that upon finalization the agreement would be published in its entirety, including the statement of charges. Once Graziano refused to sign the agreement, petitioner withdrew the article 78 proceeding, since the absence of a finalized consent agreement made it moot.
Petitioner filed a second article 78 proceeding on January 27, 2005. In this second proceeding, petitioner argued that Graziano's refusal to sign the consent agreement was an "abuse of discretion" and done "solely in retaliation and as retribution and punishment for petitioner having filed the first article 78." Petitioner sought an order "compelling respondent to serve and sign the consent agreement negotiated and agreed to by the parties."
Supreme Court rejected petitioner's arguments and denied his petition insofar as it requested an order compelling respondents to sign the consent agreement.
It is hornbook law that a mandamus to compel may not force the performance of a discretionary act, but rather only purely ministerial acts to which a clear legal right exists. Under CPLR 7803 (1), the petitioner "must have a clear legal right to the relief demanded and there must exist a corresponding nondiscretionary duty on the part of the administrative agency to grant that relief" (Matter of Scherbyn v. Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 NY2d 753, 757 [1991]). If in fact petitioner were seeking a mandamus to compel, his petition would fail. However, it is by no means clear whether petitioner's claim is properly cast as a writ of mandamus to compel rather than a mandamus to review.
In accordance with CPLR 7803 (3), (77 NY2d at 757-758). Though petitioner requests an order to compel a discretionary act, the substance of his demand in the second article 78 proceeding is for the court to review respondents' decision and annul it as an abuse of discretion.
The sole cause of action in the second article 78 proceeding is plainly stated as one for "abuse of discretion." The petition clearly shows that petitioner sought review of respondents' refusal to execute the consent agreement on the grounds that the refusal was for an improper purpose.
Petitioner concedes that the decision to enter into the agreement was discretionary. However, he argues that the discretion is not absolute so far as "respondent's rejection of the previously agreed upon consent agreement was retaliatory, punitive and vindictive, and was, therefore, arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of...
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