In the Matter of Richard M. (anonymous)

• Decision Date: 09 November 2011
• Parties: In the Matter of RICHARD M. (Anonymous), appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

89 A.D.3d 849

932 N.Y.S.2d 165

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 08154

In the Matter of RICHARD M. (Anonymous), appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Nov. 9, 2011.

Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and John A. Newbery of counsel), for appellant.Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Edward F.X. Hart and Drake A. Colley of counsel), for respondent.DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, J.P., ANITA R. FLORIO, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Richard M. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), dated February 28, 2011, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated January 21, 2011, made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of burglary in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, and criminal trespass in the third degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 18 months. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the fact-finding order.

ORDERED that the order of disposition is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent based upon the finding that he committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal trespass in the third degree, and substituting therefor a provision dismissing that count of the petition; as so modified, the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the fact-finding order is modified accordingly.

The appellant contends that the expert witness in fingerprint comparison and identification did not give adequate factual detail to support his conclusion that three latent fingerprints left at the scene of the burglary matched known fingerprints of the appellant. Contrary to the appellant's contention, the opinion of the expert witness was supported by a sufficient factual basis establishing that an accepted methodology was appropriately employed ( see People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427, 430, 541 N.Y.S.2d 340, 539 N.E.2d 96; People v. Garcia, 299 A.D.2d 493, 749 N.Y.S.2d 882; see generally Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 434, 447, 824 N.Y.S.2d 584, 857 N.E.2d 1114).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621; cf. People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that there was legally sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of burglary in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree ( cf. People v. Urquidez, 5 A.D.3d 800, 801, 773 N.Y.S.2d 567; People v. Hirsch, 280 A.D.2d 612, 720 N.Y.S.2d 535; People v. Murray, 168 A.D.2d 573, 573, 562 N.Y.S.2d 788). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Michale A.C., 73 A.D.3d 1042, 1043, 900 N.Y.S.2d 655; cf. 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d...