In the Matter of Marriage of Owens, No. 53328-2-I (WA 3/21/2005)
| Decision Date | 21 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 53328-2-I,53328-2-I |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Marriage of: KIMBRA L. OWEN, nka KIMBRA L. MARTIN, Respondent, and DANIEL D. PHILLIPS, Appellant. |
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 93-3-03315-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 10/08/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Bruce W Hilyer.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Suzanne Lee Elliott, Attorney at Law, Ste 1300 Hoge Bldg, 705 2nd Ave, Seattle, WA 98104-1741.
Daniel D Phillips (Appearing Pro Se), 11929 West 66th Street, Kansas, MO 66203.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Douglas Paul Becker, Attorney at Law, 701 5th Ave Ste 4550, Seattle, WA 98104-7088.
Daniel D. Phillips moved to quash a child support contempt order and to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens in his former wife Kimbra Owen's action to collect delinquent child support. After the trial court denied his motions, it refused to allow him to file an answer. Phillips appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce the child support order. He argues in the alternative that forum non conveniens was a proper basis for dismissal. The trial court rejected his arguments, holding that the Missouri Supreme Court had already decided the jurisdictional issues, and its decision was entitled to full faith and credit. On appeal, Owen no longer argues that full faith and credit applies, so we reach only the jurisdictional issues. We hold that the support order was properly registered in Washington and gave the trial court subject matter jurisdiction to enforce it. Because Phillips only contested the court's personal jurisdiction over him when opposing modification of the support order in 1995, he has waived his right to contest personal jurisdiction for registration and enforcement of the order. We affirm the superior court's order, but remand so that the court can allow Phillips to answer the enforcement motion.
In July 1983, Phillips married Kimbra L. Owen (nka Martin) in Oregon. The couple's only child was born in August 1983. The family moved to Missouri in 1987 and then to Kansas in 1988, where Phillips and Owen divorced in June 1989. They resolved all rights and claims in a divorce and custody decree entered by the Johnson County (Kansas) District Court on June 30, 1989. This decree included a child support order that was later modified by the same court in 1993.
Phillips moved to Missouri in August 1989 and remained there until 1997, when he moved back to Kansas where he still lives. Owen and the child moved to Washington in 1992 after living briefly in New Jersey. Since 1993 this case has involved a complex, multi-state history of litigation about child support orders.
In 1993, Owen petitioned in the King County Superior Court for modification of the custody decree and approval of her proposed parenting plan. Phillips consented to entry of the plan, and it was filed in February 1994. In 1995, Owen submitted a request in King County Superior Court to register and enforce the Kansas support order. She also filed a petition for support modification at the same time, asserting that personal jurisdiction derived from the fact that the child may have been conceived in Washington. Phillips entered a special appearance and moved to dismiss Owen's motion to modify support, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because the child could not have been conceived in Washington. He did not contest personal jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing the order.1 The superior court entered a default judgment against him for unpaid child support and granted Owen's petition for modification. Phillips did not appeal.
Later in 1995, Owen sought to enforce the modified Washington order in Missouri where Phillips was living at the time. The Missouri Division of Child Support Enforcement entered an administrative order against Phillips, which he appealed all the way to the Missouri Supreme Court. In 1999, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned the order, holding that Washington had no authority to modify the Kansas order under requirements of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). In 2001, Owen unsuccessfully petitioned a Kansas court to enforce the modified 1995 Washington order in Kansas.
In February 2003, Owen filed a motion for contempt in King County Superior Court because Phillips failed to make child support payments as required by the modified 1995 Washington order. Phillips filed a special appearance and motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. A court commissioner found the court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a contempt order.
Owen then filed a motion for contempt based on Phillips' failure to make child support payments as required by the Kansas order. Phillips again moved to dismiss. This time he asserted lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens. A court commissioner denied the motion to dismiss and found Phillips in contempt, entering judgment for back child support payments, interest, medical expenses, and attorney fees. Phillips moved for revision and filed a motion for a stay of the Washington judgment pending a Kansas court's determination of arrearages. In the alternative, Phillips asked to file substantive answers to Owen's allegations. In October 2003, the superior court denied Phillips' motions and affirmed the commissioner's ruling. Phillips appeals.
Owen now acknowledges that Washington courts do not have jurisdiction to modify the Kansas order. So the main issue on appeal is whether Washington courts have jurisdiction to enforce the Kansas support order.
Phillips argues that Washington courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction because Kansas retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of the child support order. Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo.2 Because Washington superior courts have general jurisdiction, they lack subject matter jurisdiction only ". . . under compelling circumstances, such as when it is explicitly limited by the Legislature or Congress."3 UIFSA has been adopted by all states and controls the subject matter jurisdiction issue in this case.4
Phillips argues that Kansas retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for enforcement purposes because (1) the Kansas support order was never validly modified, and (2) Owen never properly registered the order in Washington. He contends that the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994 (FFCCSA) dictates that Kansas' continuing, exclusive jurisdiction remains in effect until another state's court validly modifies a support order. But as Owen correctly points out, although the FFCCSA restricts modification of out-of-state child support orders, it also requires enforcement of those orders.5
Phillips contends that the support order was not properly registered in Washington in 1995 and that strict compliance with the terms of the registration statute is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the superior court. He asserts that Owen's registration request and supporting documentation were not filed properly under RCW 26.21.490, and that the registration notice he received failed to specify the amount of arrearages as required by RCW 26.21.520(d). He acknowledges that the superior court has jurisdiction to enforce the Kansas support order if the order is validly registered as a foreign support order under UIFSA.6 Owen argues that the superior court has subject matter jurisdiction because King County Superior Court was a proper place to file the documents, and Phillips waived his right to object to registration when he failed to contest the validity or enforcement of the order in a timely manner. We need not determine whether Phillips waived his right to claim lack of subject matter jurisdiction because we hold that Owen substantially complied with the registration requirements of the UIFSA.
As we noted above, a support order issued by another state's tribunal may be registered in Washington for enforcement.7 The order may be registered by sending the required documents and information `to the support enforcement agency of this state or to the superior court of any county in this state where the obligor resides, works, or has property{.}'8 Washington tribunals `shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.'9 The parties agree that Owen sent the registration request and supporting documents to King County Superior Court. They also agree that Phillips has never resided, worked, or owned property in King County or anywhere else in Washington. Owen asserts that the superior court is a `support enforcement agency' for purposes of RCW 26.21.490. But the superior court clearly is not the support enforcement agency for the state, as it is neither a public official nor an agency. The order should have been registered with Washington's support enforcement agency, the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS).10 Despite this error, the superior court accepted the registration request, filed the Kansas order, and notified Phillips.
Phillips relies on Scanlon v. Witrak11 to argue that `strict compliance' with registration procedures is necessary to establish subject matter jurisdiction. But there we held that Georgia courts retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction because there was no proof that the Georgia support order had ever been registered in Washington.12 We did not hold that `strict compliance' was required. Nor did we address whether an out-of-state order that was registered despite procedural flaws substantially complies with the statute. Phillips does not cite, and we cannot find, any Washington precedent addressing that issue. We have found cases from other states...
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