In the Matter of Strong v. State, 2005 OK 45 (OK 6/21/2005), 99408.

• Decision Date: 21 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 99408.,99408.
• Parties: IN THE MATTER OF KENNETH R. STRONG, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. THE OKLAHOMA POLICE PENSION AND RETIREMENT BOARD, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1

2005 OK 45 IN THE MATTER OF KENNETH R. STRONG, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. THE OKLAHOMA POLICE PENSION AND RETIREMENT BOARD, Defendant/Appellee. No. 99408. Supreme Court of Oklahoma June 21, 2005

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV, Honorable David M. Harbour, Trial Judge.

¶0 The respondent/appellant, Kenneth R. Strong (Strong/retiree), served over sixteen years with the Midwest City Police Department. Upon his separation, Strong opted to leave his retirement in the defendant/respondent's, Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement Board (Board), retirement program (OPPRS/Retirement Program), electing a vested benefit. Board employees informed Strong, over the phone and in an initial letter, that he would be eligible to begin drawing his retirement in December of 1999. Nevertheless, when Strong contacted the Board in early 1999 to verify the date he would begin receiving benefits, he was told that the original information was inaccurate and that he would not be entitled to benefits until July 23, 2008, when he turned fifty. Following a hearing, the Board determined that Strong was prohibited statutorily from receiving retirement benefits before he reached fifty years of age. The trial judge, Honorable David M. Harbour, affirmed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed finding that the Board was equitably estopped from denying benefits. The clear language of 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1 allows the disbursal of retirement benefits to a retiree leaving the system and electing a vested benefit when the retiree reaches fifty years of age or the date on which the retiree would have had twenty years of uninterrupted service — whichever is later. Under the facts presented, we hold that, where the retiree signed a form containing the statutory language giving notice of the age and service requirements preceding the right to retirement benefits and he acknowledged an awareness of the time restrictions, the Board is not estopped from denying benefits despite its originally having given the retiree incorrect information concerning the date he was entitled to draw retirement.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED; ORDER OF OKLAHOMA POLICE AND RETIREMENT BOARD SUSTAINED.

Stephen J. Merrill, Wilson H. Busby, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant,

Steven K.Snyder, Assistant Attorney General, Wellon B. Poe, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee.

KAUGER, J.:

¶1 We granted certiorari to determine whether, under the facts presented, the defendant/respondent, Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement Board (Board), is estopped from relying on 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1.¹ The clear, explicit and unmistakable language of the statute limits the Board's disbursal of retirement funds from its retirement program (OPPRS/Retirement Program) to a retiree leaving the system and electing a vested benefit before the later of reaching fifty years old or the date on which the retiree would have had twenty years of uninterrupted service had the employment continued.

¶2 Here, the respondent/appellant, Kenneth R. Strong (Strong/retiree), admits signing a form containing the statutory language giving notice of the age and service requirements which preceded the right to retirement benefits and of being aware of the time restrictions. Under these facts, we determine that the Board is not estopped from denying benefits despite its originally having given the retiree incorrect information concerning the date he was entitled to draw retirement.

FACTS

¶3 Strong became a member of the Retirement Program through his service as a member of the Midwest City Police Department beginning in December of 1979. In May of 1996, he received an outside job offer. Before accepting the offer, the retiree alleges that he spoke with two Board employees who advised him that, if he elected a vested option, he would be entitled to begin drawing retirement benefits in December, 1999. He also received a letter from the Board's Executive Director stating that benefits would begin at the end of 1999. Nevertheless, when Strong submitted his application for vested retirement benefits, the form he signed contained language specifically stating that he would not be entitled to receive benefit payments until either his fiftieth birthday or the date he would have had twenty years of credited service had his employment continued, whichever occurred later in time. Furthermore, Strong admitted that he was aware of the limiting "whichever is later" restriction.² Strong will turn fifty in 2008 while he would have had twenty years of service, had he stayed in the Retirement Program, in December of 1999.

¶4 In March of 1999, Strong contacted the Board to inquire how returning to police work would affect his retirement benefits. He alleges that it was after this contact that he was first informed that he would not be eligible for benefits until he turned fifty in 2008. The discussion was followed by a Board letter indicating that their communication of 1996 contained an error and advising Strong that the date he would begin receiving benefits would be July 23, 2008, rather than December of 1999.

¶5 At the end of the 1999 calendar year, Strong demanded the payment of retirement benefits. The Retirement Program refused asserting that payment would violate the "whichever is later" rule of 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1.³ On January 17, 2001, the Board determined that Strong was prohibited statutorily from receiving retirement benefits before he reached the age of fifty. The trial judge, Honorable David M. Harbour, affirmed in an order filed on May 20, 2003. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed finding that the Board was equitably estopped from denying benefits. It remanded the cause on December 14, 2004, with orders for the Board to begin pension benefits immediately and to reimburse Strong for benefits accruing since December 1, 1999. On January 28, 2005, the last of the certiorari pleadings were filed. Certiorari was granted on April 25, 2005, to determine Strong's right to retirement benefits.

I. ¶6 THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111 ALLOWS THE PAYMENT OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS ON THE LATER OF ONE OF TWO OCCURENCES — THE RETIREE REACHING THE AGE OF FIFTY OR THE DATE WHEN THE RETIREE WOULD HAVE HAD TWENTY YEARS OF UNINTERRUPTED SERVICE. DESPITE THE RETIREMENT BOARD'S INCORRECT ADVICE THAT BENEFITS WOULD BEGIN AT AN EARLIER TIME, A RETIREE, AWARE OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE, MAY NOT RELY ON ESTOPPEL AS AN AVENUE TO RECEIVE BENEFITS NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

¶7 Title 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1 provides in pertinent part:

". . . If the member who has completed ten (10) or more years of credited service elects the vested benefit, the member shall be entitled to a monthly retirement annuity commencing on the date the member reaches fifty (50) years of age or the date the member would have had twenty (20) years of credited service had the member's employment continued uninterrupted, whichever is later. . . ." [Emphasis added.]

The Board argues, and Strong does not dispute, that the explicit language of 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1 undeniably allows only the disbursal of retirement benefits to a retiree leaving the system and electing a vested benefit when the later of one of two things occurs: 1) the retiree reaches fifty years of age; or 2) the date on which the retiree would have had twenty years of uninterrupted service. Although an officer or an agency may have implied powers not granted by statute, implied authority is limited to that necessary for the due and efficient exercise of express powers.⁴ Here, there is no need to imply any power to carry out the meaning of the statute.

¶8 A cardinal precept of statutory construction is that where a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and the meaning clear and unmistakable, no justification exists for the use of interpretative devices to fabricate a different meaning.⁵ Here, the Legislature has plainly stated that the later of two...