In the Matter of The Fort Totten Metrorail Cases Arising Out of The Events of June 22, 2009.Lead Case: Jenkins v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.

• Citation: 793 F.Supp.2d 133,74 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 691
• Decision Date: 22 June 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 10mc314 (RBW).
• Parties: In the Matter of the FORT TOTTEN METRORAIL CASES ARISING OUT OF THE EVENTS OF JUNE 22, 2009.Lead Case: Jenkins v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, et al.This Document Relates To: All Cases.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

793 F.Supp.2d 133

74 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 691

In the Matter of the FORT TOTTEN METRORAIL CASES ARISING OUT OF THE EVENTS OF JUNE 22, 2009.Lead Case: Jenkins

v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, et al.This Document Relates To: All Cases.

Case No. 10mc314 (RBW).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 22, 2011.

Alton C. Hale, Gary, Williams, Finney, Lewis, Watson & Sperando, P.L. & Sperando, Stuart, FL, J. Mitchell Lambros, Lambros & Lambros, Cockeysville, MD, Joseph Alexander Malouf, Gaithersburg, MD, Laurin H. Mills, LeClair Ryan, Alexandria, VA, Lawrence M. Mann, Alper & Mann, Bethesda, MD, J. Stephen Simms, Marios John Monopolis, Simms Showers LLP, Baltimore, MD, P. Matthew Darby, Berman Sobin Gross Feldman & Darby LLP, Towson, MD, Anna C. Huff Brunkenhoefer, R. Blake Brunkenhoefer, Greg W. Turman, Brunkenhoefer, Almaraz & Turman, PLLC, Corpus Christi, TX, Brian Keith McDaniel, McDaniel & Associates, James Charles Bailey, Jason H. Ehrenberg, Allan M. Siegel, Ira Sherman, Joseph Cammarata, Chaikin, Sherman, Cammarata & Siegel, P.C., Harlow R. Case, Jack Harvey Olender, Karen E. Evans, Jack H. Olender & Associates, P.C., Keith W. Watters, Keith Watters & Associates, Kim D. Brooks–Rodney, Cohen & Cohen, Richard A. Bussey, Stein, Mitchell & Muse, Melissa Rhea, Sandra H. Robinson, Jack Olender & Associates, P.C., Stephen D. Annand, The Cochran Firm, Patrick M. Regan, Victor E. Long, Regan, Zambri & Long, PLLC, Lawrence Searle Lapidus, Washington, DC, W. Charles Bailey, Simms Showers, LLP, Maryland, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Memorandum Opinion

REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

This action was initiated on behalf of individuals killed or injured on June 22, 2009, in a collision between two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (the “WMATA” or “Metrorail”) trains. On October 18, 2010, the plaintiffs, except for the Estate of Jeanice McMillan,¹ who filed a separate amended complaint at the same time, filed their consolidated Second Amended Master Complaint (“Compl.” or “Master Complaint”) against the following defendants: ADCO Circuits Incorporated (“ADCO”); Ansaldo STS USA, Incorporated (“Ansaldo”); Alstom Signaling, Incorporated (“Alstom”); the WMATA; and Arinc Incorporated, alleging claims for negligence, products liability, and breach of warranty. One of the defendants, Alstom, has filed motions to dismiss both the Second Amended Master Complaint and the Jeanice McMillan Estate Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand (“McMillan Estate Compl.” or “McMillan Estate Complaint”). Alstom argues that certain counts of the Master Complaint must be dismissed because they fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted for the following reasons: (1) Counts 7, 9, 10, and 14 on the ground that they are “time-barred under the District of Columbia's ten-year statute of repose[,] D.C.Code § 12–310 (2001);” (2) Counts 11, 12, and 15 on the ground that they “are time-barred under the statute of limitations [applicable to] breach of warranty claims under the Uniform Commercial Code [ (the ‘UCC’) ] as adopted by the District of Columbia [,] D.C.Code § 28:2–725;” (3) Count 14 on the ground that it is duplicative of Count 7; (4) Counts 11, 12, and 15 on the ground “that the [Master] Complaint fails to allege the essential element[s] necessary for a claim [of] breach of warranty;” and (5) Counts 16 and 17 on the ground that they are “derivative claims” of Counts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15. Defendant Alstom Signaling Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss, April 21, 2010 (“Mot. to Dismiss”) at 1–2. Alstom argues that those counts of the McMillan Estate Complaint which correspond with the counts of the Master Complaint should also be dismissed for the reasons just outlined,² and therefore the McMillan Estate Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety “for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Defendant Alstom Signaling Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss, June 18, 2010 (“McMillan Estate Mot. to Dismiss”) at 1.³

For the reasons that follow, Alstom's motions will be granted in part and denied in part.⁴

I. Background

The complaints allege that “[o]n Monday, June 22, 2009, [at] about 4:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, ... Metrorail train 112 collided with the rear end of stopped train 214 near the Fort Totten station in Washington, D.C.” Compl. ¶ 156. As a result of the collision, nine passengers and the striking train's operator were killed and more than seventy passengers were injured. Compl. ¶ 161. The accident purportedly occurred because “[t]he Metrorail automatic train control system stopped detecting the presence of train 214 (the ... train [that was struck] ) in track circuit B2–304, which caused train 214 to stop and also allowed speed commands to be transmitted to train 112 (the striking train) until the collision.” National Transportation Safety Board, Railroad Accident Report 10/02: Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains Near Fort Totten Station 120, available at http:// www. ntsb. gov/ publictn/ 2010/ RAR 1002. pdf.

Following the accident, civil actions were filed by injured passengers and representatives of passengers who were killed, and those actions were consolidated by this Court. As a result of the consolidation, the plaintiffs filed a single Master Complaint. CMO ¶¶ 31–32. A representative of Jeanice McMillan, the operator of train 112 who died in the collision, subsequently filed a separate complaint. McMillan Estate Compl. ¶ 1.

As noted earlier, according to the complaints, the trains collided because the WMATA's automatic train control system failed to detect the presence of train 214 on the track. Compl. ¶ 163. Due to the false reading and because train 112 was operating in automatic mode, it did not slow as it approached the track occupied by train 214. Id. ¶¶ 158, 163. The train operator, McMillan, overrode the automatic mode by activating emergency brakes when train 112 was about 300 feet from train 214. Id. ¶ 160. However, despite McMillan's actions, it failed to stop in time to prevent the collision due to the train's speed. Id.⁵

The WMATA's train detection system is comprised of various components, including “transmitters, receivers, and impedance bonds,” id. ¶ 165, which, according to the plaintiffs, were manufactured by defendants Alstom, Ansaldo, and ADCO, id. ¶¶ 18, 166. The train detection system was designed in the 1970s, id. ¶ 164, and some of the parts were actually manufactured by General Railway Signal (“GRS”), “the predecessor corporation to [d]efendant Alstom,” id. ¶ 166. Around 2004, the WMATA began replacing GRS components with those provided by United Switch & Signal (“US & S”), the predecessor corporation of defendant Ansaldo. Id. ¶ 166. WMATA employees and U.S. & S personnel installed the replacement components, id., and neither complaint contends that Alstom had any role in installing the new components other than making its engineers available for technical discussions and participating in an investigation concerning an earlier event involving the train detection system, id. ¶¶ 166, 173.

The use of both GRS and U.S. & S components allegedly diminished the sensitivity of the train detection system, resulting in the track circuit not de-energizing as it should have to detect the presence of a train on the track. Id. ¶ 167. Specifically, one symptom, “bobbing,” caused the train detection system for a block of track to indicate the block was vacant, then occupied, and then vacant again. Id. ¶ 168. This problem was detected by a WMATA crew installing the replacement components, id., and a work order was opened to correct the bobbing problem, but it was not acted upon before the crash, which occurred five days later, id. ¶ 169.

Both the Master Complaint and the McMillan Estate Complaint raise claims of negligence, products liability, and breach of warranty against defendant Alstom.⁶Id. ¶¶ 228–241, 250–276, 284–305. The claims primarily allege that malfunctions in the electronic train control system caused the crash. Id. ¶ 235. Alstom, as one of the providers of the components used in the electronic train control system, is alleged to have failed to properly design, manufacture, install, inspect, test, and maintain the automated warning system that should have prevented the two trains from colliding. Id. ¶¶ 240, 253. The plaintiffs also allege that Alstom breached implied and express warranties that its products, such as the electronic control system, were fit for the safe transportation of WMATA employees and fare-paying passengers. Id. ¶¶ 269, 274, 302; McMillan Estate Compl. ¶¶ 76, 81, 86. Finally, the complaints assert wrongful death and separate survival claims for the “pre-impact fright, extreme pain and suffering, fear and anticipation of impending injury and death.” Compl. ¶¶ 306, 308, 310.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion to dismiss as to Counts 7, 9, 10, 16, and 17 of the Master Complaint and Counts 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, and 10 of the McMillan Estate Complaint. However, the Court grants the motion as to Counts 11, 12, and 15 of the Master Complaint, and as to Counts 4, 5, and 6 of the McMillan Estate Complaint. The Court will also grant the motion to dismiss either Counts 7 or 14 of the Master Complaint, permitting those plaintiffs to select one of the two counts on which they wish to proceed.

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether a complaint has properly stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Woodruff v. DiMario, 197 F.R.D. 191, 193 (D.D.C.2000). For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that it contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8(a) does not require “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff is required to provide “more than an...