In The Matter Of The Welfare Of The Children Of J.B., No. A09-1146.
| Decision Date | 14 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. A09-1146. |
| Citation | 782 N.W.2d 535 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the WELFARE OF the Children of J.B. and R.P.; S.K.J. and J.N.T.; S.L.A.J. and B.J.T., Parents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Although indigent parents, guardians, and custodians have the right under Minn.Stat. § 260C.163, subds. 3(a) and (b) (2008), to representation by court-appointed counsel in juvenile protection proceedings, in the absence of express statutory authority under Minn.Stat. ch. 611 (2008), indigent parents, guardians, and custodians do not have the right to the appointment of a public defender to represent them.
2. Under Minn.Stat. § 260C.331 (2008), the cost of court-appointed counsel to represent indigent parents, guardians, and custodians in juvenile protection proceedings is a charge upon the county in which the proceedings are held.
3. The district court did not err in holding the county in civil contempt for failing to obey the court's order to pay in full the attorney fees of private counsel appointed to represent the indigent parents in juvenile protection proceedings.
4. Courts' enforcement of statutory obligations imposed on counties does not violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Minnesota Constitution.
Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Brainerd, MN, for appellant Crow Wing County.
Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Arden Fritz, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association.
Bradford S. Delapena, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota State Public Defender.
Between November 2007 and October 2008, appellant Crow Wing County filed child-protection (CHIPS) petitions in the three cases now before us. In each case, the indigent parents petitioned for representation and the district court appointed private counsel for the indigent parents. After the County refused to pay the appointed attorney's invoices, arguing that the district court must appoint a public defender to represent the indigent parents, the district court held the county auditor and county commissioners in civil contempt. The County appealed the order for civil contempt and sought accelerated review, which we granted. The questions presented on appeal involve whether the district court erred in ordering the appointment of private counsel to represent indigent parents in juvenile protection proceedings at county expense.1 Because we conclude that the cost of court-appointed counsel to represent indigent parents in juvenile protection proceedings is a charge upon the county in which the proceedings are held, we affirm.
In June 2008, the Minnesota State Board of Public Defense resolved to discontinue representation of parents, custodians, and guardians in juvenile protection proceedings. In July 2008, the Crow Wing County Board voted not to pay for court-appointed counsel in juvenile protection proceedings.
Between November 2007 and October 2008, Crow Wing County filed in Crow Wing County District Court the three child-protection (CHIPS) petitions that are now before us. In all three cases, counsel appointed to represent the parents eventually moved to withdraw based on the County's refusal to pay the attorneys' invoices and the County's stated refusal to pay for representation in the future. In each case, the attorney's motion to withdraw was granted; each of the three cases was continued until the issue of payment for counsel is resolved.
The three cases were then consolidated before the chief judge of the district, who ordered the County to pay for legal services incurred in the three cases or appear (in the person of the county auditor and the county commissioners) to show cause why the County should not be held in contempt of court. On March 31, 2009, after the hearing on the court's order to show case, the district court found that the State Board of Public Defense “lacks resources to represent parents in CHIPS cases and lacks the ability to raise funds and lacks any source of revenue other than the funding provided by the legislature.” The district court further found that the counties “have the ability to raise revenue and/or shift resources.” In addition, the district court found that the County had “put in escrow sufficient funds to pay the attorneys' fees, but has not paid them.” The district court held the county auditor and county commissioners in civil contempt and sentenced each of them to 30 days in jail, stayed on condition that the County pay the respective attorneys. The County appealed from this order but voluntarily dismissed its appeal after the court of appeals questioned whether the matter was ripe for appeal.
The County then paid all but $50 of each attorney's outstanding invoices and agreed that the County had not complied with the district court's order. The County asked the district court to hold it in contempt. By an order filed on June 1, 2009, the chief judge again held the county auditor and county commissioners in civil contempt, vacated the stay of sanctions imposed by the March 31, 2009, order and further stayed the imposition of sanctions pending appeal. The County timely appealed to the court of appeals and sought accelerated review. We granted the County's petition for accelerated review. 2
As a preliminary matter, the County challenges several of the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on procedural grounds, as clearly erroneous, or as based on information outside the record on appeal. The district court's decision to invoke its contempt powers is subject to reversal for abuse of discretion. Mower County Human Servs. v. Swancutt, 551 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Minn.1996). We will reverse the factual findings of a civil contempt order only if findings are clearly erroneous. Id.; see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. However, a party's failure to obey an unlawful order is not a basis for a finding of contempt. Wojahn v. Halter, 229 Minn. 374, 382, 39 N.W.2d 545, 549 (1949).
Our ultimate decision in this case does not depend on the factual determinations made by the district court other than those relating to the County's failure to pay all of the fees ordered, which the County does not dispute. It is therefore unnecessary for us to resolve the County's challenges to the district court's findings of fact. However, to dispel any notion that the proceedings below were procedurally deficient, we will briefly address the County's concerns.
First, the County challenges the conclusion in the district court's order to show cause that the County “has the present and ongoing ability to pay attorneys' fees of court-appointed counsel in the child protection cases referenced herein.” The County complains that this conclusion was entered without opportunity for the County to present any evidence on the subject.
A civil contempt proceeding must comply with certain procedural requirements, including that the court's order “clearly define[ ] the acts to be performed” and that “the party charged with nonperformance be given an opportunity to show compliance or his reasons for failure.” Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 174, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1968). The County availed itself of its right to provide the district court with information about its ability to comply with the court's order. In response to the order to show cause, the County submitted affidavits from each of the county commissioners, the County's financial manager, the county auditor, and the county administrator, all describing the financial condition of the County. We therefore reject the County's argument that it had no opportunity to present evidence during the civil contempt proceedings as to its financial condition.
The County further complains that the district court's finding that the State Board of Public Defense is not adequately funded “ignores the State Board of Public Defense's ability to seek alternative funding like grants or revenues.” The Board was not a party to these proceedings and, although neither the County nor the parents presented direct evidence to the district court regarding the Board's financial condition, at oral argument the County did not dispute that the Board currently is significantly underfunded. However, as we explain in this opinion, we do not decide this case based on an assessment of relative financial needs and resources of the Board and the County, but upon the provisions of applicable statutes. Therefore, any finding by the district court regarding the financial condition of the public defense system is immaterial to our resolution of this case.
Finally, the County asserts that in the March 31, 2009, order holding the County in contempt, which formed the basis for the County's first appeal, the district court improperly took judicial notice of a July 15, 2008, order of the Itasca County District Court in another juvenile protection case. In the Itasca County case, the Itasca County District Court appears to have concluded, among other things, that “[s]tate public defenders are not mandated to represent parents in juvenile protection cases” and that courts “have the authority, where appropriate, to appoint counsel at county expense for parents in juvenile protection cases.” In addition, it appears that elsewhere in the Itasca County case, the district court cited its own “recollection” of the circumstances under which the State Public Defender began representing parents in juvenile protection cases. However, the June 1, 2009, contempt order issued by the Crow Wing County District Court that is on appeal in this case does not recite any findings or factual statements from the Itasca County District Court's order. We therefore reject the County's argument that, in holding the County in civil contempt, the Crow Wing County District Court took improper judicial notice of facts outside the record.
Having addressed the County's factual and procedural challenges, we turn to...
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