In the Matter of The EState Mcdaniel Langston v. Williams

• Decision Date: 03 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2008–CA–01090–COA.,2008–CA–01090–COA.
• Citation: 57 So.3d 657
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Patricia McDaniel LANGSTON, Deceased:Mansfield Langston, Appellantv.Ethel Williams, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

57 So.3d 657

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Patricia McDaniel LANGSTON, Deceased:Mansfield Langston, Appellant

v.Ethel Williams, Appellee.

No. 2008–CA–01090–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

March 30, 2010.Rehearing Denied Aug. 3, 2010.

Lindsey C. Meador, Cleveland, attorney for appellant.Alsee McDaniel, Indianola, attorney for appellee.EN BANC.GRIFFIS, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Mansfield Langston appeals the chancellor's judgment setting aside the creation of certain joint tenancies with his wife, Patricia McDaniel Langston. He claims that the chancellor: (1) erred as a matter of law in finding that a confidential relationship existed between Mansfield and Patricia and (2) made certain findings of fact that are not supported by substantial credible evidence. We find that the chancellor applied the incorrect standard of law to the particular facts of this case; therefore, the judgment of the chancery court is reversed and rendered.

FACTS

¶ 2. Mansfield and Patricia were married on May 29, 1994. At the time of marriage, Mansfield was forty-four years old, and Patricia was forty years old. This was the second marriage for both parties, and they both had children from previous marriages. Patricia suffered from several chronic health problems throughout the marriage including heart and kidney problems. In 2001, she was a class-action plaintiff and received a settlement following litigation involving the diet drug Phen–Phen.

¶ 3. From August 23, 1997, until March 11, 2002, the couple owned their marital home on Kentwood Lane, in Indianola, Mississippi, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. On March 11, 2002, Patricia quitclaimed the marital home to Mansfield because Patricia had purchased a home on French Road, also in Indianola.

¶ 4. On March 15, 2002, Patricia executed a will naming Mansfield as executor. The will divided Patricia's entire estate equally among her three adult children and one of her sisters. A clause in the will expressly stated that: “MANSFIELD LANGSTON, my husband, has his own estate in his name, therefore no provision for him is made in this will.” At the time this will was executed, Patricia owned the French Road home solely in her name.

¶ 5. On May 9, 2002, three deeds were prepared by the Langstons' attorney, Richard Noble. The first deed was executed by Patricia and created a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in the French Road home, which then became the couple's marital home. The second deed conveyed the home on Kentwood Lane to Patricia's mother, Ethel Williams. Mansfield testified that the home was sold to Williams at a discounted price. In the third deed, Williams sold and conveyed her home in Indianola.

¶ 6. On June 11, 2002, Patricia executed a second will that was identical to her first will except it named Patricia's mother as executor instead of Mansfield. On September 4, 2003, Mansfield and Patricia executed a $200,000 certificate of deposit as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.

¶ 7. On May 11, 2005, Patricia died due to a sudden illness.¹ Patricia's estate was opened by her mother. The estate sought to set aside the joint tenancies in the marital home and the certificate of deposit in order to bring those assets into the estate for distribution to the will beneficiaries—Patricia's adult children and Patricia's sister.

¶ 8. Following the trial, the chancellor found that a confidential relationship existed between Mansfield and Patricia. Therefore, the chancellor ruled that the burden shifted to Mansfield to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the creation of the joint tenancies was not the result of undue influence. The chancellor held that Mansfield did not meet this burden, and both joint tenancies were set aside and brought into Patricia's estate.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9. “This Court will not disturb a chancellor's findings of fact in a will contest unless the findings are clearly erroneous, manifestly wrong, or the chancellor applied an incorrect legal standard.” In re Estate of Thornton v. Thornton, 922 So.2d 850, 852 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2006). “Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo.” Id.

ANALYSIS

Whether the chancellor erred as a matter of law in finding that a confidential relationship existed between Mansfield and Patricia.

¶ 10. Mansfield claims that the chancellor erred as a matter of law in finding that Mansfield and Patricia were in a confidential relationship for the purpose of raising the presumption of undue influence. Specifically, Mansfield contends that the factors used by the chancellor to find a confidential relationship are factors that would be found in any trusting, healthy relationship between a husband and wife. Williams responds that the relationship between Mansfield and Patricia clearly met all of the factors which constitute a confidential relationship. Thus, Williams claims that the presumption of undue influence automatically applies to the two inter vivos transfers.

¶ 11. The supreme court defines a confidential relationship as:

Whenever there is a relation between two people in which one person is in a position to exercise a dominant influence upon the other because of the latter's dependency upon the former, arising either from weakness of mind or body, or through trust, the law does not hesitate to characterize such relationship as fiduciary in character.

Madden v. Rhodes, 626 So.2d 608, 617 (Miss.1993) (citation omitted). “[T]he relationship must reflect ‘a dominant, overmastering influence [which] controls over a dependent person or trust justifiably reposed.’ ” Taylor v. Welch, 609 So.2d 1225, 1231–32 (Miss.1992) (quoting Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1191–92 (Miss.1987)). The factors to be considered in determining whether a confidential relationship exists between the parties are:

(1) whether one person has to be taken care of by others,

(2) whether one person maintains a close relationship with another,

(3) whether one person is provided transportation and has their medical care provided for by another,

(4) whether one person maintains joint accounts with another,

(5) whether one is physically or mentally weak,

(6) whether one is of advanced age or poor health, and

(7) whether there exists a power of attorney between the one and another.

Thornton, 922 So.2d at 852–53 (¶ 7).

¶ 12. The chancellor examined each of these factors and made the following findings. Patricia suffered from a variety of health problems including chronic heart disease, kidney problems, asthma, gout, high blood pressure, and swelling of the feet. Mansfield helped Patricia get her medication and drove her to various doctors' appointments. Mansfield testified that he and Patricia had a close relationship. The couple shared joint bank accounts during their marriage. The chancellor found that Patricia's chronic health problems made her physically and mentally ² weak, and although she was not of an advanced age, she did have poor health. Finally, both Mansfield and Patricia granted each other power of attorney.

¶ 13. The chancellor concluded that a confidential relationship existed between Mansfield and Patricia. We find substantial evidence to support the chancellor's conclusion; however, our review does not end there. We must determine whether the chancellor correctly applied the presumption of undue influence as it relates to Mansfield and Patricia as husband and wife.

¶ 14. As the supreme court discussed in Madden, 626 So.2d at 618, the presumption of undue influence operates differently depending on whether a transfer occurs during the grantor's lifetime or occurs through operation of the grantor's will. The supreme court stated:

[T]he rules of law are different regarding gifts testamentary and gifts inter vivos where a confidential relationship exists between the testator/grantor and the beneficiary/grantee. The prior holdings of this Court indicate a presumption of undue influence only arises in the context of gifts by will when there has been some abuse of the confidential relationship, such as some involvement in the preparation or execution of the will. On the other hand, with a gift inter vivos, there is an automatic presumption of undue influence even without abuse of the confidential relationship. Such gifts are presumptively invalid.

Id.

¶ 15. Thus, a party claiming that an inter vivos transfer is void because of undue influence must show by clear and convincing evidence that a confidential relationship existed between the grantor and grantee/beneficiary. Estate of Hawkins v. Shiyou, 737 So.2d 432, 434 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.1999). When such a relationship exists, the presumption of undue influence arises automatically. Lancaster v. Boyd, 803 So.2d 1285, 1289 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2002); Shiyou, 737 So.2d at 434 (¶ 9).

¶ 16. Once the presumption is established, the burden shifts to the grantee to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. In order to overcome the presumption, the grantee must show that: (1) he or she exhibited good faith in the fiduciary relationship with the grantor; (2) the grantor had full knowledge and deliberation when he executed the deed; and (3) the grantor exhibited independent consent and action. Lancaster, 803 So.2d at 1289 (¶ 9).

¶ 17. Here, the transfers at issue were inter vivos transfers. Therefore, once the chancellor found a confidential relationship, the presumption of undue influence automatically arose. No actual showing of undue influence on the part of Mansfield was required.

¶ 18. While we recognize that our supreme court has set forth such automatic presumption for inter vivos transfers, we also find that the supreme court has found it necessary to distinguish confidential relationships between spouses in a long-term marriage. In Genna v. Harrington, 254 So.2d 525, 528–29 (Miss.1971), the supreme court held that:

It is undoubtedly true that a husband or a wife may exercise undue influence upon the other spouse, but the mere fact...