In the Matter of S.O.T., No. 11-05-00159-CV (Tex. App. 2/15/2007)
| Decision Date | 15 February 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-05-00159-CV.,11-05-00159-CV. |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF S.O.T. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the County Court at Law, Midland County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. JO5286.
Panel consists of: WRIGHT, C.J., McCALL, J., and STRANGE, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment adjudicating a juvenile of delinquent conduct. The jury found that S.O.T. engaged in delinquent conduct by interfering with the public duties of a peace officer. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.15 (Vernon Supp. 2006). The trial court placed S.O.T. on probation for one year. In two points of error, appellant complains of insufficiency of the evidence and evidentiary error. We affirm.
The State alleged that appellant engaged in delinquent conduct as defined in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03 (Vernon Supp. 2006). Section 51.03(a)(1) defines delinquent conduct as "conduct, other than a traffic offense, that violates a penal law of this state or of the United States punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail." The State alleged that, on or about May 31, 2004, "[appellant] did then and there with criminal negligence, interrupt, disrupt, impede, and otherwise interfere with peace officers, to wit: [Gregory] Kent Spencer and [Marquez] Dominguez, while said peace officers [were] performing a duty and exercising authority imposed and granted by law, contrary to Section 38.15, Texas Penal Code."
In his first point of error, appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. In his brief, appellant specifically challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that he engaged in delinquent conduct. Appellant does not specifically refer to factual sufficiency of the evidence in his brief. However, appellant did not limit his first point of error to a legal sufficiency challenge. Rather, appellant stated that "the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict." Therefore, we construe appellant's first point of error as attacking the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence.
The adjudication of a juvenile as a delinquent is based on the criminal burden of proof: beyond a reasonable doubt. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.03(f) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Therefore, we apply the same standards of review in juvenile cases challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as we do in criminal cases. In re L.F.L.T.B., 137 S.W.3d 856, 858 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, no pet.); In re Z.L.B., 115 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.); In re E.R.L., 109 S.W.3d 123 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.); In re J.D.P., 85 S.W.3d 420 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, the appellate court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (overruling in part Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407-08 (Tex. Crim App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Then, the reviewing court determines whether the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the conflicting evidence. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15, 417; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 10-11. The jury, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (Vernon 1981), art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979).
The State alleged that appellant violated Section 38.15(a)(1) of the Penal Code. Section 38.15(a)(1) provides that a person commits the offense of interference with public duties if the person, with criminal negligence, interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law. Section 38.15(d) provides that it is a defense to prosecution if the interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted of speech only. Section 6.03 of the Penal Code defines criminal negligence:
A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(d) (Vernon 2003).
Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he violated Section 38.15(a)(1) for two reasons. First, appellant contends that the evidence showed that his conduct during the incident in question consisted of speech only. Second, appellant contends that the evidence failed to show that his actions interfered with the duties of a peace officer.
Midland Police Officer Gregory Kent Spencer was the only witness at trial. Officer Spencer testified that he was on patrol duty on May 31, 2004. At about 1:20 a.m., Officer Spencer received a call about an assault that had occurred at a residence on West Kansas Street in Midland. Officer Spencer said that, on his way to the location, a woman, whom Officer Spencer identified as Ms. Wilkerson, waved him down and told him that a person known to her had been choked at the residence. The assault suspect resided at the residence. After talking with Wilkerson, Officer Spencer then proceeded to the location. Wilkerson and several other people, including appellant and appellant's sister, also went to the location in a separate car. Officer Spencer said that Midland Police Officer Marquez Dominguez also responded to the call. Officer Dominguez was not available to testify at trial. He was stationed with the Army National Guard in Iraq.
Officer Spencer testified that Wilkerson and several other people, including appellant and appellant's sister, got out of their car and walked to the suspect's yard. Officer Spencer believed that they were going to start a fight. He said that they were hollering and screaming at people who were standing on the front porch of the residence. Officer Spencer and Officer Dominguez told Wilkerson and the others to get back in their car, but they refused to get back in the car. Officer Spencer testified that Wilkerson appeared to be very upset. Wilkerson and the other people with her did not like Officer Spencer telling her to get back in the car. Officer Spencer said that, although Wilkerson and the others eventually moved back in the general direction of their car, they were screaming at him about it.
Officer Spencer testified that he talked with the victim of the alleged assault in front of one of the patrol cars. Officer Spencer was attempting to find out the details of the alleged assault. At the same time, Officer Dominguez was talking with appellant. Officer Spencer said that appellant was upset. Officer Spencer said that appellant was screaming and that he heard appellant say that nobody was going to talk to his "mama" the way that Officer Spencer had when he told her to get back in the car. Officer Spencer testified that, as he was talking with the victim, he realized that appellant and Officer Dominguez were fighting and struggling. Officer Spencer did not see or know what started the struggle between appellant and Officer Dominguez. However, the incident was videotaped by a camera in Officer Spencer's patrol car, and the State introduced into evidence a copy of the videotape. The videotape showed that Officer Dominguez and appellant were standing close to each other. The videotape then showed that appellant advanced toward Officer Dominguez until appellant got up against Officer Dominguez. The videotape then showed the struggle between appellant and Officer Dominguez. Officer Spencer testified that he ran over to help Officer Dominguez. Officer Spencer said that, when he went to help Officer Dominguez, "[e]verybody started coming after us, hollering and screaming and telling us we couldn't do that." At some point, the officers gained control of the situation. Officer Dominguez handcuffed appellant and placed him in the backseat of his patrol car.
Officer Spencer testified that, after Officer Dominguez place appellant in the patrol car, the officers tried to talk with the victim. Officer Spencer said that the victim was extremely upset, and the videotape showed that the victim was upset about what had happened to appellant. Officer Spencer tried to calm the victim. Officer Spencer said that he shouted at the victim and told him to shut up. The suspect in the alleged assault of the victim was sitting on the front porch of the residence. The victim said that he was going to get the suspect, and the victim headed to the front porch of the residence. Officer Spencer said that the officers grabbed the victim and took him to the ground. During the struggle with the victim, Officer Spencer felt the victim's hands on his pistol. Officer Spencer then pepper sprayed the victim in the face. The pepper spray stopped the victim, and the officers put the victim face down on the ground. Officer Spencer testified that, while the officers...
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