IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DONALD JUDD

• Decision Date: 21 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. 08-99-00212-CV,08-99-00212-CV
• Parties: (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999) IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DONALD JUDD
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 436

8 S.W.3d 436 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999)

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DONALD JUDD

No. 08-99-00212-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, EIGHTH DISTRICT, EL PASO

December 21, 1999.

Rehearing Overruled January 26, 2000.

Appeal from the 394th Judicial District Court of Presidio County, Texas. (TC # 6290). [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Monty Kimball, Alpine, for Appellant

John W. Vinson, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Munzinger, Carl Eugene Ryan, Scott, Eric Michael Brittain, Scott, Hulse, Marshall, Feuille, Finger & Thurmond, P.C., El Paso, for Appellee

Before Panel No. 3 Barajas, C.J., Larsen, and Chew, JJ.

OPINION

RICHARD BARAJAS, Chief Justice.

This appeal arises out of an unsuccessful challenge to personal jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment cause of action. For reasons set forth below, we reverse the order of the trial court and render judgment dismissing the declaratory judgment cause of action.

I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

Locksley/Shea Gallery, Inc., ("Gallery"), is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota. Over the past thirty years, the Gallery acquired various works of art created by Mr. Donald Judd, decedent. During this period, Mr. Judd lived in New York. At various intervals, the Gallery loaned pieces of Mr. Judd's work owned by the Gallery to Mr. Judd for the purpose of presenting them for display at various exhibitions and museums. The Gallery agreed to allow Mr. Judd to store the borrowed works in his New York apartment under an oral agreement that they would be returned to the Gallery upon request. Without the Gallery's knowledge, Mr. Judd transported the art to Texas, where Mr. Judd subsequently passed away in 1994.

After Mr. Donald Judd's death in 1994, Flavin Judd, the executor of Mr. Donald Judd's estate, received several letters from Gordon Locksley ("Locksley"), president of the Gallery. In his first letter, dated June 23, 1997, Locksley explained the arrangement the Gallery had with Mr. Donald Judd regarding the borrowed pieces of art and requested that twelve works of art be returned to the Gallery. In a letter dated August 13, 1997, Flavin Judd responded to Locksley's letter. Flavin Judd described that he was the executor and, in accordance with his fiduciary duty, he must obtain documented proof of the Gallery's ownership of the art. In response, Locksley forwarded various documents suggesting the Gallery's ownership. After receiving no reply to his letter and documentation suggesting the Gallery's ownership in the works of art, Locksley, in letters dated December 24, 1997 and February 7, 1998, again requested the return of the art. Then, in a letter dated June 25, 1998, Flavin Judd responded to Locksley's demand by informing him that the Gallery has not produced sufficient indicia of ownership to allow him to turn over the pieces of art.

At some point after these communications were made, the Donald Judd estate acknowledged the Gallery's ownership of nine of the twelve pieces, and it returned eight pieces. The title to the remaining three remains in dispute.

Rainer Judd and Flavin Judd, acting as independent co-executors of the estate of Mr. Judd, filed a petition seeking declaratory judgment as to the owner of the three works of art on October 9, 1998. The executors cited TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 17.003 (Vernon 1997) as grounds for jurisdiction. Section 17.003 states:

For the purpose of establishing title to property, settling a lien or encumbrance on property, or determining an estate, interest, lien, or encumbrance, a person who claims an interest in the property may sue another person who claims an adverse interest or a lien or encumbrance but resides outside this state, resides in an unknown place, or is a transient. The plaintiff is not required to have actual possession of the property.

Id. The Gallery then filed a special appearance on April 19, 1999, challenging personal jurisdiction. Specifically, the Gallery argued that with the exception of the various communications between it and the executors of the estate regarding the twelve works of art, it has never had any contacts with the State of Texas.

After a hearing on the issue, the trial court denied the special appearance. The Gallery then requested specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its findings of fact, the trial court noted (among other findings) that Appellant claimed ownership of the art in accordance with a supposed bailment arrangement. The court then concluded that personal jurisdiction over the Gallery was proper because "Locksley/Shea purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Texas laws. Therefore, Locksley/Shea has sufficient minimum contacts to support in personam jurisdiction in this case. The exercise of jurisdiction over Locksley/Shea comports with fair play and substantial justice." The Gallery now brings this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

In Issue No. One, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying its special appearance because the Gallery lacks sufficient contacts with the State of Texas to support a finding that the exercise of jurisdiction over it comports with due process requirements. Appellee argues that in rem and in personam jurisdiction is proper as it comports with due process guarantees. We begin with a discussion of the traditional standard of review.

A. Standard of Review

When a defendant challenges a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction through a special appearance, he carries the burden of negating all bases of personal jurisdiction. See Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. 1985); Siskind v. Villa Found For Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1982); Nikolai v. Strate, 922 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tex. App.-- Fort Worth 1996, writ denied); Hayes v. Wissel, 882 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1994, no writ). When a trial court overrules a special appearance, the defendant should request it to make findings of fact according to TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. Runnels v. Firestone, 746 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]), writ denied, 760 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1988). Absent such findings, we view the trial court's judgment as impliedly finding all the necessary facts to support its judgment. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984); Runnells, 746 S.W.2d at 848. Where a complete statement of facts appears in the record, however, these implied findings are not conclusive and an appellant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989). Where such points are raised, the standard of review to be applied is the same as that to be applied in the review of jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact. Id.

When a personal jurisdictional question is reviewed, we review all the evidence. Nikolai, 922 S.W.2d at 236; Hotel Partners v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 847 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. App.-- Dallas 1993, writ denied). The correct standard of review of the evidence is a factual sufficiency review, not a de novo review. Nikolai, 922 S.W.2d at 236; Hotel Partners, 847 S.W.2d at 632; NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 812 S.W.2d 441, 443-44 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1991, no writ). Thus, we may reverse the decision of the trial court only if its ruling is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly erroneous or unjust. In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 664-65, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951); Runnells, 746 S.W.2d at 849. In reviewing such a point of error, we must consider and weigh all of the evidence, both the evidence that tends to prove the existence of a vital fact as well as evidence that tends to disprove its existence. Ames v. Ames, 776 S.W.2d 154, 158-59 (Tex. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1080, 110 S. Ct. 1809, 108 L. Ed. 2d 939 (1990); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). So, considering the evidence, if a finding is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, the point should be sustained, regardless of whether there is some evidence to support it. Watson v. Prewitt, 159 Tex. 305, 305, 320 S.W.2d 815, 816 (1959); In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d at 661.

If evidence supports the implied findings of fact, we must uphold the trial court's judgment on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109; Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987); Runnells, 746 S.W.2d at 848. This is so regardless of whether the trial court articulates the correct legal reason for the judgment. Harrington v. Railroad Comm'n, 375 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. 1964); Marifarms Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Westhoff, 802 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1991, no writ).

B. The Texas Test for Jurisdiction over a Nonresident

A Texas court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident if two conditions are met. First, the Texas long-arm statute must authorize the exercise of jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must be consistent with federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 17.041 - 17.069 (Vernon 1986)). The Texas long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over those who "do business" in Texas. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 17.042 (Vernon 1997). Although the statute lists certain acts which statutorily constitute doing business in Texas, it also provides that other acts may qualify as doing business in Texas. See id. Thus, "the broad language of the long-arm statute's doing business requirement allows the statute to reach as far as the federal constitution permits." Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.

In Schlobohm, the Supreme Court set forth three specific elements which must be satisfied in order for Texas to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. They are:

(1) The...