In the Matter of Welfare of A.M.A., No. A06-1611 (Minn. App. 12/11/2007)
| Decision Date | 11 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. A06-1611.,A06-1611. |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Welfare of A.M.A. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 304225/JV-06-6662
Leonardo Castro, Fourth District Chief Public Defender, Barbara S. Isaacman, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant A.M.A.).
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Thomas A. Weist, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent State of Minnesota)
Considered and decided by Dietzen, Presiding Judge; Randall, Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from his adjudication of delinquency for aiding and abetting first-degree burglary, appellant contends that the district court erred by (1) refusing to suppress his incriminating statements to police; (2) finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant aided and abetted a burglary; (3) failing to secure appellant's express waiver of his right to testify in his own defense; and (4) failing to make the dispositional findings required by Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(m) (2006), and Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 2. Because we conclude that the district court correctly admitted appellant's statements, that the evidence was sufficient to support the adjudication, and that appellant properly waived his right to testify, we affirm in part. But because the district court's dispositional findings do not meet the requirements mandated by Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure and by statute, we reverse in part and remand.
P.J.S. awoke in his home in Edina in Hennepin County about 1:00 a.m. on May 3, 2006, and heard whispering downstairs. He initially thought that it might be one of his three children. But when P.J.S. went downstairs to investigate, he found two men he did not know standing in the hallway near his front door. When the men saw P.J.S., they ran out his front door, speaking in a language that P.J.S. did not recognize. P.J.S. chased the men down the street before they jumped into a van and sped away. Although P.J.S. briefly glimpsed one of the men as they drove off, he was never able to positively identify appellant or anyone else as being one of the burglars.
After the van sped away, P.J.S. ran back to his home to ensure that his children were all right and to call the police. He then surveyed his house and garage to determine what the burglars had taken. Items missing included two video-game consoles, video games, DVDs, CDs, athletic equipment, and a set of golf clubs.
Shortly before midnight on the same day, Minneapolis police stopped a minivan and identified its lone occupant and driver as appellant, A.M.A. Appellant was 17 years old at the time. When one of the officers requested appellant's driver's license, he stated that he did not have one. The officers decided to tow the vehicle and conducted an inventory search before the tow truck arrived. In the course of the search, the officers found, among other things, a set of golf clubs, a duffle bag containing athletic equipment, a checkbook, and a magazine with P.J.S.'s name on the address label. Upon further investigation, the officers discovered that the checkbook and some other items found in the minivan had been reported stolen in a recent burglary in Eagan.1 Appellant was placed under arrest for receiving and concealing stolen property. The golf clubs recovered from appellant's minivan were later identified as the clubs taken during the burglary of P.J.S.'s home.
While appellant was being held at the Minneapolis Police Department's First Precinct station, Sergeant Nathan Tennessen from the Eagan Police Department arrived to interrogate appellant about several recent Eagan burglaries. Appellant's Miranda rights were read to him, and he waived his rights. Sgt. Tennessen placed a tape recorder in his shirt breast pocket to record the interrogation. But due to a problem with the tape recorder, the first seven minutes of the 40-minute interrogation, including the Miranda warning, were not recorded. During the interrogation, appellant made several incriminating statements regarding the stolen goods found in his van and his role in acquiring those goods.
Appellant was charged with aiding and abetting first-degree burglary under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.582, subd. 1(a), . 05 (2004), and receiving and concealing stolen property under Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2004). The district court retained jurisdiction over appellant and denied appellant's pretrial motion to suppress the incriminating statements that he had made to Sgt. Tennessen. The district court subsequently adjudicated appellant delinquent after finding him guilty of aiding and abetting first-degree burglary.2 The district court's dispositional order required appellant to successfully complete the Isanti Sheriff's Youth Program and placed him on probation until age 19. This appeal follows.
Appellant contends that the district court erred in admitting the incriminating statements that appellant made to Sgt. Tennessen during his interrogation. He first argues that he did not intelligently and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Second, he contends that Sgt. Tennessen's failure to record the first seven minutes of the interrogation was a substantial violation of the Scales requirement.
"For a statement obtained from an accused during custodial interrogation to be admissible, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence both that the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination, and that the accused freely and voluntarily gave the statement." State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 286 (Minn. 1995) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 521-22 (1986)). State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d 276, 283 (Minn. 1997) (citation omitted).
"Findings of fact surrounding a claimed Miranda waiver are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions based on those facts are reviewed de novo." State v. Farrah, 735 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Minn. 2007). "Ordinarily, the state is deemed to have met its burden if it shows that the defendant was fully advised of his Miranda rights, indicated he understood his rights, and gave a statement." State v. Dominguez-Ramirez, 563 N.W.2d 245, 252 (Minn. 1997).
Miranda's due-process protections generally apply to juveniles, even those prosecuted in juvenile court. State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 592 (Minn. 2005) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1436 (1967)). "When a juvenile's Miranda waiver is at issue, we examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the suspect understood his rights and the consequences that may arise if he waives them." Id. at 592-93. This totality approach mandates inquiry into "the juvenile's age, maturity, intelligence, education, physical deprivations, prior criminal experience, length and legality of detention, lack of or adequacy of warnings, and the nature of the interrogation." Id. at 595. The inquiry into the nature of the interrogation focuses on whether the police used deceit or trickery in securing the waiver or any subsequent admission. Id. at 596. Whether a juvenile had access to a parent before and during questioning is also an important factor in evaluating whether the juvenile's Miranda waiver and admissions were voluntary and intelligent, but it is not determinative. Id. at 595-97.
Here, the general atmosphere during Sgt. Tennessen's interrogation of appellant was relaxed, not antagonistic. Sgt. Tennessen stated that he read appellant his Miranda rights, that appellant stated he understood his Miranda rights, and that they talked about his Miranda rights for "a while." Sgt. Tennessen also told appellant that he "[didn't] have to talk to me here today." When appellant subsequently sought to confirm that he was not required to talk to Sgt. Tennessen if he did not want to, Sgt. Tennessen reiterated that appellant could refuse to talk to him and could call an attorney or a parent if he desired. Appellant was also told that if he decided to talk but did not want to talk about a particular matter, such as his accomplices, he could just say "No" and refuse to talk about that matter. After this discussion of his rights, appellant waived his Miranda rights.
The district court found Sgt. Tennessen to be credible. Further, appellant does not dispute the facts as related by Sgt. Tennessen. Therefore, we turn to whether appellant's waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary and intelligent under these circumstances.
Appellant had been in custody only a few hours when the interrogation was conducted, and the interrogation was not excessively long. While appellant was informed that he could have a parent present before any questioning took place, he did not ask to contact his parent or an attorney. Further, appellant was not denied any physical requests, such as food or water. Sgt. Tennessen properly read the Miranda warning to appellant. They discussed these rights, and appellant stated that he understood his rights. Sgt. Tennessen also told appellant he did not have to talk to him if he did not want to. Later in the interrogation, Sgt. Tennessen reiterated that appellant did not have to talk to him and that appellant could call a parent or attorney if he desired. He also informed appellant that if appellant decided to talk, he could choose to talk only about certain topics and could refuse to...
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