In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of M.F., No. A08-1688 (Minn. App. 5/19/2009)
| Decision Date | 19 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-1688.,A08-1688. |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M.F., C.J. and R.T., Parents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 27-JV-07-13932.
James A. Kamin, Acting Chief Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN (for appellant M.F.)
Howard L. Kaibel, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN (for respondent C.J.)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michelle A. Hatcher, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department)
Jean Sanderson, Rachel Funk, Certified Student Attorney, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN (for guardian ad litem Kim Leipold)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Minge, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant-mother challenges the district court's default termination of her parental rights. Appellant argues that (1) the district court abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the default termination based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) appellant was given inadequate notice of the permanency trial in violation of her due-process rights; (3) the district court erred by conducting a "summary default hearing"; and (4) the district court failed to independently review the evidence and legal issues when it signed one party's proposed findings verbatim. We affirm.
The Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department (department) filed a child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition regarding appellant M.F.'s two children, A.J. and M.T., on March 22, 2007. The CHIPS petition was based on an incident of domestic violence that occurred between M.F. and M.T.'s father, R.T., at M.F.'s home on February 26, 2007 and on reports that M.F. used alcohol and marijuana daily. Following an emergency-protective-care hearing, the district court placed A.J. and M.T. under protective supervision with M.F., conditioned on M.F.'s compliance with a court-ordered case plan. The case plan required M.F. to submit to urinalysis, attend domestic-abuse counseling, provide safe and suitable housing for her children, attend individual therapy, remain available to her social worker, and complete a parenting assessment and follow its recommendations. On May 1, 2007, the department filed an amended petition asserting a new finding of maltreatment based on M.F.'s neglect of M.T. and alleging that M.F. was not in compliance with the provisions of her case plan. The district court held a second emergency-protective-care hearing and ordered the children into out-of-home placement on May 4, 2007. M.F. was granted supervised visits, and her court-ordered case plan became voluntary.
On June 18, 2007, the district court held a pretrial hearing on the amended CHIPS petition. M.F. waived her right to a trial and admitted that her chemical dependency affected her ability to parent. The district court found that the children were in need of protection or services due to M.F.'s chemical dependency and the need for ongoing case planning. The district court transferred legal and physical custody of A.J. and M.T. to the department and ordered a case plan for reunification. The case plan required M.F. to (1) complete a chemical-health assessment, (2) submit to urinalysis and participate in a 12-step program, (3) complete a parenting assessment, (4) participate in a domestic-violence group, (5) complete a parenting-education program, (6) participate in individual therapy, (7) attend medical appointments for the children, (8) have no contact with R.T., and (9) cooperate with the assigned social worker and the guardian ad litem (GAL).
After M.F. failed to comply with all of the terms of her case plan, the department filed a permanency petition seeking to terminate M.F.'s parental rights or to transfer permanent legal and physical custody of M.F.'s children.1 M.F. was personally served with the summons and permanency petition on October 25, 2007, and an admit-deny hearing was held that same day. M.F. denied the petition, and the district court scheduled a pretrial conference for December 11, 2007. M.F. signed a hearing notice that explained that the consequences for failure to appear may include "permanent termination of your parental rights." M.F. did not appear at the December 11, 2007 hearing and the pretrial conference was rescheduled to January 24, 2008. M.F. again failed to appear.2
The district court scheduled a March 10, 2008 trial on the permanency petition. M.F. did not appear at the March 10 trial because she was incarcerated at the Hennepin County Public Safety Facility on suspicion of kidnapping and deprivation of parental rights following her alleged abduction of A.J. M.F.'s attorney was present at the March 10 permanency trial, however, and participated in rescheduling the trial to June 3, 2008. The district court sent notice of the June 3 trial date to M.F. at her home address that was on file with the district court. This notice was returned to the district court as undeliverable. On June 3, M.F.'s attorney appeared for the permanency trial, but M.F. did not appear. M.F.'s social worker testified that M.F.'s whereabouts were unknown. It was noted that M.F. had an outstanding felony warrant for failing to abide by the terms of conditional release following her arrest for the alleged kidnapping. The district court granted petitioner's request to proceed by default. M.F.'s attorney did not object. The assigned social worker and the GAL testified in support of termination of M.F.'s parental rights. The district court received several documents into evidence. At the time of the default proceeding on June 3, 2008, M.F.'s children had been in continuous out-of-home placement for 13 months.
On June 16, 2008, the district court issued an order terminating M.F.'s parental rights. The district court found that M.F. had failed to cooperate with her court-ordered case plan and to correct the conditions that led to her children's out-of-home placement. Specifically, the district court found that M.F. failed to (1) follow the recommendations of her chemical-health assessment, her parenting assessment, and her individual therapy; (2) document sobriety through urinalysis or participate in a 12-step program; (3) attend a domestic-violence group; (4) attend her children's medical appointments; and (5) cooperate with the assigned social worker and the GAL. The district court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that M.F.'s parental rights to A.J. and M.T. should be terminated pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b)(1)-(2), 1(b)(5), 1(b)(8) (2006), and that termination of parental rights (TPR) is in the best interests of the children.
On June 17, 2008, M.F. filed a motion to reopen the default termination pursuant to Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 46.02. At the motion hearing, M.F.'s attorney explained that on the day of the default proceeding, M.F. had appeared in Hennepin County District Court for a hearing in a criminal case and was arrested on an outstanding felony warrant. M.F.'s attorney argued that M.F. was The district court denied M.F.'s motion to reopen the default judgment. This appeal follows.
On appeal, the district court's decision on a motion to vacate a default order will stand absent an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of Coats, 633 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn. 2001). Generally, reopening of default judgments should be liberally undertaken to allow resolution of matters on their merits. See Kosloski v. Jones, 295 Minn. 177, 179-80, 203 N.W.2d 401, 403 (1973) (). Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 46.02 provides that a court may relieve a party from a final order for reasons that include "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 46.02 is a counterpart to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.3 Coats, 633 N.W.2d at 510 n.4. In order to obtain relief from a default judgment, the party seeking relief must demonstrate, "(1) she has a reasonable defense on the merits of the case; (2) she has a reasonable excuse for her failure to act; (3) she acted with due diligence after the notice of entry of the default judgment; and (4) the opposing party will not be substantially prejudiced if the motion to vacate the default judgment is granted." Id. at 510. All four parts of the test must be met to justify relief under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 46.02. Coats, 633 N.W.2d at 510. But in light of the preference for deciding a case on the merits, a weak showing on one factor may be outweighed by a strong showing on the remaining factors. Riemer v. Zahn, 420 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Minn. App. 1988).
The district court concluded, and the parties do not dispute, that M.F. had a reasonable excuse for her failure to appear at the June 3 trial because she was taken into custody on a bench warrant and that M.F. acted with due diligence by promptly contacting her attorney following the default judgment. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the district court's conclusions that (1) M.F. does not have a reasonable defense on the merits, and (2) reopening the default judgment would substantially prejudice an opposing party.
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