In the Matter of The Paternity of Jwh v. Dah

• Decision Date: 14 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. S–10–0167.,S–10–0167.
• Citation: 252 P.3d 942,2011 WY 66
• Parties: In the Matter of the PATERNITY OF JWH, Minor Child,LRD, Appellant (Respondent),v.DAH, Appellee (Petitioner).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

252 P.3d 942

2011 WY 66

In the Matter of the PATERNITY OF JWH, Minor Child,LRD, Appellant (Respondent),

v.DAH, Appellee (Petitioner).

No. S–10–0167.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 14, 2011.

Representing Appellant: Deborah Ford Mincer, Cheyenne, WY.Representing Appellee: James A. Eddington, Torrington, WY.Before KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.HILL, Justice.

[¶ 1] LRD (Mother) challenges the district court's order awarding DAH (Father) primary custody of the parties' toddler son, JWH. Among seven issues, Mother's contentions include that the district court failed to consider that she was the primary caretaker and that Father physically abused Mother on one occasion. We will affirm in part and reverse in part and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Mother raises seven issues before this Court:

1. The trial judge erred when he failed to weigh the “primary caretaker” factor against the statutory factors of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20–2–201(a) which he chose to apply.

2. The trial judge erred in his statutory interpretation of the relative competency and fitness factor where allegations against Mother were unrelated to child's welfare.

3. The trial judge erred in judging Mother's handling of visitation under the statutory factors when Father had no legal rights to visitation prior to entry of the order adjudicating his paternity.

4. The trial judge erred by failing to consider Father's physical abuse under Wyo. Stat. [Ann.] § 20–2–201(c).

5. The trial judge erred by admitting evidence of claimed misconduct unrelated to the child.

6. The trial judge committed an abuse of discretion in awarding custody to Father.

7. The trial judge erred by offsetting Father's payments on his debts, honoring a claimed agreement in lieu of child support, and awarding only four months of child support to Mother.

Father states the issues more succinctly:

1. Does sufficient evidence exist in the record to support the trial court's decision on custody and child support?

2. Is this appeal lacking in reasonable cause so as to result in attorney fees and damages to [Father] pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05?

FACTS

[¶ 3] In 2005, the parties began a relationship which resulted in the birth of a son in 2008. The parties broke up in 2009, and Father moved out of their Torrington apartment. Their son remained in Mother's care, and the parties agreed that Father would pay utilities and one-half of the apartment rent in lieu of child support. Father made these payments until November of 2009.

[¶ 4] In December of 2009, Father filed a Petition to Establish Paternity, Custody, and Support. The parties agreed on a visitation schedule, but Father's new work routine at the Medium Correctional Institution in Torrington made the agreed-upon visitation difficult. Father's visitation with his son was thus limited by his own work schedule.

[¶ 5] A bench trial was held in April of 2010. The parties stipulated that Father was indeed the child's father, and visitation and custody were the only issues remaining. At the end of trial, the district court awarded Father primary custody of the child, subject to Mother's visitation. The court implemented a plan whereby, during the summer of 2010, the parties would exchange visitation working up to a weekly basis. On July 24, 2010, Father became primary custodian, and Mother was ordered to begin paying child support on August 1, 2010. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 6] Our standard of review regarding custody issues is well-established:

“[C]ustody, visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”

This Court has consistently recognized the broad discretion enjoyed by a district court in child custody matters. We will not interfere with the district court's custody determination absent procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion. In determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, our primary consideration is the reasonableness of the district court's decision in light of the evidence presented. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's determination, affording every favorable inference to the prevailing party and omitting from our consideration the conflicting evidence.

Durfee v. Durfee, 2009 WY 7, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1087, 1089 (Wyo.2009) (citations omitted).

Furthermore,

It has been our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the children are to be given paramount consideration. The determination of the best interests of the child is a question for the trier of fact. We do not overturn the decision of the trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of a violation of some legal principle. Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 148 (Wyo.1999), quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo.1998).

Testerman v. Testerman, 2008 WY 112, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Wyo.2008).

A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Our review entails evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's decision.... Findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence cannot be sustained. Similarly, an abuse of discretion is present when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.

Blakely v. Blakely, 2009 WY 127, ¶¶ 6–7, 218 P.3d 253, 254–255 (Wyo.2009) (citing Parris v. Parris, 2009 WY 44, ¶ 15, 204 P.3d 298, 303 (Wyo.2009)).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 7] Although Mother separates her overall argument into seven distinct issues, we believe she has one issue with subparts. Mother argues generally on appeal that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded custody of the parties' minor child to Father. First, Mother contends that the district court failed to give proper consideration to the fact that she was the primary caretaker of the child and failed to mention that fact in its oral findings.

[¶ 8] We have considered this very issue before,

[B]y once again noting that the district court's responsibility for fashioning family relationships through custody determinations encompasses one of the most difficult and demanding tasks assigned to a trial judge. “This life-altering decision is perhaps most exacting in cases such as this, where it is apparent that both parents love their children and are fit and competent to have custody.” Beyond the emotional and family turmoil that attends custody disputes, adding to the district court's difficulty is that every case involving custody issues presents a different situation and set of facts. Consequently, there are no bright line rules to easily apply when making a custody decision. Instead, every case requires a careful weighing of the relevant factors. The district court must look to the unique family relationships of each case in order to reach a resolution that is in the best interests of the children in that particular family. The law, recognizing the different intricacies and circumstances of each case, affords the district court wide discretion when fashioning custody and visitation provisions.

Pahl v. Pahl, 2004 WY 40, ¶ 9, 87 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo.2004) (citations omitted).

[¶ 9] When exercising its wide discretion in this area, the ultimate goal for the district court is a reasonable balance of the rights and affections of each parent, with paramount consideration being given to the welfare and needs of the children. Pahl, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d at 1253. In making its custody determination, the district court is charged with the following:

§ 20–2–201. Disposition and maintenance of children in decree or order; access to records.

(a) In granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a marriage or upon the establishment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14–2–401 through 14–2–907, the court may make by decree or order any disposition of the children that appears most expedient and in the best interests of the children. In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following factors:

(i) The quality of the relationship each child has with each parent;

(ii) The ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each child throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging for each child's care by others as needed;

(iii) The relative competency and fitness of each parent;

(iv) Each parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities of parenting, including a willingness to accept care for each child at specified times and to relinquish care to the other parent at specified times;

(v) How the parents and each child can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with each other;

(vi) How the parents and each child interact and communicate with each other and how such interaction and communication may be improved;

(vii) The ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and responsibilities, including the right to privacy;

(viii) Geographic distance between the parents' residences; (ix) The current physical and mental ability of each parent to care for each child;

(x) Any other factors the court deems necessary and relevant.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20–2–201(a) (LexisNexis 2009). Guided by these mandatory statutory factors and any others that the district court deems relevant, the district court must fashion a custody award. Pahl, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d at 1253. Depending on the case, different factors will present a greater need for emphasis. Additionally “a process of this kind could readily swing the balance toward one party despite there being a material factor in favor of the other party.” Produit v. Produit, 2001 WY 123 ¶ 22, 35 P.3d 1240, 1246 (Wyo.2001). The one constant, however, is that the resolution must be in the best interests...