In The Matter Of The Termination Of Parental Rights Of Jane Doe.Idaho Dep't Of Health & Welfare v. Doe
| Decision Date | 07 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 37207.,37207. |
| Citation | 149 Idaho 59,232 P.3d 837 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights of Jane Doe.IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & WELFARE, Petitioner-Respondent,v.Jane DOE, Respondent-Appellant. |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
John C. DeFranco of Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Deena A. Layne, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Jane Doe appeals from the magistrate court's decision terminating her parental rights due to neglect of her child. Doe argues that the magistrate's decision was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. We affirm.
Doe gave birth to a son, J.M., on August 11, 2008. About two months later, on October 29, 2008, Doe was arrested and charged with felony possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. J.M. was in the car with Doe, where numerous drugs were found, when Doe was arrested. J.M. was left in the care of Doe's relatives until Doe was released on bond in early December 2008, at which time she resumed custody of J.M. At the request of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department), a detective in the Ada County Sheriff's Office met with Doe on December 11, 2008, to determine the circumstances of J.M.'s care. At that meeting, the detective declared J.M. in imminent danger because Doe had no permanent residence and was staying with a known methamphetamine trafficker, appeared to be continuing her lifestyle of methamphetamine use, and did not have a vehicle to transport J.M. in an emergency. J.M. was thereupon removed from Doe's custody and placed in foster care.
On December 31, 2008, the magistrate court entered an order giving the Department temporary custody of J.M., effective retroactively to December 11, 2008. On January 7, 2009, Doe stipulated to a finding of neglect and to placing J.M. in the legal custody of the Department for an indeterminate period. A case plan setting out tasks for Doe to complete in order to be reunified with J.M. was approved by the court on February 4, 2009.
On February 18, 2009, Doe was convicted and placed on probation for the October 29, 2008, drug charge. However, Doe was incarcerated on March 12, March 17 to March 30, and May 11 to June 9, 2009, for probation violations-including repeatedly testing positive for methamphetamine, not obtaining employment, and not obtaining stable housing. These violations ultimately led to the revocation of Doe's probation in June, and she was incarcerated on a “rider.” 1 On May 11, the Department filed a “six-month” review of the progress toward reunification of J.M. and Doe. In this review, the Department recommended a “concurrent plan of termination and adoption as the primary plan with reunification secondary to termination.” The recommended plan called for J.M. to be “placed in another permanent setting by December 2009 or returned to [Doe].” The Department then filed a petition to terminate Doe's parental rights on August 26, 2009. Following a trial, the magistrate court ordered termination on the grounds that Doe had neglected J.M. and that termination was in J.M.'s best interest.
Doe appeals, arguing that the magistrate court lacked substantial and competent evidence to support its conclusion that Doe's parental rights should be terminated because the court “ignored critical facts.” Specifically, Doe contends that because three witnesses testified at her termination trial that she may have the ability to parent once she has demonstrated a twelve to eighteen-month period of sobriety, because she has a strong bond with J.M., because she visited J.M., because she has worked hard to complete her case plan to make reunification a possibility, and because she has done well in her rider program prompted by her desire to reunify with J.M., the magistrate court erred in ordering termination of her parental rights.
We must first address an argument by the Department that Doe's appeal should be dismissed because it was not timely filed. This appeal was taken directly from the magistrate division to the Idaho Supreme Court, bypassing an intermediate appeal to the district court.2 This expedited process for appeals from orders terminating parental rights is authorized by Idaho Appellate Rule 11.1. Appellate Rule 12.2 specifies that such an expedited appeal must be initiated by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court “within fourteen (14) days from the date of issuance of the order.” The Department argues that Doe's appeal did not comply with this time limit.
Following the trial in this matter the magistrate issued a November 18, 2009, “Order Terminating Parental Rights of [Doe]” in which the court made extensive and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law ultimately determining that J.M. had been neglected and that termination of Doe's parental rights was in J.M.'s best interest. This decision said, “The parental rights of [Doe] as to [J.M.] are terminated,” but also directed the Department to “prepare an order consistent with this opinion.” The court subsequently issued a “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree as to the Mother” on December 1, 2009, ordering termination of the parent-child relationship between Doe and J.M. Doe filed a notice of appeal on December 11, 2009. The Department asserts that Doe's appeal was not timely because the fourteen-day period for Doe's appeal began to run from the November 18, 2009, decision, not the subsequent “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree as to Mother” filed on December 1, 2009.
A civil judgment, order, or decree generally must be final to be appealable as of right. I.A.R. 11(a)(1); Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 866-67, 55 P.3d 304, 320-21 (2002). A final judgment is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties. Camp, 137 Idaho at 867, 55 P.3d at 321; Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 217, 159 P.3d 851, 854 (2007). In order to avoid confusion about what written ruling may constitute a court's final judgment, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) requires that “[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate document.” Thus, a judgment differs from the findings of fact and conclusions of law that must be rendered by a trial court at the conclusion of a court trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(a). In addressing the distinction between an order for summary judgment and a final “appealable judgment,” our Supreme Court recently said, “The judgment must be a separate document that does not contain the trial court's legal reasoning or analysis,” and “merely typing ‘It is so ordered’ at the end of the memorandum decision does not constitute a judgment.” Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (Jan. 28, 2010). The Court added, “Obviously, the judgment that the court is to sign must be a document that is separate from the jury's verdict or the court's decision.” Id. Whether a judgment, order, or decree is appealable is determined by its content and substance, not its title. Camp, 137 Idaho at 867, 55 P.3d at 321; Watson, 144 Idaho at 217, 159 P.3d at 854.
In the present case, the magistrate's November 18, 2009, decision clearly was not a final judgment set forth on a “separate document.” It was, instead, a twenty-seven-page expression of the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law and an announcement of the court's decision to grant the Department's petition. Despite its title, this “Order Terminating Parental Rights of [Doe]” did not purport to be the court's final determination, for the order itself concluded with an instruction that “the Petitioner is directed to prepare an order consistent with this opinion.” A document separate from this expression of the court's findings and conclusions was both specifically contemplated by the court and necessary for compliance with I.R.C.P. 58(b).
The result of the district court's directive to the Department to prepare a final order was the December 1, 2009, document drafted by the Department and presented to the magistrate for signature. It declares the rights of the respective parties with finality3 and constitutes the final judgment from which the time for Doe's appeal began to run. As Doe's appeal was filed within fourteen days of that judgment, her appeal is timely.
We next consider Doe's argument that the magistrate court's findings and its conclusion that Doe's parental rights should be terminated are not supported by the trial evidence.
A parent's interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child is a fundamental liberty interest, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554-55, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 519-20 (1978); State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002). Consequently, a judicial decision to terminate a parent-child relationship must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 345, 144 P.3d 597, 599 (2006); Doe, 137 Idaho at 760, 53 P.3d at 343. On review, this Court will uphold the trial court's findings if they were based on substantial and competent evidence. Id. Substantial and competent evidence is “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” even if the evidence is conflicting. In re Doe, 143 Idaho at 345, 144 P.3d at 599 (quoting Folks v. Moscow School Dist. No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 836, 933 P.2d 642, 645 (1997)); In re Doe, 142 Idaho 594, 597, 130 P.3d 1132, 1135 (2006). The trial court is better positioned...
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