Folks v. Moscow School Dist. No. 281

• Decision Date: 07 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 21484,21484
• Citation: 933 P.2d 642,129 Idaho 833
• Parties: , 116 Ed. Law Rep. 1244 Marsha A. FOLKS, Claimant-Respondent, v. MOSCOW SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 281, Employer-Appellant, and State of Idaho, Department of Employment, Defendant-Respondent. Boise, September 1996 Term
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 642

933 P.2d 642

129 Idaho 833, 116 Ed. Law Rep. 1244

Marsha A. FOLKS, Claimant-Respondent, v. MOSCOW SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 281, Employer-Appellant, and State of Idaho, Department of Employment, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 21484.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Boise, September 1996 Term.

March 7, 1997.

Stoel Rives, LLP, Boise, for claimant-respondent. John E. Rumel argued.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Carol L. Brassey, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for defendant-respondent. Carol L. Brassey argued.

Green Law Offices, Boise, for appellant. Cumer L. Green argued.

TROUT, Chief Justice

This is an appeal from a decision by the Industrial Commission (Commission) granting unemployment benefits to respondent Marsha Folks on the basis that she was discharged, but not for misconduct related to her employment.

I. BACKGROUND

Folks began working for Moscow School District No. 281 (District) in 1976 as the District's orchestra teacher. Alan Lee also taught for the District at that time. Folks alleges that she and Lee frequently used profane language when they spoke with each other and that they had a very informal relationship. Lee was promoted to the position of principal of Moscow Junior High School during the 1988-89 school year. In this capacity, Lee acted as Folks' supervisor.

Lee described his relationship with Folks as "turbulent." Two or three times a year, Folks would confront Lee in his office to discuss her dissatisfaction using a colorful variety of profane terms. Lee did not reprimand Folks for these private displays of profanity. On April 20, 1993, Lee informed Folks that the District planned to cancel the orchestra program for the next school year. This was a program which Folks had overseen for the prior seventeen years and which was very important to her. The following day, as Folks stood in the teachers' lounge, Lee walked by and spoke to her. When Folks did not respond, Lee asked her "if she was not speaking today." Folks then began to yell at Lee, using profane language. Other teachers and student teachers in the teachers' lounge, as well as students in the hallway, were within earshot of the "conversation." Folks refused Lee's request to continue the conversation in his office, slammed the door to the hallway, and continued to yell at him.

On May 20, 1993, the Board of Trustees issued a Notice of Possible Nonrenewal or Discharge to Folks. A hearing before the Board was held on August 3, 1993. Folks was terminated on August 30, 1993. She subsequently applied to the Department of Employment (Department) for unemployment benefits.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 25, 1993, the Department issued an eligibility determination that Folks was not entitled to unemployment benefits because she was discharged for misconduct in connection with her employment. Folks appealed. On December 16, 1993, a Department appeals examiner conducted a hearing at which both Folks and the District presented evidence. On January 7, 1994, the appeals examiner issued a decision affirming the determination that Folks was ineligible for benefits.

The Industrial Commission conducted a de novo review of the record and, on May 23, 1994, issued a Decision and Order reversing the decision of the appeals examiner. It ruled that the District had not met its burden of establishing that Folks was discharged for employment-related misconduct. Therefore, she was eligible for unemployment compensation. The District appealed.

During the pendency of this appeal, the District sought to augment the Commission's record through admission of: (1) a 1980 Recommendation In addition, the Commission denied Folks' request for attorney's fees incurred while defending the District's motion to augment the record. Folks has appealed this decision.

of Discharge for Folks which referred to Folks' use of profanity, and (2) a 1980 Agreement in which Folks agreed to abide by all statutes, regulations, and rules applicable to teachers. The Commission denied both requests in its Order After Remand. It found that the record already included the 1980 Agreement. With respect to the 1980 Recommendation of Discharge, the Commission found that the District had failed to explain adequately its failure to present the Recommendation of Discharge in the earlier proceeding and, further, that the Recommendation would have been irrelevant to the Commission's determination of the issue. The District has appealed the Commission's denial of its motion to augment the record with the Recommendation of Discharge, as well as its determination that Folks was not discharged for employment-related misconduct.

III. EMPLOYMENT-RELATED MISCONDUCT

A. Standard of review

In appeals from the Industrial Commission, this Court is limited to reviewing questions of law. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; Welch v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 127 Idaho 361, 363, 900 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1995) (citing Hart v. Deary High Sch., 126 Idaho 550, 552, 887 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1994)). We will disturb the Commission's findings of fact only where they are not supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; Welch, 127 Idaho at 363, 900 P.2d at 1374 (citing Hart, 126 Idaho at 552, 887 P.2d at 1059); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 278, 787 P.2d 263, 264 (1990) (citing Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267, 270, 707 P.2d 378, 381 (1985)). This Court has defined substantial and competent evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Welch, 127 Idaho at 365, 900 P.2d at 1376 (citing Laundry v. Franciscan Health Care Ctr., 125 Idaho 279, 282, 869 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1994)). Although this Court will set aside the Commission's order if it is not supported by the record, we will not overrule the Commission's findings solely on the ground that we might have reached a different conclusion. Avery v. B & B Rental Toilets, 97 Idaho 611, 613-14, 549 P.2d 270, 272-73 (1976); Welch, 127 Idaho at 363, 900 P.2d at 1374 (citing Spruell, 117 Idaho at 279, 787 P.2d at 265).

The question of whether an employee's behavior constitutes misconduct in connection with employment pursuant to I.C. § 72-1366(e) is a question of fact, and we will uphold the Commission's determination of this issue if supported by substantial and competent evidence. Welch, 127 Idaho at 364, 900 P.2d at 1375 (citing Taylor v. Burley Care Ctr., 121 Idaho 792, 793, 828 P.2d 821, 822 (1991); Goolsby v. Life Savers, Inc., 107 Idaho 456, 459, 690 P.2d 911, 914 (1984)). The Commission in its Decision and Order mistakenly asserted that the issue of whether intentional insubordination amounts to misconduct is a question of law, citing Avery, 97 Idaho at 614, 549 P.2d at 273. This Court, however, has disagreed with this aspect of Avery and held that the question of whether an employee's behavior constitutes misconduct is one of fact. Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, 111 Idaho 470, 472 & n. 1, 725 P.2d 175, 177 & n. 1 (1986). Thus, although the Commission labeled the bulk of its Decision and Order "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW," the Commission actually made findings of fact with regard to whether the District discharged Folks for employment-related misconduct, and we will review these findings as such. The Commission's sole conclusion of law was the determination that, because Folks had not been discharged for misconduct in connection with her employment, she was entitled to unemployment benefits.

B. Framework

I.C. § 72-1366(e) provides that an employee who has been discharged is eligible for unemployment benefits so long as his discharge was not for "misconduct in connection with his employment." Misconduct in

connection with employment is defined as one of the following:

1. A willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest;

2. A deliberate violation of the employer's reasonable rules; or

3. A disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his or her employees.

IDAPA 09.01.30.331.01-.03; Wulff v. Sun Valley Co., 127 Idaho 71, 74, 896 P.2d 979, 982 (1995) (citing Campbell v. Bonneville County Bd. of Comm'rs, 126 Idaho 222, 225, 880 P.2d 252, 255 (1994)); Johns v. S.H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 221 (1957). The burden of proving employment-related misconduct lies with the employer. IDAPA 09.01.30.331.06; Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 419, 614 P.2d 955, 959 (1980).

C. Intentional insubordination

The District argues that Folks' April 21 outburst constituted intentional insubordination amounting to misconduct, which is defined as "a deliberate or wilful refusal by an employee to obey a reasonable order or directive which an employer is authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed." Avery, 97 Idaho at 614, 549 P.2d at 273 (footnote omitted). Although an employer's expectation that an employee will not engage in "protracted argument" with his employer is objectively reasonable, a "single incident of comparatively nonserious disrespect by complaining and arguing is not misconduct." Id. at 614-15, 549 P.2d at 273-74.

Initially, it is important to clarify where "intentional insubordination" fits for the purposes of analyzing misconduct. Our previous intentional insubordination cases do not clearly specify within which of the three categories of misconduct such behavior falls, although this Court appears to have analyzed them under the "disregard of standards of behavior" prong. See, e.g., id. at 614, 549 P.2d at 273 ("Misconduct, which will disqualify a claimant from receiving employment benefits under the Employment Security Act, includes a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employee." (footnote omitted)); Ortiz v. Armour & Co., 100 Idaho 363, 366, 597 P.2d 606, 609 (1979) ("It is the conclusion of this Court that the claimant did violate the standards which his employer had a right to expect of him at this time."). This appears to be the most...