In The Matter Of The Dissolution Of Marriage: Frank A. Segree v. Segree
| Decision Date | 02 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2009-CA-00757-COA,2009-CA-00757-COA |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF THE DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE: FRANK A. SEGREE, III, APPELLANT v. SUSAN B. SEGREE, APPELLEE |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. VICKI R. BARNES
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WARREN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: R. LOUIS FIELD
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: MARK W. PREWITT
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL-DOMESTIC RELATIONS
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DIVORCE GRANTED AND WIFE AWARDED CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILDREN, PERMANENT PERIODIC ALIMONY, EXCLUSIVE USE OF MARITAL HOME, AND CHILD SUPPORT
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART
BEFORE LEE, P.J., BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Frank Segree III and Susan Segree were divorced on September 15, 2008. In the divorce action, Susan was awarded certain personal property, the exclusive use and possession of the marital home, child support, and periodic permanent alimony. Frank appeals, claiming that the chancellor erred in her distribution of the marital assets and heraward of child support and periodic permanent alimony to Susan. We affirm the chancery court's judgment ordering Frank to pay one daughter's medical insurance and expenses and both daughters' credit cards, and we affirm the award of attorney's fees to Susan. However, as the chancellor's award of marital assets was not supported by specific findings of fact, we reverse the chancellor's judgment as it relates to the non-stipulated marital assets, alimony, and child support, and we remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Frank and Susan were married on June 4, 1983, in Franklin County, Florida. The couple moved to Vicksburg, Mississippi, where they lived for approximately sixteen years. Three children were born of the marriage: Robert Segree, who is legally emancipated, and twin daughters, Rebecca and Jacquelyn Segree, whose date of birth is June 6, 1989.1 All three children still live in the marital home.
¶3. The couple had marital issues during their last years of marriage that resulted in both parties filing divorce complaints, which were later withdrawn. Finally, Frank told Susan that he was unhappy in the marriage, and the couple separated on June 12, 2007. Later that same month, Frank began dating another woman, Yolanda Davidson, and he occasionally stayed with Davidson on weekends when he was home from working in Memphis. Susan, who was forty-four years old at the time of the separation, is a high-school graduate, in good health, and works full time for Citi Financial. Frank, who was forty-one years old at the time of separation, has a G.E.D. and is a master pilot employed by the United States Corp of Engineers.
¶4. On July 17, 2007, Susan filed a complaint for divorce on the grounds of adultery and/or habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. A temporary order was entered by the chancery court on November 14, 2007, requiring Frank to pay all debts normally paid by him and $100 per month in child support. On June 16, 2008, Susan filed an amended complaint for divorce, with permission from the chancery court, which included a request for separate maintenance. A hearing on the divorce complaint was held on July 1, 2008.
¶5. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Frank would receive two automobiles-a 2005 Mercury and a 2007 Dodge, a motorcycle, and a boat plus a motor. The parties also stipulated to the value of the marital home, the value of the couple's retirement accounts, and that Susan would receive the household furnishings and lawnmower. The chancery court entered its final judgment on September 15, 2008, granting Susan a divorce on the ground of adultery. Frank was awarded the stipulated items of personal property, along with a travel trailer. Frank was also ordered to continue to pay Rebecca's and Jacquelyn's individual credit-card debt "in the amounts and manner he has previously provided," and to pay $84,200 in outstanding debt on the marital home from his thrift savings plan (TSP). The judgment also awarded Susan: (1) permanent care and custody of her minor children, Rebecca and Jacquelyn, (2) ability to claim both minor children for tax purposes, (3) monthly childsupport of $825 for Rebecca, (4) use and ownership of the cemetery lots, (5) one-half of Frank's retirement account (total value of $138,000), (6) her retirement account (total value of $20,868), (7) sole use and ownership of the marital home (valued at $100,000), (8) one-half of the remainder of Frank's TSP, (9) $500 in monthly permanent periodic alimony (to commence upon cessation of child-support payments), and (10) $4,500 in attorney's fees. Susan also received various personalty such as a late-model sedan and a Kubota tractor.
¶6. Susan and Frank each filed motions for reconsideration. Susan's motion noted issues with federal compliance as it related to Frank's TSP and complained that the court's judgment failed to address medical insurance and payment of medical bills for the minor child or children. Frank's motion argued that the chancery court's division of the marital assets, and awards of child support, alimony, and attorney's fees, were erroneous. On November 24, 2008, the chancery court, on its own motion, amended its judgment and ordered Frank to provide medical insurance and costs for Rebecca, awarded a portable generator to Frank, and awarded Susan ownership of certain tractor tires. On May 1, 2009, the chancellor entered an order overruling Frank's and Susan's motions for reconsideration. Frank timely appeals the denial of his motion.
¶7. We affirm the chancery court's order requiring Frank to pay Rebecca's medical insurance and expenses and both daughters' credit-card debts, and we affirm the award of attorney's fees to Susan. However, we find that the chancellor failed to provide the appropriate Ferguson test in the award of marital assets and reverse the judgment as it pertains to the equitable distribution of marital assets, the award of permanent periodicalimony, and the award of child support for Rebecca and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8. This Court "will not disturb a chancellor's judgment when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied." Benal v. Benal, 22 So. 3d 369, 372 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Chapel v. Chapel, 876 So. 2d 290, 292 (¶8) (Miss. 2004)). If the chancellor's findings are supported by substantial evidence, then we will affirm. Minter v. Minter, 29 So. 3d 840, 850 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted).
¶9. Frank contends that the chancellor's allocation of the marital assets, specifically the award of the marital home, was in error. When determining the equitable distribution of marital assets, a chancery court must review the "well-known factors established by Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994)." Smith v. Smith, 994 So. 2d 882, 885 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). Those factors are:
(1) contribution to the accumulation of property, (2) prior disposition of or distribution of assets, (3) market and emotional value of assets subject to distribution, (4) the value of non-marital assets, (5) taxes and other economic consequences of the proposed distribution, (6) the extent to which property division can eliminate the need for alimony, (7) the needs of the parties, and (8) any other equitable factors.
Smith, 994 So. 2d at 885-86 (¶9). Here, although it does appear that the chancellor's judgment awarded Susan a significantly greater portion of the marital assets, this is not necessarily an abuse of discretion. "[E]quitable distribution does not require equal distribution." Morris v. Morris, 5 So. 3d 476, 492 (¶39) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Bresnahan v. Bresnahan, 818 So. 2d 1113, 1122 (¶11) (Miss. 2002)).
¶10. However, "[t]he failure to consider all applicable Ferguson factors is error and mandates reversal." Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So. 3d 274, 286 (|29) (Miss. 2009). If the chancellor fails to provide "specific findings of fact and conclusions of law" in regard to the Ferguson factors, then the case should be reversed and remanded for such findings of fact. Johnson v. Johnson, 823 So. 2d 1156, 1161 (¶12) (Miss. 2002); see also Heigle v. Heigle, 771 So. 2d 341, 348 (¶21) (Miss. 2000) (); Baker v. Baker, 807 So. 2d 476, 480 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) ().
¶11. In the chancellor's final judgment, there are no findings of fact regarding the distribution of the non-stipulated marital assets. The court merely stated that it had "considered the testimony of witnesses, exhibits, and the law applicable thereto[.]" The chancellor does not even refer to Ferguson and provides no analysis or reasoning for the distribution and awards set forth in the judgment. A chancery court's failure "to specificallyaddress these issues on the record deprives an appellate court of the information necessary to undertake a meaningful review of the chancellor's decision to determine whether an abuse of discretion has occurred that would require reversal." Baker, 807 So. 2d at 479 (¶12) (citing Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 732 So. 2d 876, 881 (¶19) (Miss. 1999)).
¶12. Susan contends that both parties ...
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