In The Matter of The EState of John DAVIS v. O'NEILL

• Decision Date: 19 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2009-CA-01025-SCT.,2009-CA-01025-SCT.
• Citation: 42 So.3d 520
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF John DAVIS, Deceased, Daniel M. Thompson, Deceased, and Louise Thompson, Deceased, Lula Mae Davis, Deceased: Eldon Ladner and Regina Ladner Davenport v. Alberta L. O'NEILL.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

42 So.3d 520

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF John DAVIS, Deceased, Daniel M. Thompson, Deceased, and Louise Thompson, Deceased, Lula Mae Davis, Deceased: Eldon Ladner and Regina Ladner Davenport v. Alberta L. O'NEILL.

No. 2009-CA-01025-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

August 19, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Robin L. Roberts, Hattiesburg, Joel Lavelle Blackledge, attorneys for appellants.

Tadd Parsons, Jack Parsons, Wiggins, attorneys for appellee.

Before WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH and CHANDLER, JJ.

CHANDLER, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. We are asked to determine whether a trial court erred by denying an amended motion for relief from and to set aside an agreed judgment pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Eldon Ladner (Ladner) and his daughter Regina Ladner Davenport (Davenport) entered into a substitute agreed judgment (agreed judgment) signed October 28, 2008, nunc pro tunc to October 14, 2008, and filed in the Chancery Court of Stone County, Mississippi. Ladner and Davenport alleged that they signed the agreed judgment under duress, coercion, and without free will. Ladner and Davenport had served as conservators and/or administrators to the various estates.¹

¶ 2. On or about April 7, 2006, Alberta L. O'Neill (O'Neill) filed a motion to remove Ladner and Davenport as conservators and/or administrators of the Estates. The motion also requested that Ladner and Davenport provide an accounting of assets and reimbursement of funds. On or about September 28, 2006, the Chancery Court of Stone County entered an order requiring a detailed accounting. On April 3, 2008, Ladner and Davenport filed an accounting. Ladner and Davenport claimed that they had given their attorney copies of the Estates' documents such as checks. However, their attorney had closed his law practice, and the documents retrieved from his office were incomplete and in disarray.

¶ 3. A trial began on April 7, 2008, but the trial court continued the proceeding. In the meantime, the agreed judgment had been signed by Ladner and Davenport, providing for payment and execution of certain documents and other obligations, and was entered by the trial court in October 2008. Thereafter, Ladner and Davenport filed an amended motion for relief from and to set aside judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) in January 2009. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Ladner's and Davenport's motion. We find that the trial court did not err by denying the motion to set aside the agreed judgement, as Ladner and Davenport failed to demonstrate that the agreed judgment had been signed under duress, coercion, or without free will. Finding no error, this Court affirms the judgment of the Circuit Court of Stone County.

FACTS

¶ 4. Alberta O'Neill requested the removal of Ladner and Davenport from their positions in regard to various estates. Ladner and Davenport had served as co-administrators for the Estate of Lula Mae Davis, deceased, and as co-administrators for the Estate of John Davis, deceased. Ladner had served as the conservator of the Estates of Daniel M. Thompson and Louise Thompson, deceased, and as the administrator of the Estate of Daniel M. Thompson.

¶ 5. In September 2006, the chancery court entered an order requiring an accounting for the Estates. A trial began on April 7, 2008; however, the matter was held over and continued to a later date. Prior to the new court date, Ladner and Davenport signed an agreed order which was approved by the chancery court and entered in October 2008. Thereafter, on January 30, 2009, Ladner and Davenport filed an amended motion for relief and to set aside the agreed order pursuant to Rule 60(b).

¶ 6. In their motion, Ladner and Davenport alleged that they were "coerced, under threats of criminal action by the Plaintiffs and other forms of duress, into executing an Agreed Judgment." Because the agreed judgment allegedly had been obtained by duress and coercion and was not the result of "the willful act" of Ladner or Davenport, they requested that the judgment be set aside. In support of their motion, Ladner and Davenport attached affidavits stating that their counsel and the Plaintiffs had threatened criminal action and coerced them into executing the agreed judgment, even though they had engaged in no criminal activity.

¶ 7. On February 2, 2009, the chancery court conducted a hearing. At the hearing, both Ladner and Davenport testified concerning the events leading to their signing the agreed order.

¶ 8. Davenport testified that she had served as co-conservator of the Davis Estates. She did not serve in any capacity for the Estates of Daniel M. Thompson or Louise Thompson. Ladner was a co-conservator with Davenport of the Davis Estates, and he was the conservator to the Thompson Estates. When asked at what point she felt threatened or felt some threat of criminal charges being brought against her, Davenport stated that it was "through the attorney representing my father and myself." Davenport stated that she and her father had received a copy of the agreed judgment in the mail three or four weeks prior to meeting with their attorney at his office. When they went to their attorney's office, the attorney told Ladner and Davenport that the judgment "was the best thing that we could do."

¶ 9. Davenport felt that she had to sign the document. She stated that her attorney "had made several comments about an attorney general and an opinion by the attorney general, and we didn't want to go there, and that it would be best if we go ahead and resolve the issue .... he brought up attorney general several times." In discussions with her attorney and Ladner, Davenport stated that she understood the consequences of not signing the document to be "possible criminal actions, possible forfeiture of my ability to be able to teach in the community college system or the university system, and that any political aspirations I may have would be terminated." Davenport signed the agreed judgment at their attorney's office.

¶ 10. Davenport's and Ladner's attorney made an "X" on the document and told Ladner that he needed to sign the document. Davenport described her attorney as normally having a calm demeanor; however, he was upset that day, evidence by his raising his voice several times. She also stated that she did not consent to the entry of the judgment.

¶ 11. On cross-examination, Davenport admitted that she had had two to three weeks to consider signing the agreed judgment. While she agreed that she had fixed her signature to the document of her own free choice, Davenport denied that she had any free will or that she willingly had signed the agreed judgment. Davenport stated that she had lacked free will because she had the strong understanding that criminal proceedings might be forthcoming. Notwithstanding her perception, Davenport admitted that she had not done anything wrong to garner prosecution.

¶ 12. Ladner testified that he had agreed to the judgment. When questioned further, Ladner stated that he had "consented for my daughter to sign it." Ladner stated that he had felt that he had to sign the agreement, because of his attorney's statement that "it was in our interest to sign this, and if we didn't do so, that [Davenport] could lose her job, be sent to jail, and several other things."

¶ 13. On cross-examination, Ladner testified that he did not sign the agreed judgment at his attorney's office. Rather, Ladner signed the agreed judgment at his house sometime later. When questioned, Ladner could not recall the specific date that he had signed the agreed judgment. Nonetheless, on the day that Ladner signed the agreed judgment, his attorney was not present, and Ladner stated that no one had threatened him that day. Davenport was the only person present when Ladner signed the agreed judgment. When asked whether he had signed the agreement of his own free will, Ladner stated "Yes, sir, I did, on behalf of my daughter." Ladner also stated that he knew the contents of the agreed judgment when he signed it.

¶ 14. Following arguments and testimony on the matter, the chancellor denied Ladner's and Davenport's motion for relief from and to set aside judgment. At the hearing the chancellor stated:

All right. This is basically an issue of credibility at this point. And I just do not find that the testimony that's been given to me today rises to the level of anything that I think would constitute sufficient coercion or improper conduct to set aside the judgment that was agreed to. So the motion's denied.

The chancellor followed the on-the-record ruling with a written judgment.

DISCUSSION

¶ 15. An abuse of discretion is the standard of review applied by appellate courts when reviewing a chancellor's decision. Corporate Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene County, 23 So.3d 454, 459 (Miss.2009); Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So.2d 266, 269 (Miss.2003). We do not disturb a chancellor's factual findings "when supported by substantial evidence unless ... the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or applied an erroneous legal standard." Greene County, 23 So.3d at 459 (quoting Biglane v. Under The Hill Corp., 949 So.2d 9, 13-14 (Miss. 2007)). On questions of law, appellate courts use a de novo standard of review. Id.

¶ 16. Rule 60 states:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(2) accident or mistake;

(3) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer...