In the Matter of Moore
| Decision Date | 30 June 1869 |
| Citation | 63 N.C. 397 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the matter of B. F. MOORE, Esq., THOMAS BRAGG, Esq., E. G. HAYWOOD, Esq., and others. |
A court has power to require members of its Bar to purge themselves from a charge of contempt incurred by their publishing, over their names, in a newspaper, libellous matter, directly tending to impair the respect due to its members.
For such persons, under such circumstances, to state that the Judges of the Supreme Court singly or en masse, moved from that becoming propriety, so indispensable to secure the respect of the people, and throwing aside the ermine, rushed into the mad contest of politics, under the excilement of drums and flags, if admitted to be untrue, is libellous; and, especially when connected with an inference expressly and immediately drawn in the same paper that such judges will yield to every temptation to serve their fellow partizans and are unfit to hold the balance of justice, directly tends to impair the respect due to the members of such court.
In a rule to show cause why a person shall not be punished for contempt, the actual intention of the respondent is material, in which respect it differs from an indictment for the like offence; therefore, where the respondent meets the words of the rule by disavowing upon oath any intention of committing a contempt of the Court, or of impairing the respect due to its authority, the rule must be discharged.
Where a party is excused, not acquitted, under a rule, &c., he will be required to pay the costs of such rule.
PROCEEDINGS for Contempt of Court.
Upon Monday the 19th day of April 1869, the following article appeared in the columns of the Daily Sentinel, a newspaper published in Raleigh:
“A SOLEMN PROTEST OF THE BAR OF NORTH CAROLINA AGAINST JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS.
The undersigned, present or former members of the bar of North Carolina, have witnessed the late public demonstrations of political partizanship, by the Judges of the Supreme Court of the State, with profound regret and unfeigned alarm for the purity of the future administration of the laws of the land.
Active and open participation in the strife of political contests by any Judge of the State, so far as we recollect, or tradition or history has informed us, was unknown to the people until the late exhibitions. To say that these were wholly unexpected, and that a prediction of them, by the wisest among us would have been spurned as incredible, would not express half of our astonishment, or the painful shock suffered by our feelings when we saw the humiliating fact accomplished.
Not only did we not anticipate it, but we thought it was impossible to be done in our day. Many of us have passed through political times almost as excited as those of to-day; and most of us, recently, through one more excited; but, never before have we seen the Judges of the Supreme Court, singly or en masse, moved from that becoming propriety so indispensable to secure the respect of the people, and, throwing aside the ermine, rush into the mad contest of politics under the excitement of drums and flags. From the unerring lessons of the past we are assured, that a Judge who openly and publicly displays his political party zeal, renders himself unfit to hold the “balance of justice,” and that whenever an occasion may offer to serve his fellow-partizans, he will yield to the temptation, and the “wavering balance” will shake.
It is a natural weakness in man, that he, who warmly and publicly identifies himself with a political party, will be tempted to uphold the party which upholds him, and all experience teaches us that a partizan Judge cannot be safely trusted to settle the great principles of a political constitution, while he reads and studies the book of its laws under the banners of a party.
Unwilling that our silence should be construed into an indifference to the humiliating spectacle now passing around us; influenced solely by a spirit of love and veneration for the past purity, which has distinguished the administration of the law in our State, and animated by the hope that the voice of the bar of North Carolina will not be powerless to avert the pernicious example, which we have denounced, and to repress its contagious influence, we have under a sense of solemn duty subscribed and published this paper:
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In re Parker
...his usual clearness, draws the line of demarcation there between cases where intention or motive is involved and when it is not); In re Moore, 63 N.C. 397 (attorney's cases, where intent was the gravamen). Other notable cases are Ex parte Biggs, 64 N.C. 217; In re Robinson, 117 N.C. 533, 23......
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In Re Parker.
...his usual clearness, draws the line of demarcation there between cases where intention or motive is involved and when it is not); In re Moore, 63 N. C. 397 (attorney's disbarment cases, where intent was the gravamen). Other notable cases are Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C. 217; In re Robinson, 117......